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A Psychometric study of Unipolar and Bipolar Affective Disorders
This study first looks into the development of paychistrio
and psychological oonoepts of affective illness. After an over¬
view of the historical background, the debates about classifica¬
tion in affective illness are examined and it is concluded that
a classification in terms of bipolar (manic-depressive) and
unipolar (recurrent depressive) types seems valid, specially from
the genetic viewpoint, and needs further definition.
The psychological literature in the field of affective dis¬
orders is surveyed and found not to be extensive particularly
with regard to mania, and to have produced, on the whole, contra¬
dictory results because of the uncertainty of nosological systems.
This study alias to describe and define homogeneous groups
of affective disordered patients in terms of bipolar and unipolar
illness, by objective psychological methods.
Patients from both poles of bipolar affeotive illness are
studied, i.e. manic and depressed :ianio depressives and also
depressed unipolar patients. In addition, patients having
recovered from each of these 3 illnesses are also studied. Thus,
six groups are examined in a oros3-sactional design, under strict
clinical criteria. There are 18 subjects in each group, except
for the depressed bipolars of whoa there are 17.
ii
The parameters on which the Groups are compared ares alata
and symptoms of illness (individual symptoms, a-priori scales of
different psychiatric syndromes, a scale of personal disturbance),
4 measures of personality trnlt.* and attitudes (anxiety, extre¬
version, intropunitiveneas, extrapunitivene3s), 4 measures of
thought pro coos (intensity and consistency of thought, number of
normal and abnormal responses on an object-sorting test), 3
measures of ,.s./sUo~aotor a.jggd (speed of maze tracing, speed of
maze tracing with an •internal* distraction, speed of maze
treeing with an ♦external* distraction), and 3 measures of mental
speed (speed of problem solving at preferred speed of work, speed
of problem solving with stress, gain in speed of problem solving
with stress).
The particular alas are to find out: how mania differs from
bipolar and unipolar depression? how the two types of depression
differ, if at all; how the recovered groups differ, that is, are
there •premorbid* differences in people who develop bipolar or
unipolar affective illnesses; and finally, what is the effeot
of illness in each group.
The /general hypotheses tea ted are:
1* Manias will differ from bipolar and unipolar depresaives on
several parameters: 3igns and symptoms of illness, personality
traits and attitudes and cognitive factors.
2. Bipolar depreasives will differ from unipolar depresaives,
but the differences will not be as pronounced as those between
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amnios on the ona hand and the two depressive groups on the other.
3# Patients having recovered from a bipolar affective illness
will differ from patients having recovered from a unipolar
affective illness, mainly in personality characteristics.
4. The effects of illness will be marked in e&oh illness group,
affecting both personality and cognitive factors, and will bo
illness specific, that is, each illness will bring about different
changes rather than a general change common to all groups.
These hypotheses are all borne out in the main findings which
are reached at statistically.
The general conclusion is that bipolar and unipolar affective
disorders differ not only in that ona oonsista only of recurrent
depression and the other of recurrent depression and mania, but
also the depressive illnesses of each disorder are different on
several important parameters, and people who develop one or the
other disorder differ in •premorbid* personality traits.
The author la indebted to the many people who assisted
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particular» to Dr. G. A. Poulds for his interest and guidance*
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"And though we must endeavour to render all our principles
as universal as possible* by tracing up our experiments to the
utmost* and explaining ail effeots from the simplest and fewest
causes* it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience?
and any hypothesis* that pretends to discover the ultimate
original qualities of human nature, ought at first to be rejected
as presumptuous and chimerical."
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Zt is often said that to lock at the history of psychiatric
thinking about depression la to look at the development of
payohiatry Itself* This would indicate the importance of
depreaaion in the study of mental illness* It oertainly seems
to aooount for a high proportion of in-patient and out-patient
oases in payohiatrio hospitals* even though since the advent of
effeotive anti-depressant drugs general practitioners now treat
a number of oases* Tor example* the 1970 admission figures
for the whole of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital show that* of
2098 admissions* 963 or 27 per oent had been classified as
depressive or affective illness according to the International
Classification of Diseases codes (1969)* Depression or elation
also accompany several other primary psychiatric conditional
organic psychoses* schisophrenic * puerperal psychoses* eto*
Tat in spite of the long history of psyohiatrio interest
in the affective disorders* this field of mental illness is
still fraught with disagreement and semantic* sociological and
aetiologio&l problems* The very term "affective disorders" is
controversial* D* Hill (1968) points outs "The solution
proposed long ago - to group all illnesses in whioh alteration
of mood is the major symptom under the general heading of
'affective disorders' - whitewashes the problem but in faot
solves nothing*" Some of the alternative terms for* or sub¬
classes of* the affective disorders are: melancholia* manic-
depressive illness* endogenous depression* psychotic depression*
reaotive depression* exogenous depression* neurotic depression*
mania* hypomanla* bipolar and unipolar recurrent depressive
psychosis and involutional melancholia* Anxiety states are
also usually included under the rubric of affective disorders*
All these texms have* in turn* been used for classifiestory
purposes at different levels of dlsoourse* descriptive or aetio-
logioal: sometimes these two levels have become irretrievably
mixed in the oourse of discussion*
The importance of classification and the order of priority
in the field of psyohiatry is well indicated by Cattail's dictum
(1940) that "nosology necessarily precedes aetiology"* Sysenok
(I960) also points out: "Before we can reasonably be asked to
look for the oause of a particular dysfUnotion or disorder* we
must have isolated* however crudely* the dysfunction or disorder
in question and we must be able to recognise it and differentiate
it from other syndromes*" The confusion is further aggravated
in the field of the affeotive disorders by "the multiple use
of the term 'depression* to desoribe a mood* a symptom* a
syndrome* and a specific disease entity" (Mendels* 1968)* Sains
and Bigelow (1961) state that the term 'depression' is beooming
more and more nebulous despite its illusory clarity and simplicity"*
This study looks into the historical background of the
oonoept of affeotive disorders, indicating how the modern contro¬
versies have arisen* The more recent literature in the field
oan be divided into two main partes The polemics about classi¬
fication, where very often the emotions of the writers have had
the better of their logical thinking, and the aetiologioal
studies whioh, in turn, have suffered from the shakiness of the
underlying classification*
Beoent studies, particularly those of Leonhard (1959)t
Ferris (1966), and Winokur et al. (1969), have appeared to show
that it is legitmate to distinguish between two types of affeotive
disorder: recurrent or unipolar depression, and manic-depressive
or bipolar illness* Many studies have often included both
types in one broad group of payohotie or aanio-depressive illness,
in the Kraepelinian tradition* If it is true that these two
groups are different, it would be most important in future bio¬
chemical or other aetiologioal research to study them separately*
This study sets out to oonsider these two broad groups of
affective illness, during illness and after recovery, to see
whether they differ on various psychological parameters* The
literature is sadly lacking in descriptive studies of well-
defined homogeneous groups of this kind* Clinical psychologists
seem to have devoted their energy mostly to the study of
schizophrenia or brain-damage and to have disregarded the
affeotive disorders* Mania has been especially disregarded
la the past* In the introduction to ths 1968 H.M.P.A. Symposium
" ascent Developments in AffsotiTS Disorders" 9 A* Coppen writes*
"Although this symposium is devoted to the affective disorders*
It is clear that most work has been carried out on depression
and that aania is a relatively neglected field* Shis is undoubt¬
edly due to the relative rarity of mania and the difficulties
of studying patients with this condition*"
In view of its special interest in affective disorders*
the MEC Brain Metabolism Unit in Edinburgh has provided a unique
opportunity to study both depressed and aanio patients and has




Man has probably always known depression* The biblloal
story of King Saul (ca* 1033 B.C.) presents a quite detailed
clinical aooount of what appears to be recurrent depression*
with homicidal attempts and finally suicide (Whitwell, 1936)*
The term "melancholia" , meaning black bile* was introduced
by Hippocrates and the School of Cos (ca* 460*367 B.C.)*
Hippocrates classified mental illness into: epilepsy, mania,
melanoholia and paranoia* His views were in the main physio¬
logical* a super-abundance of black bile causes melancholia;
on the other hand, a state of exaltation is due to the predominance
of warmth and dampness in the brain* He considered that seasonal
climatic conditions are of some importance: mania and melanoholia
are diseases of Spring. Though these same Hippooratio terms
are still used, they covered far more diverse conditions than
are understood by them today.
Plato (427-347 B.C.) partly followed the view of morbid
humours as being the cause of madness, but deviated from the
empirical attitude of Hippocrates and turned to the inspired
views of the past* the soul consists of two parts, the rational
and the irrational. The rational soul presides over the others,
its seat is in the brain, it is immortal and divine. The
irrational soul may become ill,i*e. it may sever its ephemeral
union with the rational soul* Man under these circumstances
becomes mad. He proposed three kinds of madness: melancholia,
mania and dementia* (Michla, 1843)•
Aristotle (384-322 B* C*) ascribed to the heart the role
which Plato ascribed to the brain* He maintained that it was
not the black bile, as Hippocrates had proposed, which in itself
oarried the cause of mental disease, but warmth or cold* The
black bile is merely a carrier of heat and cold* If it is
moderately cold it produces vertigo, apprehensiveness, or a
state of being stunned (melancholia?), if it is warm, gaiety
and carefree joy appear (hypomania?)• Very cold bile makes man
cowardly and stupid, very hot bile generates sexual desires,
cleverness, loquacity and suicidal impulses* However, Aristotle
could not leave the brain entirely out of his psycho-physiological
system and assigned to it a special but passive role: "To him
the braint an excremental and almost inorganic part of the body,
devoid of blood, warmth and sensibility* in its position at the
top of the body, presided over only one function - that of
condensing, by means of its cold consistency, the vapours which
arise from the heart*" (Mioh^a, op^-eit,}.
At the time of Aristotle, Greece had passed its peak and
had started its decline, and the seat of learning moved to
Alexandria and Bgypt and then to Home* Nothing original was
contributed to mental science, however, until the appearance of
Asclepiades towards the middle of the first century B.C. He
was ths first to divide diseases into acute and ohronio and to
differentiate delusions from hallucinations. The next important
oontribution to the specific field of the affective disorders*
however* came from Aretaeus of Oappadooia (oa. 30-90 A.3.). Be
was inolined to consider mania and melancholia as expressions
of one illness* thus adumbrating the future oonoept of aanlo-
depressive illness. Aretaeus was the first* or at any rats
the first known* to become interested as we ore today in the
personalities of the people who later developed severe mental
diseases* the so-called pre-paychotlo personalties* In doing
this* Aretaeus characteristic 12y abandoned the huaoralistio
terminology (* Phlegmatic' * * choleric temperaments) and limited
himself to clear description. Persons who are subject to furor
or mania* says Aretaeus* are ' naturally irritable* violent*
easily given to Joy* have a facile spirit for pleasantry or
childish things" • * Those who are prone to be of depressive
proclivities are apt to develop melanoholia." (Trilat* 1839).
This is the first hint that oertaln mental diseases are but a
psychological extension of the so-called normal personality
traits of the individual.
Aretaeus also pointed out that melanoholia "does not affeot
the intellectual abilities" (Trelat, op.oit.)* thus foreshadowing
what the French later called "faM* ralappaaffiW. The aelan-
chollo patients* he continues* are "restless* sad* dismayed*
sleepless" : " They are seised with terror if the affeotlon makes
progress" i " They become thin by their agitation and loss of
refreshing sleep"s "At a more advanced stage they complain of
a thousand futilities and they desire death"• This is a
fairly accurate olinioal picture of even a present-day " melan¬
cholic" . later writers« suoh as Soranus and his pupil Caelius
Aurelianus* did not have muoh to say about aelanoholia or mania
but devoted much time to therapeutios* oriticiaing the practices
of the day and bringing in "a humanitarian tone of practical
justice, sensitive comparison and psychological sobriety"
(Zilboor.g at al. 19411 p80) rare among the praotitioners of these
days.
The end of this period takes us to Galen (130-200)* seven
centuries after Hippoorates. His was an eoleotio system* a
kind of summary as well as epilogue to the classic Greoo-Homan
period in medioine. He accepted the Bippooratio theories but
often failed to apply them. He spoke of the febrile delirium
as caused by yellow bile and also considered yellow bile res¬
ponsible for the irritability and outbursts of anger seen in
mania. Galen thought of a melancholic humour (suoous melan-
ohollous) as a waste produot of the liver and spleen. The
brain is affected by " conaensus" or sympathy. The melancholic
is sad beoause his sensual soul (one of the three souls) is
affected and he is thereby deprived of love and joy* the two
chief characteristics of the sensual soul* the seat of which is
the heart.
After Galen the medical world suffered the great decline
of the Dark Ages* The decline of the claesloal worldt the
influence of the Orient and the advent of the Christian Church
did not help* The whole field of mental diseases was torn away
from medicine and became the provinoe of magic and the Church*
Interestingly* Szasz (1961) attacks as a "demonology the medical
model in relation to mental illness* whereas in fact demonology
throve when the study of mental illness became non-medical.
Psychiatry really became a study of the ways and means of the
devil and his cohorts* Ixoroism was the treatment method*
Demonology* with its stress on " stigmata diaboli* incubi and
suecubi" * lycanthropy and witchcraft* became the order of the
day. By the middle of the 15th century the darkest ages of
psychiatry set in - on the very eve of the Renaissance* The
most authoritative and most horrific document of that age was
the "Malleus Malefioarmtf' - "The Witches Hammer* (1487-1489) -
by two Dominican monks* Sprenger and Kraemer. This became the
textbook of the Inquisition* The psychopathological theory
adopted by the " Malleus" does not fully discard the remnants of
the Galenic tradition* but its authors are careful to avoid any
undue emphasis on medioal authority* for "no wltohcraft can be
removed by any natural power* although it may be assuaged"
(English edition).
II. The 16th and 17th Centuries:
By the 16th century there is a gradual revival of empirical
medioine in the study of insanity* of interest in the individual
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and in humanism. For the first time the word " psyoholigia" is
used. In 1590 Rudolf Goeckel published his "Psycholigia - Hoc
est de Hominis Perfectlone" - "Psychology or the improvement of
man" • Reactions against the demonology of the time and a recog¬
nition of natural causes in mental illness are associated with
the names of Vives (1492-1540), Paracelsus (1493-1541), Cornelius
Agrippa (1486-1535) and especially Weyer (1515-1588). Although
nothing new was added to the knowledge of the affective disorders,
and the majority of writers were content to repeat what Galen
had said, we find very clear descriptions and clinical illustra¬
tions which form the basis of a new psycho-pathology. Weyer,
for example, writes: "I have seen a man who stubbornly refused
to eat and drink, thinking he was condemned. There are people
who are so miserably tormented by little scruples of conscience
that they look for five legs in a ram when a ram has but four,
they imagine mistakes where there are none and, uncertain of the
divine clemency, they weep day and night thinking themselves
damned." (Weyer, 1579).
Throughout the first quarter of the 17th century demono-
logical literature continued to appear, while the physicians
quietly continued to observe mental disease. Felix Plater
(1558-1614), the Basle professor, attempted to build up an
empirical psyohiatry by classifying the diseases according to
their nature and setting up empirically recognised varieties.
Of his four divisions of insanity, the third, "mentis alienatio"
11
includes melancholy and hypochondriasis among the subdivisions*
He was unable to deny the devil or Galens he used purgative
measures freely# and spoke of the dryness of the brain as a
cause of mental diseases* Hiverius of Montpellier (1589-1635)
wrote about a proximate cause of melancholia* a poison generated
in the body* which can be taken up and best developed in the
atrabiliar constitution. Waldsohmidt (1644-1687)* of the
chemical sohool* thought melancholia arose from abnormal fermen-
tation in the organism*
Despite this continuation of Galenism* the medical man of
the 17th century did make a positive contribution* To him goes
the credit for exploring the human body in search of the cause
of mental disease* The age-long persistence in seeking for a
" seat" of the soul and of mental disease was particularly
accentuated in the 17th century* This was because the study
of pathological anatomy soon convinced physicians that diseases
are produced by diseased organs* Also* the reoapture of the
Hippooratio view that the seat of madness is inthe brain led to
a most enthusiastic and oareful study of the brain*
Thomas Willis* whose "Opera Qp»pia" was published in 1681*
was the most influential and important representative of this
new branch of medicine* In his "Opera Omnia" he has chapters
on melancholia and mania* but his excellent technique of
disseotion and powers of observation were far ahead of his
psychological acumen* He would rather beat a mentally sick
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man* or consider him possessed by the devil, than attempt
through compassion to gain sympathetic understanding* How¬
ever* he observed that mania and melancholia may merge* and
suggested that alternations of excited and depressed states may
be different forms of the same mental disease - a fact first
pointed out by Aretaeus sixteen centuries before* Blood¬
letting was still a popular therapeutic technique and later on
blood transfusion began to be advocated specifically by Moritz
Hoffman (1662) who suggested it as a cure for melancholia and
later by Denis (1667) and Sir George Bnt (1667) who tried to
introduce it in the treatment of mental diseases in England*
In Germany* Klein recommended blood transfusion* as did Etts&ller
in his "Ohlrurgia Transfusoria" in 1682, particularly in cases
of melanoholia* The change of mood produced by the transfusion
they explained easily: just as* according to Aristotle* an old
man needs only the eyfe of a young man in order to look like a
young man, so too will the blood of a young man make an old
person keen and bright* Thus was Harvey's great discovery mis¬
used by those who purported to treat mental illness*
As mental disease was taken over by practical medicine and
treated in a mechanistic* organistio way* so psychology lost
favour with medicine* and was delivered into the hands of the
purely speculative thinker* It was Francis Bacon, Descartes*
Eobbes, Locke* Malebranohe and Spinoza who carried the burden of
wondering about the way invhich the mind* volition and emotions
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work and make man act* Apart from John Locke, none of these
men was a physician, and they had little to offer to the under¬
standing of mental illness* She century came to a close with
a reaction again3t the mechanistic theories and practices which
it established in the person of G* 3* Stahl (1660-1734)* He
felt repelled by the increasing oleavage between body and mind»
and considered that this dichotomy was unjustified and did harm
to the understanding of disease in general and of mental disease
in particular* Stahl, therefore» was a great pioneer in medicine
in that he put squarely before the dootor the task of forming a
synthesis of physical and mental phenomena, of the organic and
the psychological* He pointed out the effect of the psychic
on the organic due to the "anlma sensitive", or the life-force
- a concept akin to Bergson's "elan vital" * Stahl's views are
based on the conception of "motua tonico-vitalis" whioh is res¬
ponsible for all motions, i*e* functions of a living organism*
Mental diseases occur when the soul is impeded in its free
function* This impediment or inhibition is frequently due to
a mood, or an idea, which is foreign or contrary to the life
force (G* 3* Stahl, 1708)* It is not appropriate to discuss
his views further here, except to point out that his influenoe
was carried into the eighteenth century by zilckert (1737-78),
Unzer (1727-99) and specially by the Montpellier school where
Boissiers de Sauvages (1706-67) and Pinel (1745-1826) taught*
J&ckort described patients with strong "imaginations^ in whom
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all other feelings and senses are suppressed, thinking only of
the subject which makes the imagination so lively: if this
state be oonjoined with lasting sadness, that is melancholia
(Zuckert, 1764)*
III- The Century of 3nli«htenmeat»
The 18th century, the century of enlightenment and ration*
alisa, was the age of the great sensualist and materialist
philosophers such as Berkeley (1685*1753), David Hume (1711*1776),
Hartley (1705*1757), Condillao (1714-1780) and Diderot (1713-1784),
but was also the age of neurology, of nosological systems and
of hospital reform. The discussion of the relationship between
body and mind and the philosophical speculations on the nature
of the mind began to lead to the concept of functional as opposed
to organio diseases, but Hippocratic and Galenic influences may
still be seen in the classifications* For example, F. Hoffman
(1660-1713) considered the proximate cause of melancholia to
consist in a rush of thick blood to the brain, its stagnation
there and impeded return (F« Hoffman, 1740)* Hermann Boerhaave
(1668-1738) defined melancholy in almost the same way as had
Hippocrates: "Physicians oall that disease a Melancholy in which
the patient is long and obstinately delirious without a fever,
and always intent upon one and the same thought." He adds:
"If Melancholy increases so far, that from the great motion of
the Liquid of the Brain, the patient be thrown in a wild fury,
it is oalled madness." He observed that melancholia and mania
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might he different phases of the same illness (Boerhaave, 1728).
George Cheyne published a hook in London in 1733 entitledt
" The Bnglish Malady: or a treatise of nervous diseases of all
kinds: as spleent vapours, heaviness of spirits, hypochondriacal
and hysterical distempers."
Benjamin Fawcett, in his "Observations on the nature, causes
and cure of melancholy, especially of that which is commonly
known as religious melancholy" (1780), considered religious
melancholy to he a sub-division of general melancholy and believed
it to be as much a physical disease as other mental diseases.
Anne Charles Lorry (1726-1783) found it necessary to differ¬
entiate a "Melancholia Nervosa" from a "Melancholia Humoralis" ♦
J. Haslam (1764-1844) remarked that states of excitement and
depression alternate in thesame individual and that if these
states continue to alternate the ultimate outcome is grave.
This method of viewing a mental disease from the standpoint of
its prognosis was destined to become an important aspect of
psychiatry towards the end of the nineteenth century.
Francois Boissier de Sauvages (1706-1767), one of the
leading nosographers of the day, in his "Nosologie Methodiaue" ,
divided insanity into three groups. The first is "morbi deliri" ,
and includes mania and melancholia. Their oause is a material
one, located in the brain, the sense organs or the arrangement
of the nerve fibres. Melancholia is a chronic, afebrile,
brooding delirium fixed on a small number of objects.
- 16
Linnaeus, in the 17th century, had divided mental disorders
on formal grounds into ideal, imaginary and pathetic types,
melancholia being a disorder of the pathetic. Several writers
followed such formal systems, especially the philosophical
writers. Immanuel Kant, for example, in his "Anthropologic"
(1798), considered man to possess the powers of perception,
understanding and feeling; consequently he might become mentally
ill when something went wrong with one of these powers or any
combination of the three.
Dreyssig (1770-1809) collected all mental disorders into
three forms: mania, melancholia, imbecility. Melancholia is
a partial insanity or a partial failure of judgement and reasoning
capacity, limited to one or a few subjects. It may be true or
false: true melancholia is bound up with a lasting sad mood,
false melanoholia with indifference or cheerfulness; raging
melancholia, as the most severe form, approaches mania. (Pre¬
sumably he was discriminating between what oame later to be
called "simple depression" and "mixed states''.).
Morgagni - (1682-1771)* the Italian pathologist, had reminded
his medical colleagues of Homer*s words: "In saying things
that were probable, he uttered many falsities^', indicating the
world's new respect for facts. In his "De sedibus et oausis
morborunf (1761) he denied any complete distinction between
melancholia and mania. He stated that mania is so akin to melan¬
cholia that these disorders often change from the one into the
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other, and "ao you may often see physicians doubting whether
they should call a patient melancholic or manic, who alternate
between talkative boldness and frightened silence". Lewis
(1934) points out that "this sounds a little like a referenoe
to catatonic excitement, rather than mania".
John Brown (1735-1788), following Haller^ theory of the
excitability of tissues, became the most influential exponent
of the theory of irritability and exhaustion of the nervous
system leading to asthenic states. His " Blementa Medicinae"
(Edinburgh 1780) was widely read not only in Britain, but also
on the continent, and became very influential, directly leading
to such terms as "neurasthenia" (Baird) and "psychasthenia"
(Pierre Janet) in the nineteenth century.
Alexander Crichton, in "An Inquiry into the Nature and
Origin of Mental Derangement' (1798), said that the passions work
on the nerves by means of the blood vessels, and melancholia is
the outcome of vascular activity in the nervous system.
James Sims (1799) considered melancholia to be a condition
where imagination of unpleasant experiences was mixed with
correct recollections, the sufferer arriving from such faulty
premises at formally correct conclusions, thus restating to a
large extent the Lockean point of view.
The psychiatric literature of this period is very prolific.
Several writers in Britain, Prance, Germany and Italy wrote
about nosological systems of mental diseases, conforming to
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the iatraphysical tradition put forward in the seventeenth
century, or to current philosophical ideas. Many more wrote
about hospital management and the new humane approach to mental
patients, this trend being exemplified in the person of
Philippe Pinel (1745-1826). In addition to his most famous
work on hospital reform and reorganisation, Pinel is also the
author of a great nosology based on his experience at the
Bicetre and the Salpetrieres "Traits Medioo-Philosophique sur
l*alienation mentale" (1809). He divides mental illnesses
into: mania, melancholia, dementia and idiooy. He says: "I
have kept the name melancholic delirium for the variety that
was directed exclusively upon one object or particular series
of objects, with dejection, gloom, and more or less tendency
to despair, especially when it goes so far as to become incomp¬
atible with one*s duties in society." He differentiated melan¬
cholia as a habitual temperament from melancholia as a mental
disorder. He spoke of "degenerating" into mania (though his
case history sounds more like a paranoid schizophrenic), and of
melancholia leading to suicide, and illustrated his argument
with case histories.
IV. Systematisation:
The 19th century has been called the "Era of Systems^
(Zilboorg and Henry* 1941). They writes "The growing interest
in the mentally ill, the study of mental illness, the building
of hospitals and clinics, the foundation of psychiatric
- 19
societies and psychiatric periodicals, the publication of many
and voluminous books on medicopsyetiological subjects make the
psychiatry of the nineteenth century a confusing and complex
structure of manifold aspects. It was a century teeming with
activity, controversy and enthusiasm. The outlines of theories
and practices coupled with the hospital reform and administration
which took shape towards the end of the eighteenth century
released an impetus long overdue, and in the course of the
nineteenth century psychiatry became not only a separate branoh
of medicine but a potent force in the cultural development of
Europe and the United States." (p.'379)«
With specific relation to melancholia and mania, or the
affective disorders, the most influential names are Esquirol,
Janet, Falret, Griesinger, Baillarger, Hooh, Kahlbaum, and the
greatest of them all, Kraepelin, who heralded this present oentury.
J. E. D. Esquirol (1772-1840), the pupil of Pinel, wrote
about four varieties of mental disorder: Mania, monomania or
fixed delusion, dementia and idiocy. He differentiated certain
depressive states from the other psychoses and called them
" lypemaniasf1, a forerunner of the modern concept of the depression#.
By Esquirol*s time, the term t!melancholia" was full of confusions
and Ssquirol helped to return it to its former clarity. Of
lypemania, Esquirol wrote: "We believe that this is a good
definition: melancholia with delirium, or lypemania is a
chronic afebrile cerebral malady, with partial delirium, kept
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up by a sad, debilitating or oppressive emotion.0 As to the
relation to mania, he wrote: "Xypemania sometimes passes into
mania; it is doubtless this change that has caused melancholia
and mania to be confused.0 (Bsquirol, I838).
Bsquirol surpassed his predecessors in the aocuracy and
completeness of his descriptions and became very influential.
Pri chard dedicated his "Treatise on Insanity4' (1835) to
Esquirol: "The most distinguished writer of his age on the
subjects which I have endeavoured to investigate". Pritchard,
famous for his concept of "Moral Insanity" , wrote that "A
considerable proportion amongst the most striking instances of
moral insanity are those in which a tendency to gloom or sorrow
is the predominant feature?'.
G. Burrows (1828), the director of the Clapham Retreat,
concluded that "mania and melancholia have one common physical
origin, and are one and the same disease".
M. Allen (1837) regarded mania and melancholia as "effects
of the same power being overactive in different directions?'.
Thus most writers of the time seem in agreement with Ssquirol
about the relation between melancholia and mania and their
clinical descriptions.
Jean-Pierre Falret (1794-1870), a pupil of Bsquirol, became
interested in those abnormal reactions which are accompanied by
suicidal drives orwhich terminate in suicide. In his study
of such abnormal depressions, he noticed that some of them wear
off by turning into a state of abnormal elation and that some of
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the elations, after running a certain course, turn into profound
depression. It was a sort of closed emotional circle. He
recognised in this cycle a separate type of mental disease and
in 1854 he published "He La Folie Circulaire". This type was
later called by Baillarger (1853#-) " Folie Na Double Forme" , a
concept which was finally established in psychiatry under the
name of manic-depressive psychosis in the last years of the 19th
century by Kraepelin.
Studying the varieties of "folie a double forme" , Baillarger
noticed that certain depressions merge with states of stupor -
an observation of great importance. August Hocha(1860-1919)»
in the United States, described the "benign stupor^' as a form
of manic-depressive psychosis.
By the middle of the century, psychiatry, particularly that
of the French, seems to have abandoned its official dependence
on Hartley, Hume, Berkeley, Condillac and Locke. The hospital
and the clinic established themselves as the only reliable
source and as the natural laboratory of human psychology. The
trend away from psychology towards physical and physiological
causes is seen in Morel (1809-1873) with his insistence on
hereditary causes. Degeneration was the basis of his psychiatry.
Magnan (1835-1916) followed the same trend and, at a session
of the Sooi^te Medioo-psyohologiaue in 1886, remarked: "All
the numerous conditions which are confused with consciousness
under the name of insanity - folie rai3onnante. mania without
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delirium, pseudo-mania, etc., - are merely psychological stigmata
of hereditary insanity."
With few exceptions, Ehgland occupied itself very little
with the investigation of the nature of mental illness, or with
the medico-psychological theories. The foundation of the York
Retreat by William Tuke in 1792 opened an era of hospital reform,
legislative reform and organisation to which most of the 19th
century was devoted. Those who were interested in clinical
investigations followed the tradition established by Thomas Willis
and John llaslam and concentrated on the study of the brain and
the blood vessels which fed it. The outstanding names of the
time are* . Prichard, whose notion of "moral insanity" was
mentioned earlier on; David Skae (1814-1873), from "Edinburgh,
who propounded a scheme of classification, with aetiological
bias, containing twenty-five separate diseases; and H. Maudsley
(1835-1918) who brought together all the theories of the past
which in his day had become crystallised almost as postulates.
Anaemia, toxic states of the blood, other circulatory defects,
infectious poison ; all were considered causative agents of
mental illness. The only psychological causes which Maudsley
was willing to recognise were overwork or over-exertion of some
of our functions, which seems more of a physiological than a
psychological point of view. Maudsley's classification follows
the traditional division into the disturbances of emotions
(depressions): affective or pathetic insanity, and disturbances
- 23 -
of imagination. In one place he describes the alternation of
hypomania and mild depressions as an example of moral insanity,
elsewhere he alludes to Falret*s " folie ciroulaire" as the
succession of true mania upon true melancholia.
In Germany, systematisation was the order of the day. By
the middle of the century, German psychiatry asserted the supremacy
of the brain over any other structure and proceeded systematically
to produce a psychiatry without a psychology. The outstanding
leader in this process was Y/ilhelm Griesinger (1817-1868). He
insisted on the genetic viewpoint, by whioh he meant the under¬
standing of the anatomical and physiological origin of our
psychological attributes. He was strictly descriptive and
seemed to abandon completely the idea that in mental diseases
we deal really with a veriety of diseases. His importance in
the development of scientific psychiatry is cardinal, but this
cannot be fully analysed here. With respect to melancholia,
he accepted the view of two groups of mental disorders: in the
first group are all the recoverable conditions, mania, depression
and delusional insanity. Among the forms of depression are
hyponchondria, simple melancholia, melancholia with stupor,
melancholia with destructive tendencies (suicidal or homicidal),
and melancholia with persistent excitement of the will (folie
raisonnante. moral insanity, psychopathic character). Schizo¬
phrenia in its earlier stages was regarded by him as one of the
affective disorders.
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The need for purely clinical methods of study impressed
itself upon the 19th-century psychiatrist with particular
intensity. There was no other way of bringing order into the
welter of clinical material that was being accumulated. Clinic¬
ians began to appear who, unable to determine a physicalqrcere¬
brospinal, oause for the diseases observed, began to watch the
course of the disease with greater interest. These men were
gifted clinical phenomenologists, among whom the most famous
were K. L. Kahlbaum (I828rl899) and IS. Hecker (1843-1899)•
Having already published a monograph on "catatonia" in 1874,
Kahlbaum wrote on " cyclic insanity" in 1882, describing a
" symptom complex" (a term introduced by Kahlbaum) which follows
a definite course. He introduced the term "cyclothymia" which
is still used today to designate the predisposition to have
definite alternating moods of cheerfulness and mild depression.
Hecker (1898) emphasised the frequency with which anxiety
attacks often occur in " genuine melancholia".
Sail Kraepelin (1855-1926), with whom we can say, as Sir
Aubrey Lewis, "the modem period opens", typifies the concern
of his time with classification based on detailed clinical
observations. In the various editions of his text book of
manic-depressive insanity, we see the influence of his day,
especially that of Falret, Griesinger and Kahlbaum, yet his
work stands out for its clarity, comprehensiveness and percep-
tiveness and has influenced the bulk of the literature on
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manic-depressive illness to -today, sometimes as the definitive
work on the subject. Grinker et al. (1961), in the "Phenomena
of Depressions"t point this out with some regret, though
praising Kraepelin's work. He insisted on the identity of
oausal factors, course and outcome as the oriteria of a mental
disease, abandoned the unitary concept of mental disease,
establishing manic-depressive insanity and dementia praecox
as the dominant sub-divisions.
In the fifth edition of his book in 1896, Kraepelin divides
all mental disease into acquired disorders and those arising
from morbid predisposition. Among the acquired disorders he
describes melancholia as a disease of the involutional period.
Among the disorders arising from a morbid predisposition,
"periodic insanity" is given as one of the constitutional mental
disorders. In "periodic insanity", manic,circular and depressive
forms are described. The independence of melancholia as a
disease of the involutional period was almost at once contested
by Thalbitzer, Dreyfus, Hoche and others. This led Kraepelin
to modify his views and Hoche (1910) points out that by the
eighth edition of his book Kraepelin had relegated "melancholia"
from a disease to a clinical picture - and that it no longer
mattered whether there was mania or melancholia, occurrence once
in life or many times, at regular or irregular intervals,
whether late or early, with predominance of these or those
symptoms - it was still manic-depressive insanity.
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Sonhoeffer (1909) *nd Moebius (1893) described exogenous
types of reactions and divided mental Illness into two large
classes of exogenous and endogenous diseases* which Kraepelin
accepted*
In the eighth edition of his text book (Robertson and
Barclay* 19*1), Kraepelin states: "Manic-depressive insanity
as it is to be described in this section* includes on the one
hand the whole domain of so-called periodic and circular insanity*
on the other hand, simple mania, the greatest part of the morbid
states termed melancholia and also a not inoonaidarable number
of eases of amentia* Lastly we include here certain slight
and slightest colourings of mood, some of them periodic* sane
of them continuously morbid, which on the one hand are to be
regarded as the rudiment of more severe disorders, on the other
hand pass over without sharp boundary into the domain of personal
predisposition* In the course of the years I have become more
and more convinced that all the above-mentioned states only
represent manifestations of a simple morbid process"• He then
goes on to desoribs in detail the following clinical entitles,
under the heading of mania? hypomania, acute mania, delusional
mania, delirious mania; under depressive states: melancholia
simplex, stupor, paranoid melancholia, fantastic melancholia*
delirious melancholia; under mixed states: depressive or
anxious mania, excited depression, mania with poverty of thought,
manic stupor, depression with flight of ideas, inhibited mania,
partial inhibition or exaltation. He then refers to * fundamental
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states" which are: the depressive temperament, the manic
temperament, the irritable temperament, and the cyclothymic
temperament.
He points out later than "under certain circumstances it
may become very difficult to distinguish an attack of manio-
depressive insanity from a psychogenic state of depression"
and "as the slighter depression of manic-depressive insanity,
as far as we are able to make a survey, may wholly resemble the
well-founded moodiness of health, with the essential difference
that they arise without occasion, it will sometimes not be
possible straight away to arrive at a correct inferpretation,
without knowledge of the previous history in cases of the kind
mentioned." (op.cit., p.200) He cautions, however, that even
"genuine circular states of depression may be occasioned by
emotional excitement", but these "patients are comparatively
little affected by the further development of affairs, in
especial not relieved even by a favourable turn of events."
(op.cit., p.200)
Kraepelin's pupil J. Lange (1926) also made a study of
depressive states and tried to save the concept of a pure endo¬
genous melancholia by making more use of the somatic and genetic
criteria of Kretschmer (1925) and placing all depressions pre¬
ceded by any form of psychic trauma in three separate categories:
psychogenic depressions, reactive melancholias, physically
provoked melancholias identical with endogenous melancholias in
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all but pathogenesis. Lange himself, however, was forced to
admit that his four groups were arbitrary and not clearcut.
Thus, as Kendell (1968) points out, the "seeds of future contro¬
versies were sown in part by Kraepelin himself, by accepting the
role of exogenous types of reaction, as described by Bonhoeffer,
and also failing to delimit the boundaries of the manic-
depressive complex".
At this stage, at the turn of the century, a great American
figure must be mentioned, as epitomising a different trend from
the Kraepelinian approach, and as a great influencing factor
in modern British and American psychiatry. Adolph Meyer (1922),
at first working with the Kraepelinian groupings, gradually
developed out of his dynamic-genetic interpretation a concept
of reaction types. To him the total personality reaction in
all its aspects is the only basis for a proper understanding of
the patient. He felt that the term melancholia should be
abandoned as it implied the knowledge of something that we did
not possess and that we should apply the term depression to the
whole class in an unassuming way, with distinctions made according
to aetiology, the symptom complex, the course of the disease
and the outcome. His psycho-bi&ogy prepared the way for the
introduction of psychological and psycho-analytic concepts.
V. Conclusion:
This historical survey has indicated the slow clarification
over the ages of the concepts of depression and mania as mental
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disordersi and how some of the most famous names in the history
of psychiatry have been associated with the study of these
illnesses.
However, it is clear that the terms "melancholia" and "mania"
were not always used in their present-day meaning. The great
French and German nosologists of the 19th century, culminating
in Kraepelin, helped finally in identifying and d©marking the
concept. This, as has already been noted, was to lead to a
great deal of controversy about sub-classifications and aetio-
logical factors. Already certain differentiating dichotomies
were being used, such as endogenous/exogenous, manic-depressive
psychosis/involutional melancholia, reactive melancholia/
endogenous melancholia.
The next chapter will go briefly into these controversies




I. The Great Debates:
Thus the scene was set for the great debates which have
raged through the last fifty years, sometimes bitterly, up to
today, especially in Britain. On the one hand are the "separ¬
atists , those in the Kraepelinian tradition, who draw a sharp
distinction between endogenous (or psychotic) depression and
reactive (or neurotic) depression* on the other hand are those
in the Meyerian tradition, the "gradualists, who maintain that
clear-cut differentiation is impossible and fruitless, and uphold
a more unitary view of depression.
Mapother (1926), in a lecture to the British Medical Assoc¬
iation, was the first to openly challenge the predominant
separatist view of the day, by refusing to admit any clinical
distinction between a neurosis and a psychosis. "The distinc¬
tion between neuroses and psychoses has grown out of practical
difficulties particularly as regards certification and asylum
treatment," he said, and he could "find no other basis for the
distinction, neither insight, nor co-operation in treatment,
nor susceptibility to psychotherapy will served• He also added
that the essence of an attack of depression "is the clinical
fact that the emotions for the time have lost enduring relation
to current experience, and whatever their origin and intensity
they have achieved a sort of autonomy" •
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The discussions that have followed about the possibility
of distinguishing clinically between psychotic and neurotic
depressions, the necessity of performing such a task whether
for therapeutic, academic or prognostic reasons, make up the
most heated and confused argument in psychiatry. We need not
go into this in detail here as we do not intend to deal with
the psychotic-neurotic problem. The classificatory system used
in this study largely by-pas3es this controversy.
It is interesting, however, to look at some of the chief
contributions in this field to assess their usefulness, as the
main bulk of the literature, especially in this country, has
been concerned with it.
On purely phenomenological grounds, Buzzard (1926, 1930),
Ross (1926), Gillespie (1926, 1930) and several others found
that they could differentiate between the two types of depression.
Gillespie (1926) stressed the factor of "reactivity*' as of
cardinal importance: the neurotic reacts to his environment,
the psychotic does not. Hereditary factors, Kretschmerian
diagnostic criteria of body build and character were also used:
for example Strauss (1930) thought it inconceivable that a person
of schizoid make-up could develop a genuine manic-depressive
illness.
lewis (1934, 1936, 1938) was the next to join the controversy
in three masterly and scholarly papers. The first was a thorough
historical review, then came a clinical survey of depressive
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states in a detailed analysis of 61 cases, and then a prognostic
study on the same material. The outcome of this research was
damning for the separatists. The differential clinical criteria
put forward by people like Ross, Gillespie, Buzzard, etc., in
the great debates of 1926 and 1930 were not substantiated, and
Lewis concluded that it was impossible to place the majority
of cases in either group and that the term "reactive depression
and the grouping it denoted" should be abandoned. He was
particularly impressed by the fact that the more closely and
the longer a patient was studied, the more difficult and im¬
possible it became to make clear-cut, qualitative distinctions.
Similarly his prognostic study led him to say: " It proved
extraordinarily difficult to classify the patients in order of
favourable results, or of duration of attack." In a later paper
(1938) he states: "It is very probable that all the tables and
classifications in terms of symptoms are nothing more than
attempts to distinguish between acute and chronic, mild and
severe: and where two categories are presented, the one - manic-
depressive - gives the characteristics of acute severe depression,
the other of chronic mild depression." He recognised, however,
that this "rather fails to provide for the acute mild and the
severe chronic cases, which are numerous". This last admission
seems to out the ground from under his own feet. More recently,
Lewis (1971), in a review of the concepts "endogenous and
"exogenous" in the classification of depression, concludes that
the terms "psychotio" , "reactive" and "neurotic?' best serve
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clinical purposes, in spite of their lack of rigour and exactitude.
Curran (1937)» Curran and Mallinson (1941)» and Tredgold
(1941) aligned themselves with lewis's position, while Rogerson
(1940) defended Gillespie's and Ross's position.
Independent support for the separatists' view was provided
by the genetic studies which had begun to appear: Brown (1942)
showed that neurotic illness depended at least partially on a
hereditary genetic basis. Slater and Slater (1944) argued that
this constitutional basis was likely to depend on a large number
of genes, each of small effect. On the other hand, genetic
studies of manic-depressive illness suggested that it was trans¬
mitted by a single dominant gene with incomplete penetrance
(Slater, 1936).
It is interesting to note, when looking at the arguments put
forward by the proponents on each side of the fence, that no side
seemed to dispute that a "pure culture" psychotic depression
differed from a "pure culture" neurotic depression, but the con¬
tention seemed to be more the existence of these paradigms in
reality and the number of shades of grey between them. Lewis
(1938), for example, says: "Actually it is a question of how
many patients fit comforably into either group, so characterised.
As is fairly plain in the series I reported, I find that few do.
Curran reaches the 3ame conclusion. I think these groups are
the extreme types rather than the clinical realities. A few
others, however, find good reason to hold the contrary view."
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The development of new treatment techniques, electro¬
convulsive therapy and pre-frontal leucotomy, seemed to make
differentiation more pressing and less academic. Most writers,
e.g. Cook (1944), Sargant and Slater (1946), and Sands (1949)»
agree that ID. C.T. benefited the psychotic depressives only:
" Some neurotic types of depression may be aggravated by very few
convulsions11 (Sargant and Slater, 1946). Partridge (1949) argued
that if differentiation was valid in the light of response to
electroplexy "and is of importance in deciding the suitability
of a case of treatment, how much the more important must it be
when considerations arise of a far more drastic treatment of
irreversible kind?". He is referring there to pre-frontal leuco¬
tomy. Mayer-Gross (1954) states emphatically: "For rational
therapy the reactive, neurotic form of depression has to be
differentiated from endogenous depression with little or no
environmental aetiology....... If there are important precipi¬
tating environmental circumstances, they may have to be dealt
with, and the neurotic personality may, in given circumstances,
respond well to psychotherapy, whereas the endogenous depression
will remain uninfluenced until convulsion treatment is applied,
or natural remission sets in with the passage of time."
Not surprisingly, however, dissident voices were still to
be heard: 3. Ascher (1952) wrote: "The apparently different
responses of various depressive reactions to electroshock therapy
is more dependent on the relative prominence of depressive mood
in the total picture than on the neurotic or psychotic nature of
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the condition." Similarly, Garmany (1958)» after a study of
525 depressed out-patients, concluded: "The distinction tradi¬
tionally made appears to be a distinction between those depressions
which show more reactivity, are less severe, and infrequently
require 3. C. T. and those depressives sharing the reverse features.
It is believed that this resolves itself into a distinction be¬
tween mild and severe depression."
Response to S. C.T. has been used in several later studies
to sustain the usefulness of differentiation, e.g. Rose (1963),
Roberts (1959) and J. Mendels (1965)*
II. Statistical Approaches:
More recently the advent of new anti-depressant drugs, and
the development of computer science facilitating the statistical
analysis of vast data, have brought about a recrudescence of
Interest in the nosological problems of depression. Graphs,
histograms, frequency distributions and factor loadings have
replaced the old arguments based on clinical experience, case
histories and intuition, yet consensus is not much nearer, as the
following short review will show.
Hamilton and White (1959) were the first to publish a factor-
analytic study intended to provide classifioatory help. Using
Hamilton's (I960) rating scale for depressive states, they
*
analysed the results of b4 male depressed patients. Four
factors had been identified from the rating scale: Factor I
was identified as retarded depression, comprising depressed mood,
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guilt, retardation, loss of insight, suicide and loss of interest;
Factor II with agitated depression; Factor TV with "psychopathic
depression"; while Factor III was mainly related to outcome
after treatment. Dividing the 64 patients into four groups,
namely endogenous, query endogenous, reactive and query reactive,
on aetiological grounds only, they demonstrated that "the first
factor that appeared to he a measure of retarded depression, was
also a measure of endogenous depression" and that the endogenous
group had a higher total score on the rating scale than the
reactive groups, thus being more severely ill. Calculating the
distribution of scores of the 64 patients on Factor I, they
found two "humps", suggesting that the endogenous depressives
were different qualitatively from the reactive depressives. The
bi-modal distribution was not clear-cut, however, suggesting
that "the difference, if any, is not great". EJysenck (1970)
has some criticisms to make of the statistical technique used,
lie writes: "Having determined the existence of two independent
factors as giving rise to the observed intercorrelations of the
symptoms, investigators cannot then turn round and construct a
single continuum running from one factor to the other. This is
strictly meaningless, and so is the nature of the distribution of
scores on this continuum, at least as far as a check on the
unitary v. binary nature of the surface is concerned.
The Newcastle group of Roth and his colleagues have produced
several influential papers showing a differentiation between
endogenous and neurotic or reactive depression. Kay (1959)
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studied a large case material of depressions in late life and
found a valid distinction between endogenous and neurotic depres¬
sion. One group of cases, the endogenous, were characterised
by retardation, severe agitation, ideas of guilt and nihilistic
and hypochondriacal delusions, by stable personalities, good
physical health and little stress at onset. The second group,
neurotic depressives, had unstable pre-morbid personality, often
had physical illness or social difficulties as precipitating
factors and did not respond to physical type of treatment.
Roth (1959) pointed out that when one uses the traditional divi¬
sion into endogenous and neurotic depression one finds that it
correlates highly with the choice of E. C. T. or psychotherapy.
In the course of a double blind controlled clinical trial
of the effects of imipramine on patients suffering from depressive
conditions, Ball and Kiloh (1959) and Kiloh and Ball (1961) found
that patients diagnosed as endogenous depressives responded
significantly better to the drug than neurotic depressivea.
Kiloh and Garside (1962) carried out a discriminant function
analysis on the data from 97 patients, all treated with imipramine,
which showed two clusters of symptoms, the one correlated posi¬
tively and the other negatively, with good outcome to treatment.
The first cluster corresponded to symptoms usually accepted as
endogenous and the second to symptoms usually accepted as neurotic.
This finding led to Kiloh and Garside*s classic paper of
1963: "The independence of neurotic depression and endogenous
depression". Adding a further 46 cases to the original 97»
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they had 14-3 patients, these being "mostly patients that one felt
could be diagnosed as suffering either from endogenous or neurotic
depression". Selecting 35 items for study, a score of 1 or 0
was assigned to each clinical feature according to whether it
was present or absent or in some cases whether moderate/severe
or slight/absent. Product-moment correlations were calculated
between each of the 35 clinical features and a simple summation
factor analysis was carried out. Two factors were extrscted:
one general factor and a second bi-polar factor. The first
factor loadings indicated "the extent to which each feature is
related to all the features as a whole, that is to depressive
illness as defined by the sum of the 35 features". The second
factor loadings indicated that two separate depressive conditions
existed, thus differentiating between neurotic and endogenous
depression. This second factor was found to be more important
than the first in producing the original correlations between
the 35 features. 14 clinical features were found to correlate
significant^(P<.05) with the diagnosis of neurotic depression:
Reactivity of depression, precipitation, self-pity, variability
of illness, hysterical features, immaturity, inadequacy, initial
insomnia, reactive depression, depression worse in evening,
sudden onset, irritability, hypochondriasis, obse3sionality.
10 features correlated significantly with endogenous depression:
early awakening, depression worse in morning, quality of depression,
retardation, duration one year or less, age 40 or above, depth
of depression, failure of concentration! weight loss 7 lbs. or
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more, previous attacks.
This study seems to provide reasonably oonolusive evidence
of the validity of the distinction between endogenous and
neurotic depression, although some obvious criticisms come to
mind. These include the selection of patients, about which
Kiloh et al. say very little, and observer bias in the original
ratings. Also, seen in the differentiating features is the
usual mixture of symptoms and traits. No discrimination is
made between the essential features of a condition (ones without
which one would not call it that condition) and ones which are
merely correlated, frequently associated with that condition.
Foulds (1965) has stressed the importance of distinguishing be¬
tween symptoms and personality traits in the study of mental
illness. Briefly, symptoms are distressing, not general, where¬
as personality traits are general, — . syntonic and enduring.
These concepts are elucidated further in chapter 6 (p 77 )•
Several other studies followed both in this country and in
America, supporting or disproving Kiloh*s stand-point. The
only novelties have been: sometimes the use of different
statistical techniques (e.g. the principal component method of
faotor analysis instead of the simple summation method), some¬
times the choice of different items for analysis, and sometimes
the selection of different populations.
As a complete review of these studies is not entirely
relevant to this thesis, it is intended to look only at some of
the contradictory findings that such studies have fostered.
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Three of the features identified by Kay, Garside et al.
(1969)v as part of the neurotic syndrome, are in direct contra¬
diction to most other researchers1 findings - early wakening,
morning accentuation, and weight loss. Traditionally these
features have been considered to be characteristic of psychotic
depression. In factor analytic studies, Kiloh and Garside
(1962) and Carney, Hoth and Garside (1965)»found high loadings
for these three items on the endogenous factor. Rosenthal and
Gudeman (1967) found morning insomnia to correlate highly with
their endogenous pattern. However, some studies have 3hown
that early waking does not discriminate between psychotic and
neurotic depression. Foulds (I960) found early waking to be
characteristic of psychotic depressives over 60 years but not of
psychotic depressives under 60 years. Costello and Selby (1965)
studied the sleep patterns of 28 reactive and 13 endogenous
depressions by means of nurses* observations and patients*
reports and found no significant differences. They suggest that
studies such as that of Kiloh and Garside (1963), which report
positive findings based on case material, would appear to reflect
"the clinician*3 knowledge of clinical tradition and his need
to arrive at a diagnosis rather than any real difference between
reactive and endogenous depressions". Hinton (1963), using
motility records, also reported no difference between the sleep
patterns of his reactive and endogenous depressive groups.
Oswald, Berger et al. (1963)» using objective recordings of
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3."9.G., eye movements and body movements, found that their
endogenous depressives spent significantly more time awake at
night than their control subjects, but that "wakefulness recurred
frequently during the night rather than sound sleep followed by
early final wakening. McGhie (1962) found early waking to be
related to age in normals.
Another inconsistent finding has been the presence or
absence of precipitating causes. Hamilton and White (1959»
Kiloh and Garside (1963) and Rosenthal and Klerman (1966), found
that the presence of a precipitant correlated negatively with
their endogenous factors. Forrest et al. (1964)» are in direct
disagreement with this finding: studying the relationship between
the occurrence of environmental stress and endogenous and neurotic
depression in a group of 158 patients, they found that "neither
a history of previous depression nor a pre-admission experience
of adverse social factors discriminated between the groups".
One is reminded here of Lewis*s finding (1934), that the more
one looked at individual cases, the more likely one was to find
precipitating factors. The subjective element involved in
assessing the presence of precipitating factors probably raises
doubts about the validity of such a discriminator.
Other studies using multivariate analytical methods obtained
completely different findings from the essentially dichotomous
findings of the studies mentioned above .
McConaghy, Joffe and Murphy (1967) replicated the study of
Kiloh and Garside (1963). They used the same 35 clinical
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features as Kiloh and Garside, except for three items - married
at any time, hysterical features, immaturity and inadequacy -
which they dropped because of lack of data, and, in addition,
included another eight items. They collected information on
100 out-patients and subjected the results to a prinoipal component
factor analysis. Neither of the factors obtained differentiated
the olinioal features considered to characterise neurotic and
endogenous depression. They then carried out a faotor analysis
of the eight features which Kiloh and Garside found to be most
likely to differentiate between the two types of depression:
1. Age 40 and over.
2. Depression worse in early morning.
3. Weight loss.
4. "Sarly awakening.
5. Depression responsive to environmental changes.




Again neither of the first two factors that emerged showed
differentiation.
The authors demonstrated that the presence of clinical
features of one form of depression in a patient did not exclude
the presence of clinical features of the other form: of the 100
patients, none showed all four features characterising endogenous
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depression without showing at least one of the features charac¬
terising neurotic depression.
They attributed the difference between their results and
that of Kiloh and Garside to two possible sources: interview
bias and patient selection.
R. "5. Kendell (1968), in * The Classification of Depressive
Illnesses*, did a detailed retrospective study of 1080 patients
diagnosed as neurotic, psychotic or involutional depression on
the Maudsley Item Sheet, which is a standard interview form
usually filled by junior registrars. 60 items relevant to
depression were seleoted from the item sheet. The patients were
divided into two groups: Group A consisting of 391 psychotics,
250 neurotics and 58 involutional, and Group B which was used
for cross-validation and consisted of 242 psychotics, 132 neurotics,
10 involutionals.
He then used a series of multivariate analytic techniques
to find out whether psychotic and neurotic depressions can be
differentiated. First, using a discriminant function analysis,
he found a significant difference between mean scores of psychotic
and neurotic depres3ives, and between the mean scores of involu¬
tional depressives and neurotic depressives, but not between the
involutionals and psychotic depressives. The items with the
largest psychotic loadings were: family history, retardation,
agitation, insomnia, delusions, previous history. The items
with the largest neurotic loadingswere: psychogenic precipitation
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and neurotic traits in childhood. Diagnostic index scores were
calculated for each patient and, when these were plotted, a uni-
modal distribution was obtained, indicating no clear-cut differ¬
entiation between the groups.
A canonical variate analysis was carried out and again the
distribution of weights on the first canonical variate was uni-
modal. Kendall comments that on both the discriminant function
analysis and the canonical variate analysis, the uni-modal
distribution obtained could be due to faulty allocation of
patients as well as to the absence of differences between the
groups.
Factor analysis is a better technique for identifying the
underlying factors accounting for the variance of a correlation
matrix. Kendall used 42 items, dropping those of the 60 original
items which occurred too infrequently or too frequently (< 10$ or
> 90$) and then computed a principal component analysis. At
the first order analysis, 12 factors emerged, giving no worth¬
while differentiation between the groups. At the second order






The distribution of scores on the first two factors was
uni-modal.
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At the third order analysis, only two factors emerged:
1. A neurotic factor, combining factors 1 and 4 of the
previous analysis.
2. A psychotic factor.
Ihere was a significant difference between the mean scores
of the psychotic and neurotic groups on both factors. However,
although there was a tendency for items to form two clusters, the
distribution of scores of patients on both factors was uni-modal.
At the fourth order factor analysis, a single bi-polar factor
was obtained, very similar to Kiloh and Garside's bi-polar factor.
Items with positive loadings, making the psychotic pole were:
retardation, abnormal rate and uuantity of speech, short duration
before admission, perplexity, delusions of guilt and persecution,
ideas of reference.
Items with negative loadingsiaentified with the neurotic
pole were: previous subjective tension, hysterical symptoms,
childhood neurotic traits, previous anxiety, obsessional symptoms,
mood variations, precipitating psychological causes: marital and
social. But again the distribution of scores was uni-modal.
finally, Kendall applied the criterion analysis technique
developed by %senck (1950). His conclusions were that high
correlations gave evidence that the constitutional basis of
psychotic depression is also present in weaker form in neurotic
depressives and conversely that the constitutional basis of neurotio
depression is also present in some degree in psychotic depressives.
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Studying 114 re-admission patients, and again calculating
their diagnostic score, Kendell found that a change from a
positive to a negative score, or vice versa, i.e. across the zero
line occurred frequently, suggesting quantitative rather than
qualitative differences.
Outcome of treatment showed that the psychotic and involu¬
tional depressives have a more f vourable outcome than neurotic
depressives. There were no sex differences, hut outcome is
better with increasing age.
More of the psychotic and involutional depressives were
treated with 73. C.T. These patients whose diagnostic index scores
were higher were more likely to be treated with E.C.T., and had
a better outcoiae to E.C.T. - these two latter dependent variables
varying linearly with the index score. Kendell concluded:
"If important variables vary linearly with the index score, then
it is important to know the index score, and a psychotic-neurotic
diagnostic dichotomy is a poor substitute."
Carney, Roth and Garside (1965) had come to the same
conclusions.
Kendell ended his monograph with a clinical study of 100
patients, using ratings of the 3ame 42 items and, in addition,
having the raters make a decision as to whether the illness was
psychotic or neurotic after completion of the ratings. He
obtained essentially the same results as in his retrospective
study. He also introduced an ingenious method of studying
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rater's bias effeet. After the ratings had been completed,
each registrar was asked to state which of five alternative
attitudes to the classification of depressive illness most
clearly represented his personal views. The attitudes ranged
from the most decidely bi-polar view to the most deoidely uni¬
polar view. Deviation scores for each registrar were calculated
from 0, the mid point of the scale. The outstanding result
was that those registrars who were oonvinced of the necessity
of distinguishing between psychotic and neurotic depressions
rated their patients on average 2 or 3 points further from zero
than Kendell. Those who had a strong bias against the distinc¬
tion rated their patients, on average» one or two points closer
to zero*
This result illustrates the dangers of "halo effect?' in
rating, and casts doubts on findings such as those of Eiloh and
Garside where a diagnosis of psyohotio and neurotic depression
was made before rating. Kendell concludes that the way his own
data were collated, namely from the item sheets filled routinely
by uncommitted registrars, for no immediate research purpose,
probably prevented the "halo effect?' operating to any significant
degree. The opposite critioism - that the unreliability and
inaccuracy of the data of the item sheets produced Kendall's uni-
modal distributions of factor scores and diagnostic indeat scores -
can be raised. Kendell, however, argues that this critioism
cannot apply to his clinical study when he himself rated a 100
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consecutive patients under conditions very similar to the
Newcastle studies.
In conclusion, he finds "no real evidence, either from this
present study or elsewhere, for the existence of two distinct
types of depressive illness". However, he does not agree with
Mapother and lewis that the differences between different depres¬
sions are simply ones of severity and ehronicity. Physiological
differences between groups of psychotic and neurotic depressions
have been shown, also differences in response to therapeutic
agents, differences of sex and age distribution, choice of treat¬
ment and outcome. Finally, the emergence of factors clearly
identifiable with the neurotic and psychotic stereotypes in
several studies, even in Kendell*s studies which came from the
stronghold of "unitary" thinking, indicates that important
differences exist between the depressions. Kendell thinks that
this does not imply that there are two different disease entities,
but rather that "depressive illnesses are best regarded as a
single continuum extending between traditional neurotic and
psychotic stereotypes". He continues that a patient • s position
on that continuum, ^iven either by the diagnostic index score or
an analogous variable like the Newcastle diagnostic score,
provides more information about symptomatology, treatment and
prognosis than does assignment to a traditional diagnostic cate¬
gory. Moreover the concept of a continuum preserves the most
important tenets of both the separatists and their opponents,
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yet avoids the weaknesses of their respective standpoints. It
preserves the traditional stereotypes as the two poles of the
continuum and acknowled0es that the differences between them are
genuine and not simply questions of severity and ehronicity.
On the other hand it recognises the impracticability of drawing
any clear-cut boundary between them. Admittedly it fails to do
justice to the wealth of clinical variation which depressive
illnesses exhibit but it doe3 less violence to the facts than
any simple alternative .
Kendall's work has been reviewed at some length because it
has been highly praised by most reviewers and because it seems
to epitomise the bulk of recent research in the affective dis¬
orders. His statistics have, however, been criticised by Hope
(1969) and ^ysenck (1970). The latter suggests an attractive
two-dimensional model: neurotic and psychotic depressions are
two separate and independent continue, so that two scores are
needed to describe a patient, instead of the one score suggested
by hendell. He states that it is ^uite possible for a psy¬
chotic patient to have some neurotic symptoms and for a neurotic
patient to have psychotic symptoms. What is not clear is when
a patient should be labelled "psychotic" and when "neurotic".
G. A. Fouleds (1965) model is tighter logically: all psychotics
have neurotic symptoms, but neurotics do not have psychotic
symptoms.
At least such a model would apply to other disorders apart
from depression. Foulds also makes explicit his necessary
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condition for calling an illness psychotic: the presence of
delusions and/or hallucinations. As pointed out, such explicit-
ness has not always been apparent in most of the work in this
field.
Mendels and Cochrane (1968) after reviewing the endogenous-
reactive concept as it originated from Moebius and Kraepelin,
its development to present-day factor analytic studies, point
out the possible reasons for disagreement among studies: "the
terms may mean different things to different raters, if different
variables are given the same name, there is no reason why results
should agree". They also say that the results may be distorted
if the variables are differentially related to sex, for example,
agitation and initial insomnia show clear positive loadings in
studies using only women: (Hordem, 1965; Rosenthal, and
Gudeman, 1967; Rosenthal, and Klerman, 1966) but not so in studies
using men or both sexes: (Carney, Roth and Garside, 1965;
Hamilton and White, 1959; Kiloh and Garside, 1963). Other
factors distorting the results may be rater bias, as pointed out
in previous sections, different factor analytic models, specially
rotation of factors, different variables and different populations
studies.
IIIAn alternative view:
C. Perris and his colleagues have published a series of
articles, most of whioh were published in 1966, in the form of a
monograph entitled "A study of Bi-polar (Manio-Depressive) and
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Unipolar (Recurrent Depressive) psychosis". In the Introduction,
Perris states: "The present work has been planned and carried
out as a contribution towards a more precise nosography of
depressive illnesses". Many authors, probably starting with
Kraepelin*s work, seem to use •manic-depressive illness as synony¬
mous with •endogenous* or •psychotic1 depression, i.e. to cover
patterns of illness with both manic and depressive phases as well
as those with one or more depressive phases only. It is felt
that this has led to much confusion.
Perris*s starting point is Leonhard•s (1959) classification:
Leonhard classified the endogenous psychoses into bipolar (manic-
depressive) and unipolar recurrent depressive psychoses. Polarity
is thus the decisive factor in differential diagnosis: bipolar
psyohosis is characterised by the occurrence of both manic and
depressive episodes, unipolar psychosis by the occurrence of
depressive episodes only. Leonhard demonstrated differences in
heredity, personality traits and symptom patterns between these
two groups. Other authors have shown an interest in Leonhard*s
classification, especially on the continent: Astrup et al.(1959).
Stenstedt (1959) and Iundquist (1965).
Perris and his colleagues set out to make a systematic study
of homogenous groups of bipolar and unipolar depressives and
succeed in presenting very convincing evidence of important
differences between them. Operationally the recurrent depressives
(injpolars) had had at least three episodes of depression with
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free intervals in between. The minimum requirement for the
diagnosis of psychotic depression was "globality of depressive
pattern and impaired reality confrontation severe enough to
warrant hospital admission. The manio-depressives (bipolar*)
had "suffered from both manic (or hypomanic) and depressive phases,
irrespective of whether they were treated in hospital for both
manic and depressive phases, or exclusively for one of them ••••"
'Short euphoria in direct connection with treatment has not been
taken into account." Perris found that with the criterion of
three discrete depressive episodes without mania, the chances of
unipolars later becoming bi-polars were minimal. The differences
found were in: genetio factors, childhood environment and pre¬
cipitating factors, male celibacy rate, personality traits,
flicker threshold, sedation threshold, response to therapy, treat¬
ment time, relapse rate, mortality rate (Perris, op.cit. Table 1 p.f$6),
Perris oonoludes from his evidence that the differences in
test results between the bi-polar and the unipolar groups could
perhaps be accounted for by personality differences. Testing
personality after remission he found the bi-polars to be more
cyclothymic and extraverted (" sub-stable" in the terminology he
adopts from Sjobring (1958)) and the unipolars more introverted,
"psychoasthenio" or"subvalid" (again in Sjobring's terminology).
The finding that the bi-polars (extraverted group) have a lower
flicker threshold during remission, relapse more often, respond
more quickly to treatment, have a higher mortality rate than the
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unipolars (introverted group) could be attributed to personality
differences: "Without additional information, bi-polar and uni¬
polar depressive psychoses could be regarded as expressions of
the same illness with different colouring due to the pathoplastio
influence of personality." However, he finds the evidence from
genetic studies, that the "heredity is different between the two
groups and, besides, specific within each group1', a strong
argument in favour of two separate disease entities. In a care¬
ful family study, Perris found that, among 13d bi-polar (manio-
depressive) probands, there was bi-polar heredity in 16^ of oases
and unipolar heredity in 0.8$ of oases; among 139 unipolar
(recurrent depressive) probands there was unipolar heredity in
11$ of cases but bi-polar heredity in only 0.5$ of cases. Like
Leonhard, he found that the morbidity risk in first degree relatives
was greater for bi-polar than for unipolar patients. Angst (1966)
also found a higher familial incidence in the bi-polar patients
and like Perris, he showed that bi-polar illness was extremely
rare in the families of unipolar patients.
Winokur, Clayton and Heich (1969) also found that the first
degree relatives of manic patients, when compared with the re¬
latives of patients in whom depression alone is found, have a
higher incidence of affective illness, and manifest mania more
frequently.
Perris's findings about differences in personality between
bi-polar and unipolar depressives will be covered in more detail
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In the next section. In view of his striking findings, it was
felt that his method of classification was very promising and
that more fundamental work should be done on homogenous groups
of this type to clarify and extend differentiation* if any.
IV. Conclusion:
It can be seen from the above review that to divide a group
of depressives into "psychotic^ and "neurotic" categories involves
a lot of error, and uncertainty. It may be that such a categoriz¬
ation is too sophisticated for our present state of knowledge, and
yet in empirical research, some 3ort of public and practical
classification system is required. A bi-polar - unipolar
dichotomy, on the other hand, seems a more objective classification
which should be explored further. The study reported in this




In addition to tha prolifio nosological literature, there
have been interesting studies looking at depression in the light
of different disciplines or methods: for example* phenomenology;
(Grinker et al. 1961, and particularly the existential literature:
Ey» 1954* Binswanger, 1931* 1932)* epidemiology (I* K. Rawsley*
1968)* biochemistry (Gibbons* 1968* Coppen* 1967) and psycho-
dynamics (Freud, 1917).
Here it is intended to review only suoh of the psychological
and psychometrio studies as are relevant to the study.
I. Pavchodvnamio and Psychoanalytic Studies:
Abraham* in 1911* was the first to apply systematic psycho¬
analytic thinking to the understanding of affective illness.
Two later papers followed* in 1916 and in 1924* in which depression
is considered to be a regression to the oral level of libido
development, with the typical oral features of impatience and
envy, increased egocentrioity and ambivalence. Hate and hostility
paralyse the depressed patient*s capacity to love, leading to
feelings of impoverishment. He likened the depressive stupor
to a form of dying. In the 1924 paper, manic-depressive psychosis
is compared with obsessional neurosis. Abraham considers the
indecision of ambivalence close to the doubts of the compulsive
neurotic. While the obsessional tries to retain and control
«•> —
Ms object, the melancholic has regressed to an anal-sadistic
stage when he tries to expel and destroy the object. He then
feels ambivalent about the lost object and tries to introject it
by oral incorporation. Abraham speaks about the oral sadistic
tendencies revealed by the symptoms, dreams and fantasies of
depressed and manic patients, e.g. cannibalistic fantasies, and
suggests that beneath these hostile impulses "there lurks the
desire for a pleasurable sucking activity4' •
Freud (1917)» in " Mourning and Melancholia44. compared melan¬
cholia to normal mourning. Both may occur as a reaction to the
loss of a loved object, but in melancholia the loss which may
take the form of separation, frustration or disappointment,
remains unconscious. Thus, in normal mourning, confrontation
with reality leads to gradual reohannelisation of the libido to¬
wards other new objects*
In melancholia, the whole struggle of ambivalence is inter¬
nalised: The intense self-aocusations are expressions of hate
towards the ambivalent internalised object. Freud explained this
as the narcissistic identification of the ego with the object
through introjection, a regression to the oral stage of libidinal
development.
In 1922 Freud added some comments about mania to his original
statements about depression. He suggested that mood swings, in
general, are caused by the tensions between ego and ego ideal:
"The manic phase represents a triumphant reunion between ego and
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ego ideal; in the sense of expansive self-inflation* hut not in
the sense of a stabilised equilibrium."
lewin (1950), in "The Psycho-Analysis of Slation" * is one
of the few psyoho-analysts to have turned his attention to mania*
He thinks of the manic state as a re-living of the nursing experi¬
ence * and of the oral triad - wishes to eat, to be eaten and to
sleep - as a point of fixation* Sleep can be likened to death
and the wish-fear of being eaten (engulfed by the breast)* which
can be avoided by a super vigil. This super vigil consists of
mania or hypomania.
Fenichel (1949) takes up Abraham*s point about hostility in
depression* He feels that depressive patients react to frustra¬
tion with ever-ready hostility which they deny. The self-blame
of the melancholic is a letting loose on the ego of the hostility
unconsciously felt for the object.
Hado (1927) took the theory of identification a step further
than Abraham and Freud. The latter had implied the incorporation
of the lost or frustrating object in both the ego and ego-ideal
or superego. Eado postulates the splitting of the object into
a M good", i.e. gratifying object, and a "bad" , i.e. frustrating
object. The "good" object is incorporated into the superego*
punishing the "bad** objeot in the " egtf1', the ultimate goals being
expiation* reconciliation and synthesis.
Deutsch (1933) agrees with Hado that depression can be the
rebellion of the ego against a cruel superego. The unconscious
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wish is to bribe the superego and thus gain forgiveness*
Gero (1936), in the detailed presentation of two case
histories, disagreed with Abraham about the universality of the
obsessional character in depressives, and found no evidence of
Bado's theory of intra-psyohio propitiation# However, he
agrees with both writers that " oral eroticism is the favourite
fixation point in the depressive1'.
More recently, Bibring (195$) and Jacobson (1953, 1954)
both speak of depression as a loss of self-esteem. Bibring
found the common denominator in all types of depressive illness
to be the lowering of self-esteem and the loss of self-love*
Early childhood traumatic experiences as well as frustration of
other aspirations may predispose individuals to depressive illness.
Jacobson considered self-esteem as "the degree of discrepancy or
harmony between the self-representations and the wished-for
concept of the self"* She thought of denial as the typical
defence mechanism of manic-depressives. At an extreme level,
denial can lead to a loss of touch with reality and to mania.
Katan (1953) views mania as a restitutive attempt aimed at
getting as much pleasure as possible and avoiding conflict. The
manic patient engages in continuous activity to keep the depriving
environment out of his awareness. "Mania is not a process of
discharge of destructive aggression, but an attempt to control
this destructive drive."
D. A. Schwartz (1961) proposes "a unitary formulation of the
manic-depressive reactions". Like Jacobson, he views denial
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as the defence mechanism against aggressive impulses in both
mania and depression! "The manic denies the impulse by denying
a motive for it. The melancholic denies it by denying the
capacity to carry it into action."
Schwartz's hypothesis is that manic-depressive reactions
occur in people who at their late oral stage of development
introjeoted the attitudes of people perceived as excessively
depriving and towards whom unacceptable aggressive and retaliatory
impulses were felt. Schwartz concludes that therapy in these
illnesses would benefit if this same deprivation was regarded as
the core of both reactions. Gibson, Cohen and Cohen (1939) also
speak of denial as a common defenoe mechanism.
This brief overview of psychoanalytic thinking may give an
idea of some of the main contributions to the field of affective
illness. The main themes seem to bes problems of identification,
regression to an earlier stage of libidial development (usually
oral), defence mechanisms (usually denial) against aggression and
intrapsychic struggles between the ego and super-ego. Many of
these oonjeotures are teleological, unproven and unprovable, but
may give insight into some aspects of the illness, and suggest
hypothetical constructs for further testing. The importance of
aggression is one such construct which will be taken up in this
study.
II.Barly Parent-Child Relationships:
Since the mainstream of psychoanalytic thought on the affective
illnesses views the parent-child relationship as crucial, the
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works of child psychoanalysts and related psyohodynamic exposes
are here treated separately.
Melanie Klein (1934) pushed back psycho-analytio specula¬
tions to the infant*s first year of life. She believed that
the infant was not merely narcissistically orientated but was
object-orientated right from the start of extra-uterine life.
Thus the mother-child relation in the first year of life is all
important. This first year of life contains the fixation points
to which the individual will regress later under stress and
strain. These fixation points Klein calls the "paranoid" and
the "depressive position". The paranoid position develops first,
as defence against pain, in the form of projection, then comes
the depressive position at about the time of weaning, around the
first half-year of life. The child can only see the mother as
all "good", i.e. gratifying, or all "bad", i.e. depriving. The
internalised "good" object makes the child feel good himself,
but the internalised "bad" object makes the child feel bad him¬
self and hateful. In this inner conflict characteristic of the
depressive position, Klein sees the first guilt feelings arise.
The need of the mother for survival and the guilty anxiety prompt
the child into repair actions, the magic of self-punishment,
such as crying spells and rage directed against the child's own
body. When repair succeeds and the guilty anxieties are sur¬
mounted this leads to a more integrated ego and more realistic
object relations. But an excess of the depressive anxieties
without successful experiences of repair leads to a fixation to
the depressive position. The adult regresses to this position
whenever excessive stress overtakes the integration of his ego.
The manic reaction is an attempt at integration and repair by
the denial of the frustrating, depriving aspect of objects.
Klein*s theories are partially deviant from classical psycho¬
analytic theory and probably sound fantastic to psychiatrists
unwilling to speculate on the thoughts and fantasies of the pre-
verbal child.
Spitz, H. A. (1946) in his well known paper "Anaclitic
Depression" describes a "striking syndrome" which affected 19 out
of 123 unselected infants in a nursery: " In the second half of
the first year, a few of these infants developed a weepy behaviour
that was in marked contrast to their previously happy and out¬
going behaviour. After a time this weepiness gave way to with¬
drawal. The children in question would lie in their cots with
averted faces, refusing to take part in the life of their surround¬
ings" . In addition to weepiness and withdrawal, these infants
showed retardation of development, slow reactions, retardation of
movement, sometimes stupor, a fall in their developmental quotient,
loss of appetite, loss of weight, insomnia. Spitz comments
that the physiognomic expression "would in an adult be described
as depression". Aetiologlcally, race, sex, age, developmental
and intellectual level were not important, the one significant
aetiological factor being that "the mother was removed from the
child somewhere between the sixth and eighth month for a practi¬
cally unbroken period of three months, during which the child
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either did not see its mother at all, or at best once a weetf1•
The better the relationship between mother and child was before
separation, the worse the depression would be.
The precipitating factor, therefore, seems to be the loss
of the love object, as described by Abraham and Freud. Spitz
also thinks that he has provided clinical evidence for Fenichel's
(1945) assertion that: "Actually traumatic experiences in the
nursing period can be found more often in subsequent manic-
depressive patients than in schizophrenics." However, he states
that he is describing something quite different from Melanie
Klein's "depressive position" as an inesoapable stage in infantile
development, irrespective of individual circumstances. Spitz's
"anaolitic depression" has sufficient and necessary causes which
are not the common experiences of all infants.
Bowlby (1952, 1953)» following up Spitz's lead, put forward
the influential thesis of maternal deprivation: "What is believed
to be essential for mental health is that the infant and young
child should experience a warm, intimate, and continuous relation¬
ship with his mother (or permanent mother substitute) in which
it
both find satisfaction and enjoyment. Bowlby regards complete
separation from the mother as the worst type of deprivation, and
institutional care as the most common example of it. He considers
the effects of oomplete deprivation to be severe and long-
lasting "leading to anxiety, excessive need for love, powerful
feelings of revenge and, arising from these last, guilt and
depression". The extreme example is the "affeotionless"
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character who cannot accept or reciprocate love and who very
often develops anti-social behaviour. Bowlby cites many
authors as supporting his views, especially Goldfarb (1947t 1949)»
and Spitz (op. cit.). Bowlby^ special point, however, is the
irreversibility and long-lasting effect of infantile deprivation.
Neither Spitz nor Goldfarb seem to go so far.
Many authors have, put forward evidence contradictory to
Bowlby's e.g. Orlansky (1949) who found that events of childhood
or later life could counteract and change " the character structure
tentatively formed during infancy**. The work from the Iowa
Child Development Centre (Skeels, Updegralf et al.. 1938) and a
great deal of work published since, (e.g. Clarke and Clarke, 1953)*
have shown that backwardness associated with deprivation need
not be permanent and irreversible.
Bowlby's work has been widely criticised, chiefly by O'Connor
(1956) aad Wootton (1959)» but it has stimulated a lot of research
in the effect of early environment in mental illness.
Recently Granville-Crossman (1968) has reviewed the relevant
literature for the affective illnesses. The difficulty in com¬
paring studies is that "parental deprivation" has been used
rather loosely to mean childhood bereavement as well as separation
from parents for some other reason, and defective relationship
with parents. The term has also usually been taken to mean
maternal deprivation, even though some authors have stressed the
importance of paternal deprivation. Batchelor and Napier (1953)
suggest that loss of father may be of some importance in attempted
suicide. Brown (1961) reports an excess of paternal deaths in
childhood in a group of depressive patients and Andry (1962)
suggests that rejection by father may be of aetiological importance
in delinquency. Munro (1965) also reports that depressives as
a whole are more likely to have lost a father by death during
the age period 11 to 15 years.
Without going into detailed appraisal of the parental depriv¬
ation thesis in relation to affective illness (for extended dis¬
cussion see Granville-Grossman (1968) and Munro (1965)» a few of
the main studies and their results will be mentioned here.
Brown (1961) comparing depressives with general practice
patients and with control figures from the 1921 census, found a
significantly higher incidence of childhood bereavement in
depressive patients. Forrest, Fraser and Priest (1965)» using
medical ward patients as controls, found significantly more child¬
hood bereavement among their manic-depressives (bipolar depressions)
than in their patients with depressive reaction. Perris (1966)
on the other hand did not find childhood bereavement a discrimin¬
ating factor between his bipolar and unipolar recurrent depressives.
Stenstedt (1952) finds that dissolution of the home or serious
parental friction may inorease the risk that sibs. of manic-
depressives will themselves develop the illness.
Beck et al. (1963)» rating their depressed patients as "high-
depressed" and "low-depressed" on a depression inventory, found
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that prevalence of orphanhood before 16 years correlates signi¬
ficantly with severity of depression. Dennehy (1966), using
the 1921 census figures as control, found a significantly higher
incidence of childhood bereavement in depressives. On the
other hand Oltman et al. (1951) found little difference in the
degree of parental deprivation between manic-depressives and
normals. Munro (1965)* studying a selected group of 153 cases
of primary depression and 163 medical out-patients as oontrols,
found that depresaives as a whole are no more likely to have lost
a parent by death before their 16th birthday. However, he found
that severe depressives report a highly significant excess of
disturbed relationships with both mother and father during
childhood.
Gregory (1959) found no significant difference in child¬
hood oi*phanhood between depressives and the expected figures for
the general population. He also (Gregory, 1962) found no diff¬
erence in early bereavement among the diagnostic categories, one
of which was affective psychosis. Pitts, Meyer, Brooks and
Winokur (1965) found no significant difference in the incidence
of childhood bereavement between a group of manic-depressives
and general hospital controls.
These studies have, as seen, failed to show a consistent
association between early bereavement and subsequent development
of affective disorder.
Mabel Blake Cohen et al. (1954) published an interesting
psychodynamic study of the family background of manic-depressives,
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based on intensive psychoanalytic psychotherapy of 12 patients.
They state: "our purpose is to delineate as far as possible the
experiences with significant people which made it necessary for
the prospeotive manic-depressive to develop the particular
patterns of interaction which comprise his oharacter and his
illness". They found a typical parent-child relationship and
typical family-community relationship which influenced the char-
aoter structure of the child and the way he interacted with other
people in later life. In brief, the stereotype is that of a
family set apart in its milieu because of economic* religious*
racial or some other sooial factor. In its ensuing struggle to
gain acoeptability the family attempts to conform and to enhance
its sooial prestige by economic status. In this struggle* the
children play an important role: they are expected to conform
to a high standard of "good" behaviour. Thus the parents*
especially the mother* inoulcate in the ohild a concept of "good"
behaviour which is strict and conventional and derived from out¬
side* namely what the neighbours think is good. The part which
the ohild plays in improving the family's social status* together
with this externally derived 3ense of values, tends to devalue
the child in his own right. The child who is later to develop
manic-depressive psychosis is very often selected as the special
standard-bearer of the family, because of various reasons, such
as high abilities and rank in family.
In most cases, mother is the strong dominant character,
whereas father is weak but lovable. Mother is seen as cold and
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unlovable, but to be pleased and placated by good behaviour.
After good relationship with the child in the first year, the
mother becomes more independent in her effort to Inculcate good
behaviour in him. The authors say: "These early experiences
probably lay the groundwork for the manic-depressive*s later
ambivalence". Because of his special position in the family*
the manic-depressive guards his position jealously and is envied
by the other siblings and one or both parents. As he grows up
he guards himself against others by underselling himself or by
being extremely helpful to others. As an adult, during the
periods free from illness, he seems well-adjusted and friendly.
But his friendships are superficial as he cannot communicate
properly, but merely indulges in a stereotyped social performance
without taking others* characteristics into account. Though his
chief desire is to be left alone he develops one or two very
dependent relationships with demands for love and attention with¬
out any sense of reciprocity. Hence a psychotic attack is often
precipitated by loss, or less obviously by a promotion or a
situation viewed as loss, where the patient loses well established
dependency relationships.
Cohen et al. go on to give examples of how these people can
be helped in psychotherapy. Most of their insist comes from
transference and counter-transference situations according to
psychoanalytic tradition.
Gibson, Cohen and Cohen (1959) followed up the concepts put
68
forward by Cohen and her group. They devised a special
questionnaire based on previous findings, satisfied themselves
of its reliability by inter-rater and test-retest method and
studied a group of 17 schizophrenics, 27 manic-depressives, and
Cohen's original group of 12 manic-depressives. They found no
major differences between the two manic-depressive groups, but
highly significant differences between the manic-depressive and
schizophrenic patients: e.g., the manic-depressive's family had
made a bigger effort to rise in social status and the patient was
dealt with as an instrument for achieving social prestige. Inci¬
dence of envy and competitiveness had been particularly high.
The patient had been the principal object of this envy and had
engaged in self-defeating behaviour.
Such studies are most promising in their therapeutic and
psychodynamic implications, and should stimulate more family
studies in affective illness, perhaps along the line of studies
in the families of schizophrenics (e.g. Bateson et.al.. 1956 and
Wynne et al.. 1963).
Many of the family patterns depicted here as significant tend
to be typical of middle-class and upper middle-class families.
More research is needed to clarify the importance of early up¬
bringing in the development of affective illness.
IlUntelluctual and Cognitive Studies:
Most reported studies have found no differences in intell¬
ectual performance between depressives and normals. Granick
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(1963) compared 50 psychotic depressives and 50 normals, matched
for age, sex, race, education and religion, on the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale sub-tests of Information and Similarities and
on the Thorndike-Gallup Vocabulary Test. He failed to find any
significant difference in performance between the two groups.
Friedman (1964) oompared 55 depressives and 65 normals,
matched for age, sex, education, vocabulary score and race, on
a battery of 33 cognitive, perceptual and psychomotor tests.
The depressives obtained lower scores on only 4 per cent of the
82 test scores derived, a finding that could be due to chance.
Friedman concluded that actual ability and performance during
severe depression is not consistent with the depressed patient*s
unrealistically low image of himself.
Rapaport (1945), in a comparison of a depressed group and
a schizophrenic group, reported a significant lowering of digit-
symbol scores within the depressed group. He concluded that
performance on this test was sensitive to retardation as seen
clinically in depression. However, Jastak (1949) re-analysed
Hapaport*s data and noted that the schizophrenic group had a
mean age of 31 years, and the depressed group a mean age of 49
years. When age was held constant, the depressed patients
failed to show the consistently lower test scores. Fisher
(1949) reported that depressed patients who were rated as
improved following electric shock therapy obtained signifioantly
higher mean digit-symbol scored than a group of unimproved
depressives.
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Shapiro et al.. (1958) found that depressed patients, after
recovery, did not show any improvement in their performance on
a battery of psycho-motor tests when compared to a control group*
Beck et al. (1962) controlled for age and intelligence in a
group of 178 psychiatric patients and found no relationship be¬
tween digit-symbol scores and depression.
On the other hand, Payne & Hewlitt (I960), comparing groups
of normals, dysthymic neurotics, hysterics, endogenous depressives
and schizophrenics, matched for pre-morbid intelligence, age and
education, found that the depressives were consistently slower
than the normal and neurotic groups both on intellectual speed
tests (as tested by the Nufferao Speed Tests, Purneaux 1956) and
on motor speed tests (as tested by Babcock-Levy (194-0) test).
Poulds (1952) found that on a maze-drawing task, a certain type
of distraction (repeating numbers) temporarily obscured or broke
up the pattern of affective disturbance in dysthymics and resulted
in an increased speed, whereas no such speeding up occurred in
the case of non-dysthymios* He also found an increase in speed
in dysthymios after electroconvulsive therapy. The effect on
maze performance of distraction and E. C. T. was therefore similar.
Poulds concludes that distraction may achieve the effect of
speeding up performance "by drawing the attention away from the
affective disturbance, whilst E.C.T. in some way reduces the
intensity of the unpleasant affect and thus enables the activity
with which it is competing to dominate consciousness more
j
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frequently than had been possible." This finding is incon¬
sistent with the study of Shapiro et al. (1958) mentioned above.
Babcook (1941) had reported that manic-depressives were generally
as impaired as other functional psychotics. They were poorer
at motor than at mental speed tests Nelson(1953) confirmed
this finding; and also Babcoek's finding that manic-depressives
showed relatively sLow learning, but good fixation of what is
learned.
In conclusion, the results of objective measurement of
retardation in depression have not always been consistent,
probably because of the heterogenous nature of the groups studied.
It is quite possible that some depressives are retarded, while
others are not. Because of the difficulty of differentiating
psychotic from neurotic depressives, it has not been possible
to confirm on objective measures the clinical opinion that
psychotic depressives are retarded and neurotics not.
iv. Conceptual Performance:
Very little work has been done on the conceptual performance
of depressives or manics. Payne and Hirst (1957) investigated
conceptual thinking in 11 depressed patients and 14 normal controls,
matched for age, sex and vocabulary level. In a previous study,
Epstein (1953) had found that sohizophrenio patients showed a
tendency toward " overinclusion" as tested by the Epstein over-
inclusion test. This finding was in agreement with Norman
Cameron's formulation that schizophrenics are unable to preserve
- 72 -
their conceptual boundaries so that irrelevant ideas become
incorporated into their concepts, making their thinking less
lucid. Payne and Hirst found that their depressives showed an
even higher level of overinolusion than the schizophrenics,
indicating that this type of thought disorder is not typical of
schizophrenia. They ooncluded that overinclusive thinking may
be related to psychosis in general, rather than to any specific
psychosis.
This finding was not supported by Payne and Hewlett (I960)
using different measures of overinclusive thinking, namely
Benjamin Proverbs Test, Goldstein object-sorting tests, Payne's
object classification tests, and the Shaw test. On all four-
measures their group of 20 endogenous depressives scored as
normal, whereas the 20 schizophrenics scored as overinolusive.
Again, however, the Bpstein test did not differentiate between
the groups.
Regarding mania, McGhie (1967) commented that hypomanic
patients were not distinguished from schizophrenic patients on
certain tests of overincluslon. Apart from this, there has been
only one study of the performance of manic patients on tests of
conceptual thinking. Mellsop et al. (1971) compared the per¬
formance of 12 manics, 24 schizophrenics with thought process
disorder and 12 normals on the Bannister-Pransella (1966) Grid
Test of thought disorder. They found that the intensity score
differentiated the manics and the controls from the schizophrenics,
but not the consistency score. Thus, according to this study,
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the manics do not seem to show thought process disorder, in the
sense of looseness of constructs.
Beck (1967) made a study of cognitive distortions in
depression, using an interview method. He found that depression
was characterised by themes of low self-esteem, self-blame, over¬
whelming responsibilities and desires to escape and that hypomania
was characterised by themes of self-enhancement. These themes
were characteristically different from typical themes of other
nosological groups, such a3 anxiety or paranoid state. Pheno-
menologically, the formal characteristics of the depressive cog¬
nitions were described as follows: 1) they were automatic, i.e.
they seemed to occur without previous reflection or reasoning,
2) they were involuntary, i.e. they occurred even when the
patients had resolved to avoid them and 3) they were plausible,
i.e. the patient tended to accept their validity.
Beck goes on to propose a cognitive approach to affective
illness: it is the depressive cognitions that bring on the
depressive affect.
Further studies to test this hypothesis should be developed.
V. Perception:
Dixon and Lear (1962) measured the visual threshold for one
eye while presenting neutral and emotive material below the
awareness threshold to the other eye. Their five depressive
patients showed a consistent raising of threshold (peroeptual
defence) as compared to the six schizophrenics who showed a
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lowering of threshold (perceptual vigilance). Their results are,
however, based on very small samples.
Mezey and Cohen (1961) studied the perception of time in 21
depressed patients. They found that three-quarters of the
patients estimated that time was passing more slowly than normal.
This feeling tended to disappear with recovery. However, when
objective tests were administered, the estimation of time under
experimental conditions was as accurate during the depressed
phase as during the recovery phase.
Investigating spatial judgement, Rosenblatt (1956) found
that, contrary to manic patients, depressed patients have a
tendency to focus on the downward rather than the upward aspect
of a spatial situation. Fisher (1964) tested the specific
hypothesis that the degree of downward bias in perception is
related to the degree of depression. His results supported the
proposition that subjects with a sad affeot showed a downward
bias in perception, whereas subjects with a neutral affect showed
an upward bias.
That perception is influenced by affect and emotion is a
well established finding in psychology, but this aspect has not
been studied in any great detail in depression or mania.
VI. Personality Studies:
Several references have been made in the previous sections
to the personality of depressives. Psychotic depressives have
often been said to have "good" or "adequate" pre-morbid personality,
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though it is never very clear what it is "good" or "adequate"
for. Presumably it is good and adequate for the job of living
in general, or it may be good and adequate because it conforms
to the clinician's values. In contrast neurotic depressives
have been said to have in turn, hysterical, obsessional or
inadequate personalities.
Kraepelin devotes a special chapter of his text-book to what
he calls "fundamental states?*. These he describes as disorders
"which on the one hand frequently accompany the 'free* intervals
between the attacks, on the other hand characterise the manic-
depressive temperament in such cases also in which the full
development of the malady is absent. He differentiates the
depressive temperament (present in 12.1^> of his manic-depressive
cases), the manic temperament (present in 9$)» the irritable
temperament (present in 12.4/0 and the cyclothymic temperament
(present in 4$). Though the last type, cyclothymic temperament,
seems to be the least represented in Kraepelin*s sample, he
states that it is "without doubt in reality much more frequent."
Many other authors have supported the opinion that cyclo¬
thymic or cycloid personality is predominant in manic-depressives,
e.g. Kretschmer (1936), Mayer-Gross et al. (1954), Henderson and
Gillespie (1956). Astrup et al. (1959) also found a preponder¬
ance of cycloid personalities among their manic-depressives,
whereas their reactive psychoses had a preponderance of "sensitive?1
personalities. Leonard et al( 1962) found a cyclothymic temperament
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in his manic-depressives (bipolar) and a sub-depressive tempera¬
ment in his recurrent depressives (unipolar). Winokur,Clayton
and Reich (1969) found that 80/i of their manic-depressives to have
Hcyclothymic or hypomanic pre-morbid personality, whereas only
29^ of recurrent depressives were considered cyclothymic or
hypomanic." Rowe and Daggett (1954)» in a retrospective study,
found their manic-depressives to be "sociable, intelligent and
active"and their recurrent depressives to be "shy and conscientious".
Kraines (1957) found manic-depressive illness " extremely
common in persons who present a pre-morbid picture of good adjust¬
ment, extravert characteristics, and high basic levels of energy".
Those who present as shy, retiring introverts very often conceal
basic extraverted patterns.
The psychoanalysts, as seen above, have usually stressed the
anal-sadistic, dependent traits of depressives and manic-depressives.
Ayd (1961) describes depressive psychotics as often
" obsessional" •
On the whole, however, there have been very few systematic
personality studies in affective illness. Most have been
clinical and impressionistic, with vague, undefined criteria, and
therefore not repeat&ble. Worse still,(with the notable exception
of Leonhard and Winokur et al.) most authors have not differen¬
tiated among different types of affective illness. Finally,
very often statements have been made on the basis of assessments
of patients when they are ill and therefore likely to give a
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distorted view of themselves. The effect of illness, the fact
of being in hospital etc., are bound to influence the way a
person sees himself, reports himself, or is seen by others.
Several authors have recently drawn attention to this important
methodological point, notably Astrup et al.(1959). Ferris (1966)
and Metoalfe (l96g).
Some systematic and relatively objective studies of per¬
sonality in affective illness have, however, appeared recently
and these will be reviewed here.
Joseph Becker (I960) attempted to verify Cohen et al.*a
formulation of the manic-depressive character (see above) within
the framework of McClelland*s experimentally derived concepts of
achievement, (McClelland et al. 195$)• McClelland and his
colleagues have identified two relatively independent types of
achievement orientation: Mneed achievement" is said to charac¬
terise people whose concern is to live up to an internalised
standard of excellence, whereas "value achievement" is character¬
ised by people who value achievement for achievements sake as
a response to excessive parental stress or achievement striving.
Becker compared 24 recovered manic-depressives (bipolars)
with 30 non-psychiatric controls, keeping nationality, age range
and minimum level of education constant. He administered a
rating soale to check the reliability of the clinical judgement
of remission and a series of other standard experimental tasks:
a need achievement measure, a verbal level test, four attitude
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scales and two performance tasks. His results showed that the
scores of the manic-depressives on the value achievement scale
were significantly higher than those of the controls, indicating
that the manic-depressives placed a "strong, positive, conscious
valuation on achievement"* Manic-depressives soored signifi¬
cantly higher on a scale measuring rigidly conventional author¬
itarian attitudes, conformity, intolerance of ambiguity and
social imperceptiveness. Manic-depressives scored significantly
higher on a scale measuring submission to authority, emphasis on
discipline and rigidly defined roles for family members. Their
scores did not differ from the controls on the need achievement
task or the two performance tasks.
Thus Becker's empirical findings seem to support Cohen's
aetiological formulations. The fact that McClelland*s concepts
of value and need achievers are not well-known in the psychiatric
literature must, unfortunately, diminish the appeal of this work.
It has been reported here in some detail, because of its method¬
ological approach. To <iuote Backer: "Greater research leverage
could be achieved by translating manic-depressive character into
a personality type whose characteristics, correlates, and genesis
have been more comprehensively studied."
Using a different approach, Perris (1966) also presented a
systematic personality study. Perris compares two well defined
groups of recovered depressives, bipolars and unipolars, and he
uses a multi-dimensional approach, namely that of the Swedish
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psychiatrist Sjobring (1958). Nyman (1956) and Coppen (1966)
have presented Sabring's work in English. In summary Sjobring
speaks of four dimensions of personality:
1. Capacity or intelligence.
2. Validity: effective energy. The sub-valid person
is bound to stability, routine, easily tired, cautious,
tense, meticulous.
3. Stability: similar to introversion-extraversion.
The 3ub-stable person is naive, interested in hi3
fellow-men, frank, open, weakly integrated.
4. Solidity: related to maturity. The sub-solid person
is impulsive, weak, changeable.
Nyman and Marke (1962) have formed a 60-item inventory to
measure three of these dimensions, leaving out Capacity (see
Coppen, 1966, for English translation).
Perris hypothesised that the two recovered depressive groups
would score differently, that the manic-depressives would score
as sub-stable which is equivalent to what other authors have
called, cycloid, cyclothymic, warm, sociable, and that the re¬
current depressives would score as sub-valid, which is equivalent
to insecure, obsessional, sensitive, as called by other authors.
His hypotheses were borne out at high statistical levels of
significance.
Perris's work shows the dangers of making statements about
depressives in general, without taking into consideration such
important sub-classifications as bipolar and unipolar, which his
own work, as well as Ieonhard*s have shown to be a valid diag¬
nostic differentiation. Perris (1971) using the H.P.I., found
recovered bi-polars to higher extraversionandkwer neuroticism than
unipolars.
Metcalfe (1968) gave support to Perris's findings using the
M.P.I, to compare recovered depressed women with "normal" women
and other groups of patients. She reports that even though the
neurotic score of recovered depressives does not differ from the
norm for normals, when the individual questions are examined,
it transpires that the women recovered from depression score
higher on four question, and lower on four others, than "normal"
women. The same applies when the recovered depressives are
compared with other groups of recovered patients. Metcalfe has
interpreted these two sets of questions, after minimising their
neurotic content by some unspecified numerical procedure. The
positive answers to the first set are said to indicate "a tense,
worrying attitude to life"; the negative answers to the second
set indicate "a denial of fantasy and imagination, and a rigid,
limited, habit-bound personality". This description, closely
resembles Perrisfs description of the " sub-valid" personality of
the recurrent depressive.
A study by Coppen and Metcalfe (1965), using the Maudsley
Personality Inventory (M.P.I.) in a follow-up of severely depressed
patients, 3howed startling effects of illness on personality.
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39 patients were tested just after admission and again, after
treatment, when considered recovered. The drop in average N
score (neuroticism) was dramatic and significant and was par¬
allelled by a significant rise in S score (extraversion). 10
patients were followed up a few months after discharge and the
changes accompanying improvement were found to have been maint¬
ained and even increased. Interestingly too the average N score
after recovery was very similar to the reported N score for
normals, discrediting %senck*s concept of N as a measure of a
"tendency to neurotic breakdown under stress?'. Also using the
M.P.I., Perris (1971) in the study mentioned above found very
similar results: "parallel to recovery 3 scores increased, N
scores decreased and EJ/if ratios 3howed a tendency to increase?' in
his 3 groups of patients: bi-polar depressives, unipolar
depressives and neurotic depressives.
Mayo (1967) used different measures, namely the hostility
and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire, H.D.H.Q. (Foulds 1965)and
found important psychological changes associated with improvement
in depression. Testing 24 depressed in-patients at admission
and when clinically improved, he found a significant drop in the
mean level of general punitiveness and also in mean level of
intropunitiveness, i.e. of hostility directed towards the self,
as self-criticism and guilt. Hostility directed towards others,
extrapunitiveness, expressed as acting-out hostility, criticism
of others and projected delusional hostility, did not 3how any
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significant change with improvement, although they all showed
a drop.
Foulds (1965)» using the Hysteroid-Obsessoid Questionnaire
(II. O.Q.), a personality questionnaire, compared psychotically
depressed and neurotically depressed women, and found the
psyohotics to be more obseasoid. However, with improvement,
there was a significant change in that the recovered psychotics
tended to score more as the neurotics, i.e. as more hysteroid;
the mean for the improved neurotics had scarcely changed. This
is in strong agreement with Metcalfe's study reported above,
which is not surprising since the reported correlation between
the H.O.Q. and the M.P.I E^aiS^Game*]^). In addition to becoming
more hysteroid, Fouleds improved psychoticn also beoame more
extrapunitive, less self-critical and less delusionally guilty.
The improved neurotics showed changes in the same direction, but
to a smaller extent. Foulds comments that psychosis disrupts
personality to a greater extent than neurosis and inevitably
makes accurate self-report more difficult. Interestingly too,
Foulds breaks down the type of responses of his two groups to a
diagnostic inventory, (Symptom-Sign Inventory) into 4 categories
and finds the following percentages for each category.
I'Hftctipp Mood Guilt Ghana
Depressives 49 33 10 13
Melancholies 43 48 42 41
Thus he concludes that " the neurotic depressive emphasises
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her failing powers first, fairly closely followed by her mood
of depression, she rarely expresses feelings of guilt or shame.
The psychotic depressive on the other hand, emphasises her
feeling of guilt and shame almost as much as her failing powers
and depressed mood" (opus cit. p.227).
lfysenc&M(1964) has al30 provided some objective systematic
personality study of depressives. He finds that psychotic
depressives have a higher mean N (Neuroticism) score than
schizophrenics, their scores being nearer to the neurotic mean
than the normal mean. He notes, however, that this may be due
to "the diagnostic failure to distinguish properly between endo¬
genous and reactive depression." According to his theory
depressives are dysthymics and are therefore expected to have
low 3 (extraversion) scores. I^rsenck and Claridge (1962) found
some evidence for this. They seem, however, to have tested
their dysthymics during illness.
The importance and interest of such objective personality
studies is that they are repeatable, public, and above all can
provide independent variables for other studies, such as out-^,
come of illness, biochemical factors, type of illness and symptoms
pattern.
vtt.Conclusion:
Psychological studies in the field of affective disorders
can be seen to fall into two categories: those which use
psychological constructs as hypothetical causal factors in
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aetiological studies, e.g. psycho-analytic studies, and those
which use psychological tests and measures to describe groups of
depressives, e.g. some of the personality studies.
The former are often methodologically weak and seem to
assume a common aetiology for all types of affective illness.
The latter, apart from some notable exceptions, have used mixed
groups of depressives and are limited in scope. Studies of
manics and hypomanics are conspicuous by their absence.
Certain important methodological points have emerged
however;
1. The importance of well selected and defined groups is
crucial if research results are to be readily under¬
stood and repeated by other workers.
2. The relevance of the bi-polar-unipolar dichotomy in
affective illness has begun to emerge as a valid system
of classification.
and 3. The influence of illness on personality testing has been
pointed out and demonstrated, making it necessary for
researchers to specify the stage of their patients'
illness at which personality data were obtained.
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CHAPTER 5
AIMS, DESIGN and HXfQTHBSISS of the STUDY
I AIMS:
The alms of the present study are to do with the description
and classification of affective disorders.
A. Description:
The review in the previous chapter has indicated that
there have been very few systematic investigstions of those
disorders of psychological functioning which clinicians claim
to have observed in patients with affective illness. One
aim of this study is therefore to use psychological techniques
to describe objectively aspects of the signs and symptoms,
and personality, cognitive and psychomotor functioning of
affectively ill patients.
B. Classification:
The previous review also indicated that there is little
general agreement about whether unipolar and bi-polar depression
are two separate entities or are better regarded as different
expressions of the same disease. A further aim of the
present study is, therefore, to throw light on this problem
by investigating the pre-morbid personality of both types
of depressed patients, as well as their psychological
functioning during illness and during periods of remission.
Mania and depression: A second aim in relation to
to classification is concerned with depression and mania.
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Many writers categorise these together as "affective cycloid
disorders" , hut the rationale of this is seldom made
explicit* The aim of the present study is to find out
in what way patients with mania differ from» and resemblev
those with depression*
The questions to be answered can be summarised thus:
la. In what way does mania differ from bi-polar and uni¬
polar depression?
lb. In what way does bi-polar depression differ from uni¬
polar depression?
£. How do these groups compare when well: are they the
same people who develop different illnesses or different
people developing different illnesses?
3. What is the effect of illness in each of these groups
or what changes occur with illness?
II HBSIGN
To answer the questions outlined above, bi-polar and uni¬
polar groups have to be tested under two conditions: when ill
to give illness comparisons, and when recovered, to give pre¬
morbid differences. Both the manic and depressive phase of the
bi-polar depressive illness have to be studied to provide features
of both poles of the illness. Also, recovered bi-polars must
be tested after recovery from both mania and depression to provide
complete data about the effect of illness.
A cross-sectional design was decided upon rather than a
follow-up design to avoid the psychometric complications of
re-testing and also because of the uncertainty of seeing the
same patient in both a manic and depressive episode within the
period of data collection.
Thus, six different groups of patients were studied:
1* A group of manic-depressives (Bi-polars) in mania. (Bp.M)
2. A group of manic-depressives (Bi-polars) in
depression. (Bp.B)
3. A group of depressed recurrent depressives (Unipolars)
(Up.D).
4* A group of manic-depressives (Bi-polars) recovered
from mania. (B.Bp.M. )
5» A group of manic-depressives (Bi-polars) recovered
from depression. (xi.Bp.B.)
6. A group of recovered recurrent depressives (Unipolars)
(B.Up.B.).
(Henoeforth, in tables, the groups will simply be referred
to by the initials Bp.M., Bp.B., etc.).
Comparing groups (1) (2) and (3) will answer questions la
and lb outlined above, giving illness comparisons.
Comparing groups (4) (5) and (6) will answer question 2,
giving comparisons during recovery.
Finally comparing (1) with (4)» (2) with (5)# (3) with (6)
will answer question 3» namely the effect of illness in each group.
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It was hoped to obtain at least 18 subjects in each group
to make up a balanced design large enough to make group compar¬
isons reasonable*
III GSNSRAL HYPOTHESES:
A. Manics will differ from bi-polar and unipolar depressives
on several parameters: signs and symptoms of illness,
personality traits and attitudes, and cognitive factors*
B. Bi-polar depressives will differ from unipolar depressives,
but the differences will not be as pronounced as those be¬
tween manics on the one hand and the two depressive groups
on the other.
C. Patients having recovered from a bi-polar affective ill¬
ness will differ from patients having recovered from a uni¬
polar affective illness, mainly in personality characteristics*
D. The effect of illness will be marked in each illness
group, affecting both personality scores and cognitive
factors and will be illness specific, i.e. each illness will
bring about different changes rather than a general change
common to all groups.





I SELECTION OF PATIENTS:
A. Definitions:
Manic-depressives or bi-polars were defined operationally
as patients who had had at least one manic or hypomanic episode
and one depressive episode in the past, both severe enough to
be treated in or out of hospital. This meant that these
patients were seen at least during their third episode of ill¬
ness. As it happened, most had had in fact more than 3 illnesses.
Similarly recurrent depressives or unipolers were patients
who had had at least 3 episodes of primary depression without
mania, again severe enough to be treated. This criterion was
influenced by Perris*s observation that patients with at least
3 episodes of depression without mania were unlikely to develop
mania in the future. It was hoped thus to avoid the misclassifi-
cation of calling subjects unipolars who were in fact potential
bi-polars. The term "primary41 used here is meant to exclude
patients whose depression seems to derive from a primary person¬
ality disorder or to accompany a primary anxiety state.
B. Criteria
i Clinical:
A consultant psychiatrist or senior registrar soreened
the patients and in addition case-note3 were carefully
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sorutinised for history of previous episodes of illness.
Special care was taken to avoid cases of organic psychosis
and schizophrenia* On the whole, however, the rigorous
criterion of 3 clear-cut treated episodes in the history
tended to exclude doubtful cases* Difficulty arose some¬
times about deciding whether a genuine hypomanic attack had
occurred or not, e.g. a number of recurrent depressives seem
to become mildly hypomanic just after recovery. The criterion
applied in such cases was whether the hypomania was severe
enough to be treated. The psychiatrist also interviewed
recovered subjects to ascertain degree of recovery. Only
patients completely recovered clinically were accepted.
Unlike Perris, we did not define our groups as psychotic be¬
cause of the lack of generally accepted criteria for doing
so (see chapter 3), and also because it was felt that such
a criterion was not essential to the thesis. The interest
lay in defining differences, if any, between cases with a
history of bi-polar illness (manic-depressive) and those
with a history of unipolar illness (recurrent depressive).
Historically, the bi-polars have usually been called psychotic,
whereas the unipolars have been sub-divided into psychotics
and neurotics. Such a classification seems confusing and
inconsistent and has no real support apart from tradition.
If the psychotic/neurotic dichotomy is to be kept, it seems
logical that it should apply to both groups, bi-polars and
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unipolars, as sub-divisions. In this study the depressives
v}*''
were simply severely depressed patients treated either with
electroconvulsive therapy or by chemotherapy.
ii Age;
Another criterion for inclusion in the study was age
limit: an upper age limit of 60 years inclusive was adopted
because of the known effect of ageing on certain of the
measures usedf such as motor and mental speed« (Welford,A.T.,
1958i 1962). Also, Gilbert (1935) using Babcock's norms of
mental efficiency (Babcock, 1941) found that the mental
efficiency of subjects aged 60-69 was -4.80. Nelson (1953)
using the same index found a correlation of -.41 between age
and efficiency index in normals. Thus there is strong evi¬
dence for a tendency of mental efficiency to deorease with
increasing age, especially from the age of sixty onwards.
(The efficiency index is the weighted scores on Babcock(s
battery averaged minus the efficiency score expected from the
vocabulary level of subjects.) No attempt was made to control
for age apart from the limit of 60 years, in order not to bias
the sample which was meant to be reasonably representative
of hospital admissions with affective disorders. No lower
age limit was imposed, as the criterion of a history of at
least 3 illnesses ensured that the very young would automati¬
cally be excluded. The youngest subject of the study was
19 years old.
iii Intelligence:
Intelligence was not controlled for the same reasons as
that mentioned above for the age factor. In addition,
intelligence level is not an important factor in the
measures used in this study, as will "be shown below (Section
III); except for the very low or sub-normal.
Though level of intelligence was not measured directly
by any of the more familiar intelligence tests, those below
average intelligence were excluded by their inability to
perform the Nufferno Speed Test (Purneaux, 1956) which was
administered for the purpose of measuring mental speed.
Purneaux (1956) states about the test used in this study:
"The sheet provides satisfactory scores for speed, stress-
gain and speed-range, for mental ages not less than about
11 year3" (p 5/7).
In addition, the 3 factor on Cattell's 16 P.P. (Cattel
& 3ber, 1964) provided a measure of intelligence. This
factor has been much criticised because of its shortness
(13 items) and low validity. Reported validity coefficients
range from. 19 (Reimanisl96|5)jiiD. 51 (Sims and Clower 1.966 ^low-
ever, recent work by Kear-Gobwell (1970) has shown the B
factor scale to be a reasonably valid measure of general
intelligence in a female hospital population (correlation
with Progressive Matrices = 0.79 after correction for atten¬
uation). But in the male sample it appeared to be a mixed
measure of both verbal ability and general intelligence
(correlation with P.M.>.46, after correction for attenuation).
This measure was thought adequate for the purpose of this study.
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C. Description of Patients
The aim of obtaining at least 18 subjects in each group was
fulfilled, except for one group, the depressed manic-depressives,
of whom 17 were tested, one of whom failed to complete the full
battery of measures.
An analysis of variance was carried out to compare the groups
on age and intelligence (Cattell's B factor).
Table 5*1 below summarises the main characteristics of the
sub-groups.
It can be seen that both manic groups, group 1 and group 4
are significantly younger than the other groups. (p<.02 - p<.002).
This may be a chance finding, as the selection procedure was the
same for all groups. On the other hand, it is likely that a
relatively younger age is typical of manic and hypomanic patients.
Winokur et al. (1969) found their bi-polar manics significantly
younger than their group of recurrent unipolar depression. In
their large follow-up study, they found that 33^' of their 61 bi-
polars had had symptoms before age 20, and 66f before age 30.
They concluded that the onset for manic-depressive illness is much
earlier than for recurrent depression.
The effect of age on test results will be examined whenever












































II CONDITIONS OF TESTING
Consecutive admissions to the MHC Brain Metabolism Unit
which fulfilled the criteria mentioned above were tested.
Circulars specifying the research requisites were sent to the
consultants of other wards of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital and
neighbouring hospitals and they kindly referred those patients
they felt were suitable.
The subjects comprising the 3 ill groups (Groups 1, 2 and 3)
were seen as soon as possible after admission, preferably before
treatment had started. If they had just been started on chemo¬
therapy and still displayed symptoms and signs of illness, they
were still accepted for the project. However, no patients was
seen after an EOT programme had started.
Sometimes a patient would seem too retarded or too elated and
overactive to be able to co-operate. In such cases testing was
postponed until after recovery and those subjects would thus be
included in one of the recovered groups (groups 4, 5 or 6). Re¬
covered patients were seen as out-patients after they had been
home for at least two weeks.
The average time for completing the tests was 2-2i hours.
Most subjects completed the testing in one session, except for
the very depressed who sometimes required several short testing
sessions to ensure maximum co-operation. Surprisingly the manios
and hypomanics were on the whole quite easy to test, the only
difficulty being for the tester to keep up with their pace of
work sometimesJ
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Out-patients were usually given the 16 P.P. to do at home
and asked to post it hack in one or two days. Most of the in¬
patients required supervision for that test, though some were
able to do it on their own. Again the very retarded and the
very elated had to he nursed through every question of that long
questionnaire.
The various tests and measures were not administered in any
set order, hut varied so a3 to keep the interest of the individual
subjects.
Ill M3ASU11DS US 3D
The measures used in this study were chosen because they
are, on the whole, well documented and well known measures of
the aspects of illness and personality this study sets out to
investigate.
They are objective standardised instruments which are widely
used in clinical psychology, thus making results easily compar¬
able and repeatable for other researchers. The tests will be
described under the sub-headings of the functions they measure.
A. Diagnostic:
The Symptom Sign Inventory, or S.S.I. (Foulds and Hope,
1968), was used for the purpose of eliciting symptoms. It is
an orally administered test, whose development as an aid to the
differential diagnosis of the mentally ill has been well documented
(Foulds, 1962; 1965a,b; 1967) and which derives directly from
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Poulds' theory of personality dysfunction (Poulds, 1964} 1965a;
1971).
His theory was referred to briefly in the earlier chapter
on classification (chapter 3) in relation to the psychotic/
neurotic dichotomy. Another important aspect of the theory is
its explicit effort to develop measures of traits and attitudes
on the one hand, and signs and symptoms on the other, these
measures being independent of each other. Recently, Poulds
(1971) has introduced the concept of "states" as different from
both traits and symptoms. He offers the following tentative
definition of these three concepts:
1. "A symptom is a qualitative change from a previous
condition, such as is found very rarely in any random
sample of the general population, about which the indi¬
vidual complains because it is distressful to him «•••
If the change in bodily or mental functioning is not
reported as a distressing complaint, but the skilled
observer recognises it as indicative of such maladapt-
ation as is likely to cause or to have caused danger
or distress to others or to the patient himself, this
is a sign."
2* state is an affective change from a previous condi¬
tion, which endures for weeks rather than days and where
that changed condition is of a degree rarely found in
any random sample, of the general population."
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3* "A trait (or an attitude) is that concept which serves
to classify the relative generality, consistency, and
continuity of responses to somewhat similar situations.
In some instances a trait may "be that previous condi¬
tion from which a state may emerge. A deviant trait
is an enduring condition of a degree rarely found in
any random sample of the general population and which#
if it changes at all, does so only over a period of
years ."
Thus# generality and endurability are the important discrim¬
inants. The Symptom Sign Inventory aims to elicit signs and
symptoms only and was chosen for that purpose, to test whether
and how the symptoms and signs of illness vary among the experi¬
mental groups. Many existing inventories (e.g. the M.M.P.I.)
seem to measure symptoms# traits and states all in one.
The manual of the Symptom Si^n Inventory (S.S.I.) (Foulds
and Hope# 1968) provides all the necessary information on the
derivation of the items for each of 8 a-priori psychiatric scales#
the administration of the inventory and the use of the various
scoring keys. In the present study all 80 items of the S.S.I,
were administered# and since the groups were already very highly
selective diagnostioally# the interest lay not in the S.S.I,
diagnoses# but in individual items endorsed (see Appendix A for
full copy of S.S.I.). The groups were therefore compared on
individual items endorsed, total number of symptoms, and total
mm tm
responses on each of the 8 a-»priori scales* These are:
A : Anxiety*
B : Neurotic Depression.
C X Mania.
D : Paranoid Schizophrenia.
E ♦• Obsessional State*
P : Non-Paranoid Schizophrenia
G •• Hysteria.
H «• Psychotic Depression.
Eaoh of these scales contains 10 items intended to elicit
symptoms or signs which are frequent and typical in that diagnostic
group* By comparing the groups on the 8 a-priori scalest it was
hoped to find out which groups of symptoms differentiated the
groups» if at all.
In addition one of the set scales of the inventozyf the
Personal Disturbance (PD) Scale was used. The PD scale comprises
20 items» each of which distinguished at least seven male and
seven female diagnostic classes from a sample of normal females
(the manual has no data on normal men). The following 20 items
when answered in the affirmative characterise the person who is
personally disturbed (the letters and numbers denote item position
in the S.S.I. )•
A9 Are you afraid of going out alone?
B2 Have you lost interest in almost everything?
B4 Is the simplest task too much of an effort?
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B6 Have you found it difficult to concentrate recently?
B7 Does the future seem pointless?
B9 Are you slower ecently in everything you do than you
used to be?
D1 Are people talking about you and criticising through
no fault of your own?
SI Are you distressed by silly, pointless thoughts that
keep coming into your mind against your will?
33 Are you unnecessarily careful in carrying out even
simple everyday tasks, like folding up clothes, reading
notices, etc.?
36 Do distressing thoughts about sex or religion come into
your mind against your will?
37 Do you feel you just have to check things again and
again - like turning off taps or lights, shutting
windows at night, etc. although you know there is really
no need to?
38 Have you an unreasonable fear that some careless act
of yours might have very serious consequences?
310 Do you have an uneasy feeling if you don't do something
in a certain order or a certain number of times?
F1 Do you feel that there is some sort of barrier between
you and other people so that you can't really under¬
stand them?
F5 Do you think other people regard you as very odd?
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F6 Do you feel that you cannot communicate with other
people because you don*t seem to be on the same
wave-length?
F9 Do you have very strange and peculiar thoughts at
times?
G4 Do you ever lose all feeling in any part of your skin,
so that you would not be able to feel a pin prick, or
do you ever hove burning or tingling sensations?
H7 Are you ever so low in spirits that you just sit for
hours on end?
The PD scale is an improved version of the Personal Illness
Scale described by Foulds (19654) and has been used by many
researchers to identify individuals who were experiencing diffi¬
culties in mutual personal relationships (Foulds and I»layo, 1967,
Philip and McCullooh, 1968 ; Vinoda, 19o6; and Philip, 19684).
The PD Scale differs from its predecessor, the PI scale, in that
it contains fewer items from the a-priori anxiety scale and more
from the neurotic depression and obsessional scales. Mayo
(1968 ) showed the existence of a population of normals who had
many symptoms of personal illness, but who had not sought
psychiatric help. This finding led to the dropping of the term
"personal illness*' from the 5.S.I. manual since it could be
seen that although almost all Personality ill individuals
obtained high scores on the PI scale, some persons scoring high
on the scale were not personally ill, i.e. as defined by Foulds
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(1965$ their symptoms did not constitute a personal illness
since they were able to cope with them*
The Manual presents the frequency distribution of scores,
their means and standard deviations of various diagnostic groups
and of normals on the PD scale* Philip (1968$ has criticised
the use of mean scores on the PD scale on two accounts: firstly
that distribution of scores is markedly skewed, especially in
the case of normals, secondly that it is not a quantitative
scale, in the sense that it cannot be said that a person with a
PD score of 10 is twice as disturbed as a person with a PD score
of 5* He quotes as example the mean PD score of female manics
(as quoted in the manual, table 11) which is 3*80 while psycho-
tically depressed women have a PD score of 7*78. Philip proposed
instead the use of three categories derived from the frequency
distribution of the manual: Normal (PD score of 0 and 1),
Borderline (scores of 2, 3 and 4) and Personally Disturbed
(scores of 5 + ).
It is felt, however, that manics may be an exceptional group
in view of the quality of their illness: the elated, euphoric
manic will not report himself as distressed by symptoms if he
feels, subjectively, at the height of well-being. (It is felt
that the S.S.I, does not give the same importance to signs of
illness as to symptoms, despite its name). All the other
diagnostic groups quoted in the manual have fairly uniform mean
PD scores which differentiate them from normals. (See table
6.1 below).
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Table 6.1 Mean scores of different diagnostic groups on the
Personal Disturbance Soale (women) - S.S.I. Manual, 1968*



















A - Anxiety state
ND - Neurotic depression
H - Hysteria
0 - Obsessional state
NPS - Non-paranoid schizophrenia
PS - Paranoid schizophrenia
M - Mania
PD - Psychotic depression
N - Normals
On the first oount» the argument about distribution, it is
the normals who obtain a highly skewed distribution, whereas mental
patients obtain a roughly gaussian distribution (Foulds, 1971), -
(see figure 6.1 below reproduced with permission of the author
and the editor of 'Psychological Medioine').
This study has therefore made use of mean PD scores for diff¬
erentiating the three ill groups, but has used Philip's categories
for comparing the recovered groups.
Pi-flr. b'i> f PlSrunBA/scz* Scores of
.. AOKMfiLS/ ft/eikAQTlCS t AW TsfCHOTlCS.
( rfproduczp f«oa\ &*/>♦ foulpsj }qy f)
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B. States and Traits:
i. Hostility? Aggression and hostility play an important
role in the phenomenology of affective illness and in psyoho-
dynamic theories, specially those of the psychoanalytic school,
as we saw in the previous review section* Shis aspect of
personality and illness has been studied here with the use of
the Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire or HDHQ
(Caine, Foulds and Hope, 1967)*
It is a questionnaire designed to measure a wide range of
possible manifestations of aggression, hostility, or punitiveness*
Foulds (1965$ gives a detailed description of the development of
this instrument and it has since been used in several studies*
Its rationale lies in Foulds*s theory (op oit) of person¬
ality and personal illness or disturbance* Personal disturbance
is seen as a continuum of increasing degrees of failure to
maintain or to establish mutual personal relationships. The
more a person is able to empathise, the more successful he will
be at sustaining mutual relationships, and the less likely he
is to resort to blaming himself or others, even under stress.
Egocentricity and lack of empathy are common to all the personally
disturbed and the personality disorders and entail self-blame and
blaming others: "To resort to blame without at once going beyond
it is to resort to egooentricity" (op oit p.91). Foulds proposes,
therefore, that punitiveness is a suitable attitudinal measure
of egocentrioity and hence personal illness.
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He assumes that hostility or punltlveness is unitary and
oan be directed either inwards towards the self or outwards, to¬
wards others and objeots - the terms he uses are intropunitiveness
and extrapunitiveness. first coined by Hosenzweig (1934)* The
intropunitive and extrapunitive scales were derived from the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory or M.M.P.I. (Foulds,
Caine and Creasy, I960), and consist of 5 sub-scales: self-
criticism (SC) and Delusional Guilt (DG) make up the intropunitive
scale and Acting-out Hostility (AH), Criticism of others (CO),
Projected Delusional Hostility (PH), make up the extrapunitive
scale* In constructing the sub-scales it was assumed that: on
the extrapunitive scale, paranoids would score high on PH, psycho¬
paths would score high on AH and that hysterold personalities
would show a tendency to criticise others (CO), on the intro¬
punitive scale, it was hypothesised that melancholies would score
high on delusional guilt (DG), while obsessold personalities
would endorse many self-critical (SC) items. It seems, then,
that hostility and its direction can properly be called states,
as defined above. Poulds et al. (I960) found a positive corre¬
lation between all the sub-scales, allowing them to postulate a
factor of general punitiveness. The patterns of correlation
confirmed the hypothesis that the intropunitive scale was measuring
something different from the extrapunitive scale. Hope (1963)
tested the principal components of subtest correlation matrices.
His results showed a similar component structure for both normals
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and neurotics, the first component being unipolar with all 5 sub¬
tests represented (General Hostility), the second component
contrasted the two intropunitive sub-scales (SC and DG) with the
three extrapunitive sub-soales (AH, 00, PH). Hope worked out
formulae for calculating scores which would approximate to the
full component scores whilst being easy to calculate. For
General Hostility, the formula was AH + CO ♦ PH + SC ♦ DG, for
Direction of Hostility (2S + DG) - (AH + CO ♦ PH), positive scores
indicating predominant intropunitiveness. The Manual of the
Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (HDHQ) (Caine,
Foulds and Hoppe, 1967) follows Hope's results and theoretical
formulations. Validity studies have borne out predictions that
psychotics should be higher on General Punitiveness than neurotics
and the latter higher than normals, that paranoids would be extra-
punitive and melanoholios intropunitive, that selected melancholies
(those with no paranoid features) and selected paranoids (those
with no depressive features) would be at the extremes of the
continuum.
Beliability estimates were based on test-retest correlation
coefficients obtained on a sample of 30 normals who were retested
a year after Initial testing. The reliability of General Hostility
was found to be 0.75 while the reliability of Direction of
Hostility was 0.51*
Philip (1968) tested the constancy of the structure of the
HDHQ by comparing Hope's results with results from a similar
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population in a different part of the country and concluded that
Hope*s component scores of General Punitiveness and Direction of
Hostility are generally applicable.
In addition to the work reported above under the review
seotion of personality studies (p.7*f-)t other studies have used the
HDHQ: with attempted suicides (Vlnoda, 1966, Philip, 1968), with
prisoners (Foulds, 1968), to differentiate patients with "psychic*1
and "somatic** symptoms (Foulds et al.. 1966).
Most of these studies have used the principal component
scoring system for analysis, but the present author has followed
Philip*s suggestion (1968^,1971) of an alternative scoring
system. Philip notes that Foulds et al. (I960) found that
intropunitiveness seemed to measure something different from
extrapunitive,: and that clinical experience suggests that the
intropunitive measures vary over time more than the extrapunitive
measures. Hence he concludes that it might be profitable to
measure extrapunitiveness and intropunitiveness independently
rather than combine them in a Direction of Hostility score.
Only the following two measures will be used in this study*
Hictrapunitiveness (Sum 3) * AH ♦ CO + PH.
Intropunitiveness (Sum I) « SC ♦ DG.
Since General Hostility (3 4- I) is a simple addition of
these two components, it was thought redundant to include it as
a separate measure.
Sten Scores (standard 10 point scale) have been used through¬
out instead of raw scores, to facilitate comparisons of scores
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on the two scales with scores on the personality measures described
in the next section, which also use sten scores. Thus the
means and variances of the different factors do not have to he
taken into account when comparisons are made.
The standard ten-point scale (or sten soale) uses 10 points
to cover the population range. To transform a distribution of
scores into stens, the raw score mean is fixed at 5*5 stens and
points which are one half of a standard deviation above and below
the mean translate to stens of 6 and 5 respectively. Thus stens
of 5 and 6 are average, 4 and 7 are slightly deviant, 2, 3, 8
and 9 are markedly deviant, while stens of 1 and 10 indicate
scores which are more than two standard deviations from the
mean. The sten soores referred to in this study are based on
the general population norms, 154 males and 372 females with
separate normative data for the sexes (Philip, personal communi¬
cation). See Appendix B •
ii. Anxiety and Bxtraverslon; These two aspects of person¬
ality were assessed with the sixteen Personality Factor Question¬
naire. or 16 P.F. (Cattell and Iber, 1964)• This Questionnaire
has been developed from Cattail*a personality sphere concept
described in a multitude of publications, articles, text-books
and test manuals. The clearest account of the theoretical and
practical aspects, which can be vexy involved due to the use of
complicated statistics and neologisms, is to be found in the
Scientific Analysis of Personality (Cattell, 1965) and in the
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latest handbook (Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoka, 1970)* The 16 P.F.
Is based on a series of interlocking researohes over 25 years,
directed to locating unitary, independent and pragmatically
important M source traits" • By " source traittf' Cattell means
3
factors (rotated to simple oblique structure) affecting large
areas of the overt personality behaviour, such as intelligence,
emotional lability, superego strength, surgency and dominance.
Thus, Cattell aims to cover the whole of behaviour that commonly
enters ratings and the dictionary descriptions of personality.
In addition to the 16 primary or first order factors, Cattell
recommends the use of second-stratum or-order factors, of whioh
four have been in use until reoently. Of the latter, only two,
Anxiety and Introversion, have been shown to be easily matched
over various studies (Horn, 1963).
In the most recent handbook (Cattell et al.. 1970), the
number of primary factors have been extended to 23 and the
second order factors to eight. However, since this study used
the previous better-known version (Cattell and Eber, 1964), con¬
sideration will be given only to that form of the test here.
Brief descriptions of the bi-polar first order factors are as
follows:
Factor Low Soore High Score
A Reserved Out-going
B Dull Bright
C Emotionally Unstable Mature, faces reality
E Submissive Dominant
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The second order factors are obtained by factorising the
correlation matrix obtained from correlating the scale scores
of first-order factors, thus producing a smaller number of
broader factors* Psychologically these second-stratum factors
may be viewed as broader influences, or organisers, contributing
to the primaries and accounting for their being correlated* As
mentioned above, the two best second order factors are:
Anxiety: affecting C-emotional instability, H-shyness, 1* sus¬
piciousness, 0+ apprehensiveness, Q^-self-conflict, tension,
and Extraversion. which affects A+, outgoingness, E+, Dominance,
F+ enthusiasm, H+ uninhibition, Qg- group dependency*
Gattell postulates a complex positive feedback interaction
of the primary factors and "considers that a higher position on
any one of the primaries involved tends, because of social
mechanisms, to generate a higher level on the others. In this
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way they become correlated, and involved in common expressions
in the course of development* Because of this degree of
functional unity, it becomes economical to give a single score
to show how a person has proceeded in this process" (Cattell
et al.. 1970, p.117).
The formulae for working out the second-order factor scores
from individual scores are set out in the handbook (Cattell and
Eber, 1964).
Anxiety: 3.7 - 0.2C - 0.2H + 0.21 + 0.30 - 0.2Q3 + (.4 Q4
Extraversion: 0.2A + 0.2E + 0.4F + 0.5H - ^*^2 ~
The products of these formulae are rounded to the nearest
whole number, the constants in the equation ensuring that the
scores are sten scores. The first order factors are also
expressed as sten scores. The derivation of sten scores was
described above. The norms used in this study were those of
the general population, males and females having separate norm¬
ative data. Form A of the test was administered throughout.
The handbook provides ample material about the psychometric
properties of the scales, which it would be pointless to repeat
here in great detail. It would suffice to say that the con¬
sistency of the test in the foim of reliability (agreement of
two different administrations), homogeneity (agreement of test
parts) and transferabilit.y (agreement of what is measured across
different populations) and its validity all reach acceptable
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levels. For form A the reliability coefficients over two and a
half months vary between .43 to .85* over four to seven days
the test re-test coefficient varied between .58 to .81. The
average concept validity (i.e. the degree to which the scales
agree with the statistical faotors they are supposed to measure)
is O.85.
It was decided to use the 16 P.F. in this study rather than
any of the other personality questionnaires in use, because of
its psychometric robustness and its wide scan of personality
factors. However, preliminary analysis of the results (based
on incomplete data) showed that the factors which differentiated
the groups, were in fact mostly those whieh contribute to the
second-order factors of Anxiety and Extraversion (see table 6.2
for mean scores). So it was decided to concentrate on those
two broad factors for clarity and conciseness. In fact, the
equivalence of those factors has probably been often used when
talking of personality in affective illness. Adcock (1965)
in a comparison of Cattail*s and ^ysenck*s concepts concluded
on theoretical grounds that the former*s anxiety and extraversion
(sometimes called exvia-invia) factors were equivalent to
3ysenck*s N (neuroticism) and E (extraversion) factors. He
felt that both the A and N factors would be better described as
E&iotional Beactivity. Grookes and Pearson (1970) tested the
relationship empirically. Comparing the scores of 60 hospital
patients on the SPI and 16 P.F., they found similar and sub¬
stantial correlations between the EPI scores and corresponding
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16 P.P. scores; r between N and A * 0.71» r between E and El »
0.71. They also divided the E.P.I. E scores into "impulsive"
and "sociable" items, on the basis of the analysis by Ifysenck
and Eysenck (1963) and found that the 16 P.P.,EL score correlated
better with the sociable half of the E.P.I.,E score (r = 0.74)
than with the impulsive half (r * 0.39). The two halves of
E.P.I.,E correlated only moderately together (r » 0.37). Bendig
(1962) reached the same conclusionifcen he analysed the Guildford
Zimmerman Temperament Survey in conjunction with M.P.I, scales.
Two distinct extraversion factors emerged: one in the Guildford
tradition and conforming to the Jungian concept of inhibition,
the other characterised by sociability and ascendance. The
M.P.I. ,E score loaded more heavily on the latter factor, the
former factor giving insignificant loadings.
In the light of this discussion it would seem that Cattail*s
and Eysenck*s concepts of extraversion are similar despite
different theoretical approaches: Social inhibition and
general inhibition respectively.
Another advantage then of concentrating on the Anxiety and
Extraversion second-order factors will be to facilitate compari¬
son with other studies using the E.P.I. or M.P.I, (e.g. Kendall
et al.. 1968, Metcalfe, 1968, Coppen and Metcalfe, 1965).
Motivational Distortion and Peking
Both the above measures, the H.D.H.Q. and the 16 P.P. are
open to the usual criticisms about questionnaires, i.e. that
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they are liable to distortion, and susceptible to faking.
Several distortion factors have been discussed in the literature
in relation to the validity of questionnaires. These can be
listed as: sheer sabotage, the various response sets, acquies¬
cence, indecisiveness, social desirability, role playing, and
finally ignorance on the part of the examinee.
Sabotage, if obvious, can usually be detected, but luckily
does not often happen, specially in an acute hospital population
which is fairly well-motivated to co-operate.
The various response sets have been investigated in a
plethora of publications, ever since Lentz (1938) first drew
attention to an acquiescence set, operating in questionnaires of
the True-False type, that caused some subjects to mark items
as true irrespective of the psychological content of these
items. Knowles (1963) reviewed this topic very fully and it
seems unnecessary to repeat his cogent arguements here. On the
whole, the awareness of these problems has led to the construction
of better questionnaires, avoiding ambiguous questions (Cronbaok,
1946), using the so-called balanced scales (Couch and Kenlston,
I960), and adopting paired comparison technique (Sdwards, 1959)»
Both the 16 P.F. and the H.D.H.Q. use a balanced scale, i.e.
both "true" and "false" or "agree"/"disagree" responses contri¬
bute to a certain score. This technique is not fool-proof
against the Yea and Naysayers, but probably helps to counteract
the acquiesence set to a certain extent. The most effective
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device to ensure the validity of questionnaires is that the
examiner should use his clinical skill to the best of his ability
to obtain full co-operation from his subjects and remember to
give the proper instructions always. It seems proper to
conclude as Warburton (1963)* "The fact that questionnaires may
be oritioised on these grounds by no means invalidates them.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating, and there is a great
deal of evidence that personality questionnaires make a valuable
contribution to our assessment of psychological qualities and
hence that the overall effect of faking is not disastrous."
C Thought Process:
Disorders of thinking are usually described as character¬
istic of schizophrenia and there have been several attempts to
describe and quantify this aspect of schizophrenia by means of
psychological measures. However, several features of speech
disturbance, and by inference thought disorder , are common to
both schizophrenia and mantes, e.g. Slater and Roth (1969),
Prefdman and Kaplan (1967), state that pressure of speech,
flight of ideas, loose associations, dlstractability and in¬
ability to adhere to a line of thought, are common to both
conditions. These features are all characteristic of formal
thought disorder or thought process disorder as opposed to dis¬
orders of the content of thought. On the other hand depressives
are characterised by slowness and inhibition of thought and
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often complain that they cannot follow up ideas, e.g. Mmy mind
does not work any more" •
This study will look at thought process in the affective
disorders using two well-known psychological measures which are
widely used in clinical practice*
i* Repertory Grid Testt Bannister (I960, 1962, 1963»
1965) has been concerned to develop a measure of thought process
disorder within the framework of Personal Construct Theory
(Kelly, 1955)» utilising the technique of repertory grid testing
derived from this theory. Bannister and Mair (1968) and Bruner
(1956), give a detailed account of Kelly's theory which is pre¬
sented as a fundamental postulate and eleven elaborated corollaries*
Briefly the theory is based on the assumption that all men may
be thought of as "scientists" in the sense that they are concerned
with the prediction and control of their environment* Bach
individual seems to develop his own personal repertoire of
constructs by means of which he structures or conceptualises his
world and tries to anticipate events. A construct is not merely
a label, it is in essence a prediction. To construe a person
as "honest" is to predict future events and predictions can be
validated or invalidated by future events or these events can
turn out to be irrelevant, i.e. outside the range of convenience
of the constructs used to predict them.
Bannister and Fransella (1966, 1967) devised a Grid Test
of Thought Disorder which consists of sorting out 8 photographs
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(elements) using 6 different constructs: kind, stupid, selfish,
sincere, mean, honest. The subject is asked to pick the photo¬
graph depicting the person who is likely to be the most kind,
his selection is turned face down and he is then asked to pick
the most kind of the photographs left, etc., until the eight
photographs have been ranked from the most kind to the least
kind. The same procedure is followed for the remaining five
constructs. When this is done the test is repeated once again,
with the additional instructions: "If you feel you want to change
your mind, you may, because this is not a memory test. There
are no right or wrong answers, I just want to know how you feel
about these people now that you have thought about them a lot"•
The assumption underlying the test is that the psychological
relationship between any two constructs for a given subject is
reflected in the statistical association between them when they
are used as sorting categories by the subject. What is measured
is the relationship between the sorting categories (constructs)
for the subjeot, not the "correctness^ of the sorts as suoh.
The two scores derived from the test are Intensity and
Consistency scores. The intensity score is the total amount
of relationship between all possible pairs of constructs over
both administrations (Grid I and Grid II), (calculated by
Spearman* rho^x 100, giving variance in common).
The consistency score is simply the test-retest correlation
(Grid I and Grid II), giving a measure of the consistency with
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which these measures have been used*
Typically, normals tend to have a well organised system of
constructs so that the correlations of the rankings of pairs of
constructs tend to he highly positive or highly negative, giving
a high total intensity score* Thought process disordered
schisophrenics have typically loose relationships between their
constructs, so that they have a low intensity score.
Normals and non-thought disordered patients also tend to be
consistent in their construing of photographs on immediate retest
but thought disordered schizophrenics have a typically low score.
Bannister and Fransella (1966) found consistency and
intensity to be positively correlated and suggested that both
scores be used diagnostically (scores lower than 1000 on intensity
and 0.49 on consistency are diagnostic of schizophrenic thought
disorder).
Several experimental studies have validated Bannister's
standpoint (Bannister and Salmon, 1966; Foulds, et al« * 1967,
McPherson, 1969; MoPherson et al.* 1970; Presly, 1969). All
studies report no relation with age, sex and I.Q., except that
subnormals, with I.Q.1 s less than 80, obtain extremely low scores
(Bannister and Fransella, 1966).
As reported above, in the review of cognitive studies,
Mellsop et al..(1971) have recently used the test with manlcs,
and found that manics obtained a mean intensity score of 1,497
and mean consistency score of *56, which did not differentiate
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them from normals. They were differentiated from thought dis¬
ordered schizophrenics on the intensity score, but not on the
oonsistenoy score (their mean schizophrenic consistency score of
0.42 was far above that of 0.18 reported by Bannister and
Fransella).
Bannister (1962), Bannister and Fransella (1966) and
Bannister et al.. (1971) have used depressives as criterion
groups in their validation studies and found that on the whole
they did not differ from normals, but differed significantly from
thought disordered schizophrenics on both intensity and consistency,
although Bannister (1962) found his depressives to have signifi¬
cantly lower intensity scores than normals. Theiro depressives
included both reactive and endogenous depressives. Neurotics,
however, consisting of hysterics, obsessionals, anxiety states
and mixed types, have been found to have higher intensity and
consistency scores than all other groups, suggesting a tightening
up of their construct system which would imply "a gross restriction
in the number of ways in which a neurotic can view any given
situation. This would mean that all situations tend to be seen
as more or less exaot replications of situations previously
experienced and behaviour becomes consequently rigid and stereo¬
typed" Bannister (1962).
'Thought disorder' could therefore be regarded as a verbal
label for a crudely defined section of a continuum which stretches
from pathologically tight to pathologically loose construing."! °P • ^
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The intensity and consistency scores of the Bannister-
Fransella Grid Test of thought disorder will he used in this
study to compare the experimental groups on this continuum and
find out whether the type of thought process disorder showed in
mania and depressiont as outlined ahovef can he experimentally
demonstrated hy this method*
ii* Object-Classification Test: The second measure of
thought process disorder used is the procedure which Payne has
developed to test N. Cameron*s (1939) theory of Moverinclusion"
to denote some schizophrenic*s inability to maintain conceptual
boundaries* Payne (196©) has fully reviewed this field. Payne
and Hewlitt (i960) factor-analysed the scores of schizophrenics
on a large number of measures and obtained a factor which they
called " overinclusion" . later Payne and Priedlander (1962)
using three of the measures which loaded best on that factor,
presented the three tests as a battery for testing overlnclusive
thinking. The Object Classification test was one of the measures.
The battery has been widely criticised, e.g. by Hawks (1964),
Watson (1967) and Price (1970), who found veiy low, or negative,
correlations among the subtects* However, only the Object
Classification test will be considered here.
It has been unclear whether Payne meant this test to measure
thought process or thought content disorder, but as Foulds et al.
(1967) point out: "As described by Cameron, • overinclusion**
appears to be more closely related to thought process than to
thought content disorder14.
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Gatheroole (1965)* reviewing testa of overinclusive thinking*
suggested that "high scores are returned by people who continue
to sort the objects in the object classification test"• He
comments that since Payne and Ilewlitt (I960) defined the over-
inclusion faotor as that "which differentiated maximally between
the depressive and schizophrenic groups" , one would expect
depressives to give up responding before schizophrenics. Simi¬
larly one would expeot retarded schizophrenics to have a lower
score than non-retarded schizophrenics and this is exactly what
Payne and Hewlett (I960) found. Hxpectedly, chronic schizo¬
phrenics, who are usually retarded* are reported by Payne et al.
(1963) to have a low score on the overinclusion factor. Gather-
Cole concludes that Payne*s test is not measuring overinclusive
thinking in Cameron's sense at all, but instead "the ability to
associate freely to the stimuli presented to the patient*.
Thus one would expect manic patients to have a high " over-
inclusion" score, and this is in fact reported by McGhie et al.
(1964). What is being measured is the inability to restrain
responses produced by the fluency of association. Hawks and
Marshall (1971) found that if overinclusive schizophrenics were
made to decrease their speed of responding, they became signifi¬
cantly less overinclusive and vice versa, if non-overinclusive
schizophrenics were made to increase their speed, they became
significantly more overinclusive.
Poulds et al. (196?) found that the correlations calculated
between various tests of schizophrenic thought disorder tended to
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be negative though statistically insignificant. Hawks and
Marshall (1971) suggest that a high overinclusion score may be
the result of responding at an over-optimal speed. A state of
information overload occurs in schizophrenia to which some schizo¬
phrenics adapt by slowing down their rate of response* Others
who do not learn to retard the rate at which they process inform¬
ation will appear overinclusive.
This theory need not apply to schizophrenics only, and,
prima facie, seems to fit the manic and depressive picture very
well. Hawks and Payne (1971) found that the combined soore
derived from the three standard tests of overinclusion had signi¬
ficant correlations with clinically rated "open hostility",
"motor aotivity" , "talkativeness", "motor speed" ,"verbal respons-
iveness" and "thought disorder". These are all manic symptoms*
As mentioned in the review of cognitive studies, Payne and
Hirst (1957) and Payne and Hewlftt (I960), have used the over-
inclusion score in studies of depressives, with contradictory
results: these may have been due to lack of homogeneity in the
populations studiesl (e.g. retarded and non-retarded depressives)
and/or to the low correlation between the tests used.
The Object Classification Test consists of 12 small objects,
4 squares, 4 circles, and 4 triangles of different sizes and
thickness, made of different materials, and painted in colours
which differ in both hue and saturation, so that there are
intended to be 10 different ways of grouping the objects, each
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according to a different principle. The subjects are asked to
sort the objects into groups in as many different ways as they
can. The 10 correct ways have been classified as M A" sortings#
All the other ways of sorting the objects including repeating an
A sortingt are scored MNon-AM. Intelligence, sex and age have
not been found to be significantly related to "overinclusion"
score (Hawks, 1964)*
Claridge et al« (1966) have observed that*non-AM (" abnormal" )
responses on the object classification test include a wide range
of abnormal responses which may have little in common. They
propose the alternative scoring system of 4 different types of
Hnon-AH responses, namely: abstract bizarre, concrete bizarre,
repitition of previous sortings and overincluslve. This method
was not followed here, that of Payne and Priedlander (1962)
seeming adequate for the purpose of this study. The raw scores
will be used instead of the transformed scores suggested by Payne
and Prledlander as the use of transformed scores is to facilitate
comparison among different sub-tests of overinclusive thinking
and to enable the use of a combined overinclusion score.
D. Speed:
Depression and mania are characteristically accompanied by
subjective feelings of slowness and increase in speed respectively.
Retardation and inhibition on the one hand, over-activity, dis-
inhibition and increased speed on the other hand, are included in
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most text-books* lists of symptoms of depression and mania
respectively* Eetardation and its opposite, increase in speed,
can express themselves in both motor and mental activities, and
it seems that both aspects need not be disturbed to the same
degree or at the same time. Nelson (1953) found that problem-
solving speed suffers less than does motor speed in mental dis¬
orders. Iier group of manic-depressives (which consisted of
Mmanics" , "melancholic^', "mild or neurasthenic depressive^',
"agitated depressives" and "anxiety states") had the poorest
scores on motor-tests as compared to other functional psychotics.
Babcock (1941)# who does not describe her manic-depressives,
obtained the same results. As pointed out in the review section,
there has not been much agreement about whether depressives show
retardation on objective measures, and no study of the performance
of manics on speed tests, seems to have been reported. Both
motor and mental speed will be studied here.
1. Motor Speed: The Gibson Spiral Maze or G.S.M. (Gibson
1965)# was chosen to study psychomotor speed. This test seemed
eminently suitable for that purpose because of its simplicity,
shortness, ease of administration and the important fact that it
is not contaminated by X.Q. The better known Porteus Maze Test,
which originated in 1914# is in fact a test of intelligence and
would not have provided a pure psycho-motor speed measure. The
G.S.M. consists of a spiral design printed on a card. It
provides a pathway 135 cm. in length bordered by heavy black
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lines. Obstacles in the form of the letter 0 in heavy type
are scattered along the whole length of this pathway. The
design differs from other mazes, like the Porteus, in that it
does not have blind alleys or alternative pathways, so that traoing
the way through does not involve intellectual ability. The sub¬
ject is asked to trace a line, starting with the arrow in the
middle, as Auickly as he can, until he reaches the exit. He is
also asked to avoid, as much as possible, touching the lines at
the side and the little obstacles. A stop-watch is used to
record the time taken from the time the subject starts tracing
and after 15 sees, he is told to "go as quickly as you can" and
at intervals of 15 sees, afterwards he gets the instructions
"quickly, now, quickly" in a firm and sharp voice.
Gibson (1965) recommends 2 scores on this test, a T score
(time recorded in seconds) and B score (error score : No. of times
side lines and obstaole3 are touched or penetrated, soored as
1 or 2). T and E are, in fact, usually found to be very highly
negatively correlated, i.e. the faster an S is the more likely
he is to make errors. Gibson quotes a correlation coefficient
of -0.5» This was confirmed by McDonald and Parker (1971)
with normal adolescent subjects and by Whiting et al. (1969) with
E.S.N, children. Gibson suggests an "adjusted" B score, by
partMLing out T, as probably the most useful single measure.
This method has not been followed here, because the basic
parameter of interest was psycho-motor speed and not a combined
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T and S score as a measure of temperament, which is what Gibson
intends this instrument to be. He reports, for example, that
performance relates to teacher-rated degrees of " naughtinesS"
and later to delinquency. McDonald et al. (op. cit.) found a
highly significant correlation between "adjusted" error soore
and Hysencl^s N score in adolescents. Foulds (1951) using the
Porteus Mazes qualitatively, found considerable temperamental
differences between different psychoneurotic groups.
Here the test will be used as an error-free speed test and
would qualify as a "simple motor response" test in Yates* (I960)
analysis of psychomotor functions. (Che test was administered
under three conditions, once in the usual way and twice with
distractions, with every experimental group. These conditions
were designed as an attempt to repeat Foulds (1952) results,
described above (p 70), regarding the effect of distraotion on
maze performance.
The usual administration (D) was as described above. An
internal distraotion situation was devised as follows! with the
usual instruction, the following was added: "As you go round, I
want you to count out loud 1, 2, 3» 4 until you reaeh the exit.
You should count at the rate of about 1 number in 2 seconds at
the most." The rate of counting was demonstrated. This
administration will be referred to as (CJ). Foulds got his sub¬
jects to repeat numbers after him, but it was thought that it
might require more involvement from the patients if they initiated
the counting themselves.
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An external distraction situation was set up by playing a
pre-recorded news item from a tape-recorder (see Appendix A),
This was played rather loudly and introduced so as to alert the
subject; "While you trace your way round, I'm going to play a
story on this tape here. I'll start it and when I say 'begin'
you can go straight ahead." This condition will be referred to
as (S>). The story was played for about one minute before the
instructions to start were given. The rest of the instructions
were as described above.
The three conditions were administered in a balanced design
to counteract practice effect; thus there were six different
orders of presentation, UCS, USC, (XJS, CSU, SUC, SCO. Since
there were 18 subjects in each group (except for one group) three
subjects in each group had the same order of presentation. In
addition, the three administrations were scattered over the
whole testing session.
Results will be reported as: motor-speed without distraction
(U), gain with internal distraction (U-C), gain with external
distraction (U-S).
2. Mental Speed: Mental speed, or speed of problem
solving, was assessed by the Nufferno Speed Tests unstressed and
stressed forms, as described by Furneaux in the test manual (1956).
Furneaux (1952, I960) has developed a theory of problem
solving ability which argues "that a subject's score in a cog¬
nitive test of the familiar kind is determined by the interaction
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of a number of determinants which should really all receive
separate consideration. A logical analysis of the nature of
the problem-solving act suggests that three attributes* speed*
accuracy* and continuance, are concerned with any kind of "intell¬
igent' behaviour1* (Furneaux I960, p. 190). He has designed a
test which measures problem solving ability (power) which involves
the three variables,rewarding continuance or persistence in
particular (Nufferao Level test). The speed measures provide
two separate scores, speed and accuracy which attempt to remain
unoontaminated. Purneaux (1952) made several important method¬
ological points about the intricacies of mental speed measurement.
He found that although certain relationships exist between the
time a particular person takes to solve problems correctly and
incorrectly, these are of such a nature that it is preferable to
base rate of work on correct solutions only. Adding the time
taken for correct and incorrect solutions increases the standard
error of measurement.
Secondly, in measuring mental speed, the level of difficulty
of the problems to be solved, must be taken account of. As
problems increase in difficulty, the time required to solve them
increases. When this time exceeds a certain maximum, which
differs from person to person, a subject has the tendency to
abandon the problem causing the difficulty, and attempts a fresh
one. The distribution of solution times at such difficulty
levels is therefore restricted, and is partly determined by the
factor of persistence or continuance. This factor is not
130 -
operative at lower levels. Therefore» in order to measure speed
of problem solving, uncontaminated by other factors, it is
necessary to choose rather easy problems, all at the same level
of difficulty.
Finally the dispersion of the time taken to provide the
right answers to a set of easy problems, all of equal difficulty,
is highly positively skewed. If, however, the observed time
values (t) are converted to logarithms, the distribution of
log-t for any particular person approximates to that defined by
a normal curve, the variance of which is the same at all levels
of difficulty and for most people.
All these conditions are fulfilled by the Nuffemo Speed
Tests - Forms A(l), A(2) and B(l). Forms A(l) and A(2), which
appear on Nuffemo Sheet 1, are of equivalent difficulty and are
satisfactory for mental ages not less than 11 years. Form B(l)#
which appears on Nufferno Sheet 2, is more difficult and is more
suitable for mental ages not less than 14 years. The problems
consist of letter series of the type used by Thurstone in his
well known "Primary Mental Abilities" battery. He showed that
such problems provide an excellent means of measuring Inductive-
Seasoning ability, and there is good evidence that this is closely
related to the General Ability (g) defined by Spearman.
The tests can be administered under unstressed or stressed
conditions and provide the following scores (1) stressed speed,
(2) unstressed speed, (3) Accuracy, (4) Stress speed Gain,
(5) Speed range, and (6) Speed slope.
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In this study only the easier forms A(l) and A(2) were used
and the following measures: Unstressed speed (Form A(2)),
Stressed Speed (Form A(l)), Stress Speed Gain, A(1)S - A(2)U.
(A oopy of the tests can be seen in Appendix A).
Furaeaux's directions for individual administration of the
tests were followed rigorously.
Practice columns 1, 2, 3, were administered first, then
Form A(2) unstressed and finally A(l) stressed. The instructions
for test A(2) unstressed are: "We are going to do the real test
now. When you start work again, carry on at your most comfort¬
able rate. Don't waste time but there is no need at all to
rush and get flustered. Are there any questions? Ask now
because I shall not be able to help you at all once the test has
started. Start here."
The time for the solution of individual items was recorded
unobtrusively in a cumulative fashion.
The instructions introducing Form A(l) stressed were: "We
are going to do another similar test, but before we start there
are 3ome new instructions. This time you must work as quickly
as you can, not at the rate you prefer, but as fast as you possibly
can." This time the stop-watch is placed conspicuously and
clicked noisily. Again individual item solution time was
recorded.
In the scoring Fumeaux recommends that if the last line
used in practice section 2 is 9 or less, the S's slowness should
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be investigated. If it is not due to unfamiliarity with the
alphabet or misunderstanding of the instructions, he recommends the
use of a corrected score. When such occasions arose in this
study, after the subjeot*s familiarity with the alphabet had been
ascertained, Furneaux's recommendation was not followed as it
was assumed that the slowness was due to a temporary disability
(illness) which was what was being investigated.
After averaging log time for correct solutions, the corrected
speed score (SP) was read from table 52 of the manual, which en¬
ables high scores to go with high rate of work, giving Sp.U.
(unstressed speed score) and Sp.S. (stressed speed score).
Sp.S. - Sp.U. gives the stress - Gain score.
IV STATISTICAL ANALYSIS *
Since six groups were involved, a one way analysis of
variance. (Guildford 1956) was carried out to test whether there
was an overall difference between the groups. The two missing
values in Group II (Bp.D.) were filled in by group means for the
purpose of computer calculation, (EDEX programme). Thus though
calculations were made on 108 variables for each measure, the total
number of degrees of freedom were 105» instead of 107* In cases
where the F ratio was significant the t-test (Guildford 1956), with
appropriate standard error, i.e. standard error for the whole pop¬
ulation with 100 degrees of freedom (106-5)» was used to test
differences between the means for relevant comparisons. The
formula for standard error of the difference between means,
following
2
+ where Bp.D. was
16
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concerned. 2 was the mean error variance for all six groups, i.e.
with 100 degrees of freedom.
Where the data gave a skewed distribution, raw scores were
logged to approximate a normal distribution. The logged scores
used were log of the variable plus 1), because of fzero* scores.
In view of the significantly lower mean age of both manic
groups, ill and recovered, the association of age with test scores
was tested by the product moment correlation for measures where
age is known to be relevant, 3uch as speed test scores.
The Symptom Sign Inventory (SSI) was analysed separately as a
different statistical approach was necessary to analyse the diff¬
erent types of scores derived from this test: chi-square teehniqtu®
(Siegel 1956) was used to compare individual symptoms for the ill
groups and PD soores for the recovered groups (see methodology of
SSI above); t-tests were use# to compare mean PD scores of ill
groups, mean number of symptoms on a-priori scales and mean number
of symptoms from the whole inventory.
V SPBCIPIC HYP0TH3SSS
The specific hypotheses tested were:
A. Svmptom-Sign Inventory (S.S.I.):
1. Manics (Bp.M.) will have lower scores than both depressed
groups on all measures, i.e. on PD scale, total No. of
symptoms, No* of symptoms on each a-priori scale, except
for scale C on which they will obtain a higher score.
(Clinically, manics manifest less distress. Since most
of the a-priori scales, except perhaps C and P are
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concerned with distress, manics should score lower than
the two depressed groups on most measures used, except
on scale C)«
2. She two depressed groups will not differ on PD and mean
No. of symptoms.
3. Unipolar Depressives (Up.D.) will show more varied
symptomatology than bi-polar depressives (Bp.D.), being
probably more of a mixed group (see Perris, 1966).
4. The clinically recovered groups will have normal scores
on the PI) scale (see p. 103 and fig. 6.1).
The Hostility and Direction of Hostility Questionnaire (H.D.H.U.)
1. Manics (Bp.M.) will be more extrapunitive than both
§
depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.).
2. Manics (Bp.D.) will be less intropunitive than both
depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.). This hypothesis is
based on clinical experience as well as psycho-analytic
writings (see p.55-59 above).
3* The Bi-polar Depressives (Bp.D.) will not differ from the
unipolar depressives (Up.D.) on either intropunitiveness
or extrapunitiveness. (Depressives of all types have
usually been found to be high on intropunitiveness and
average on extrapunitiveness, Mayo, 1967; Caine et al.1967).
4. The recovered groups will not differ in either intropuni¬
tiveness or extrapunitiveness (providing they score as
•normals*. Different groups of normals have been found
not to deviate very much, Caine et al. 1967).
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5. With recovery, intropunitiveness will go up in manios
and down in both depressed groups. (This follows logi¬
cally from B.2 and B.4).
6. With recovery, extrapunitiveness will go markedly down
in manics, but go slightly up in both depressive groups,
( (following B.l and B.4).
C. 16 P.F.
1. Both depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) will show more
anxiety than the manics (Bp.M.) and will not differ
between themselves. (Bepressives have been shown to have
high anxiety during illness, see p.80-8l above, but for
manics no objective studies exist, so that the hypothesis
is based on clinical impression).
2. Both depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) will be highly
introverted while manics (Bp.M.) will be extraverted.
(Again the depressives* scores can be predicted from
Coppen and Metcalfe*s Shady quoted on p.80-81, but no
objective studies exist for manics).
3. With recovery, the two bi-polar groups (B.Bp.M. and
B.Bp.D.) will be alike and different from the recovered
unipolars (B.Up.D.). (See Perrls, 1966, 1971 described
p.79-81 above).
4. The scores of all groups will vary between illness and
recovery, (see Metcalfe, 1968, Coppen and Metcalfe, 1965,
p.80-81 above).
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D. grid Test of Schizophrenic* Thought Disorder
It is difficult to generate hypotheses on this measure, hut in
view of the characteristics of manic and depressive thought-
process mentioned ahove (Section C, p.116) if abnormal scores are
obtained they should follow the following pattern.
1. Manics (Bp.M.) will show loose and inconsistent construct
relationships, (see Slater and Both, 1969).
2. Both depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) will show a
tightening up of their construct system, obtaining very
high scores on both measures, (Bannister 1962, p.120 above).
3. The three recovered groups will obtain normal scores and
not differ among themselves.*
E. Payne's Object Classification Test
1. Manics (Bp.M.) will obtain a higher number of abnormal
sortings, non A scores, than the depressed groups
(Bp.D. and Up.D.), (see McGhie, 1967, quoted p.72, and
Gatheroole, 1965, quoted p.122).
2. The two depressive groups will not differ on either A or
Non-A. (following Gathercole's 1965 arguement, p.122).
Manics (Bp./^.) will also produce more normal sortings,
A scores, than both depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.).
3. The recovered groups will not differ and obtain average
non-A and A scores.
4. The recovered manics will obtain lower Non-A scores when
recovered than when ill (following on E.1).
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Gibson Spiral Maze (Psycho motor speed under 3 conditions)
1. Manics (Bp.M.) will be faster than both depressed groups
(Bp.I}* and Up.D.) on the usual administration of the
test (U).#
2. The two depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) will not differ
in speedi (depressives have on the whole been shown to
be slow, e.g. Nelson, 1953, Babcook, 194-1, see p. 125).
3» External distraction will facilitate the two depressed
groups1 performance (make them faster) but slow down the
manics (Bp.M.), so that the two depressed groups will
show more mean gain in speed than the manics. (Foulds
1952, see p.70 and p. 127, provides the hypothesis about
depressives, but that about manics is based on clinical
impressions of the latters distraotibility).
4» Internal distraction will also make the two depressed
groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) faster, but will not slow down
the manics' (Bp.M.) to the same extent as external
distraction. (For same reasons as F.3)*
5* The manics will be slower after recovery (B.Bp.M.) and
the depressives faster (E.Bp.D. and B.Up.D.), so that
the three recovered groups will not differ in speed.
(This again is based mainly on olinical evidence, as
objective studies have not always agreed, see p.70-71)•
Nuffemo Mental Speed Test
1. The manics (Bp.M.) will have a higher unstressed speed
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(Sp.U.) score than either depressed group (Bp.D. and
Up.D.).*
2. The two depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D*) will not
differ in unstressed speed (Sp.U.). (See p.l25»
Nelson*s and Babcock's study, also Payne and Hewlett,
I960,quoted p.70).
3. All three groups will respond positively to stress hut
the two depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) will gain
more with stress than the manics (Bp.M.).*
4* There would he no difference in either stressed (Sp.S.)
or unstressed Speed (Sp.U.) among the three recovered
groups (B.Bp.M., R.Bp.D., B.Up.D.).*
#
5« With recovery, manics will have lower unstressed speed
(Sp.U.) scores and depressives higher unstressed speed
scores.
♦ #
All hypotheses marked ( ) are hased on clinical experience,





The results will he presented in 3 seotions:
I Comparison of 111 groups: Bi-polar Manics or Bp.M. (group 1)
vs. Bi-polar Depressives or Bp.D. (group 2) vs. unipolar
depressives or Up.D. (group 3)*
II Comparison of recovered groups: Recovered bi-polar manios
or R.Bp.M. (group 4) vs. Recovered bi-polar depressives or
R.Bp.D. (group 5) vs. Recovered unipolar depressives or
R.Up.D. (group 6).
III Effects of Illness: Bi-polar Manics vs. Recovered Bi-polar
Manics (Bp.M. vs. R.Bp.M.), Bi-polar depressives vs.
Recovered Bi-polar depressives (Bp.D. vs. R.Bp.D.), and
Unipolar Depressives vs. Recovered Unipolar Depressives
(Up.D. vs. R.Up.D.).
I Comparison of 111 Groups:
This section will compare the results, on all the measures,
of the three 'ill' groups.
A. Symptom - Sign Inventory (S.S.I.)
1. Personal Disturbance Soale (PDh The mean scores
of the three groups on the PD soale are shown in table 7*1
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I 18 17 18
Mean PD 2.86 7.05 7.83
S.D. 1.42 2.88 1.62
The results of t-tests applied to these soores are shown
in table 7.2.
Table 7*2 Significance of differences between mean PD soores
Comparison t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 5-83 <.0005*
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 10.33 <.0005*
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 0.98 not sig.**
(*one-tailed test, ##two~tailed test, df * 34
or 33 where Bp.D. is involved).
Thus the manics obtain only a borderline Personal
disturbance score* whereas both depressed groups obtain
equally high scores: from the S.S.I, norms, scores of 0*1
are considered not PD, 2-4 borderline, and 4+ Personally
Disturbed. Both depressed groups obtain significantly
higher mean PD scores than the manic group and do not differ
from one another, which is in the expected direction
(hypotheses and Ag)j p -'3*-
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2. Total number of symptoms: The mean number of
symptoms endorsed on the S.S.I* by each of the three groups
is shown in table 7.3*








N 18 17 18
Mean No. of Symp. 14.83 17.70 22.67
S.D. 5.34 8.26 3.67
The results of t-tests applied to these scores are
shown in table 7*4 below.
Table 7.4 Significance of differences between mean No. of symptoms
Comparisons t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 0.79 not sig.
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 5.16 <.0005*
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 2.28 <.05**
(*one-tailed, **two
Bp.D.
-tailed t df 34
is involved).
or 33 where
The two bi-polar groups do not differ in mean number of
symptoms and endorse significantly less symptoms than the
unipolars. This is slightly contrary to expectation. It
- 141 -
was hypothesised (hypothesis A^) that the manics would
endorse less symptoms than both depressed groups and that
the two depressed groups will not differ on mean number of
symptoms (hypothesis A, 5^*
3* Scores on 8 a-priori scalea: The mean number of
symptoms obtained by the three groups on each of the eight
a-oriori scales are shown in table 7»5»








M 2.33 3.94 4.56
A
S.D. 3.33 4.13 4.73
B
M 2.06 5.88 6.67
S.D. 3.40 6.26 6.76
M 5.22 0 0.28
C
S.D. 5.32 0 0.57
M 1.06 0.59 0.83
D S.D. 1.86 1.06 1.47
E
M 1.33 1. 52 2.17
S.D. 2.11 2.40 2.38
F
M 0.56 0.76 0.61
S.D. 1.15 1.09 1.38
M 0.83 0.88 2.11
G
S.D. 1.10 1.11 2.63
H
M 1.50 4.18 5.00
S.D. 0.53 4.33 5.81
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The results of t-tests applied to these scores are
shown in table 7.6 below*














































































(one-tailed test, df 34 or 33)
It is interesting to note from the table above that the
manios do not differ significantly from the two depressed
groups on the a-priori Anxiety Scale (A). Nor do they
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differ from the depressed groups on the paranoid scale (D),
obsessional scale (E), non-paranoid schizophrenic scale (F). They
differ from the unipolars on the hysterical scale (G), but not
from the bi-polar depressed. This is against expectation as it
was hypothesised that manics would have lower mean scores on
all the sub scales of the S.S.I.t except the manic scale (C).
Only the two depressive scales (B and H) and the manic scale (C)
differentiated in the expected directions hypothesis A.ljp/33.
Hypothesis A.3 that the unipolar depressives would show more
varied symptomatology than the bi-polar depressives is also sus¬
tained as the unipolars differed from the bi-polars in the expeoted
direction on the G (hysterical) and C (manic) scales^^-Anxiety
(A), the two depressive scales (B and H), the paranoid scale (D)t
obsessional scale (E), non-paranoid schizophrenic scale (F) did
not differentiate the two depressive groups.
4* Items differentiating Unipolar Dapreaaives and
Bi-polar Depressives:
So far, it has been shown that the unipolar depressives
(Up.D.) endorse more symptoms than the bi-polar depressives
(Bp.D.) and only differ on two of the a-priori scales, C and G.
It was decided to compare these two groups on individual symptoms,
to elucidate differences between them further.
Table 7.7 lists the symptoms that differentiate the two
depressed groups significantly. However, one would expect to
find by chance 4 of the 80 items of the S.S.I, to differentiate
at the 5 psr cent level between the two groups. Therefore the
present results need to be replicated before they can be accepted.
i
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Table 7.7 S.S.I, items differentiating unipolar depressives









°4 ' Do you ever lose all feeling in any
part of your skin - so that you wouldn't 33.3 5.9 4.12*
be able to feel a pin prick - or do you
ever have burning or tingling sensations
°7 ' Do you ever suffer from blurring of
vision or any other difficulty with 22.2 0 4.26*
your sight which no one seems able to
put right?
G10* Are you worried about your physical
health? 33.3 11.8 4.58*
H5 ' Are you troubled by waking in the
early hours and being unable to get 88.9 58.8 4.14*
off to sleep again (if you don't have
sleeping pills)?
H10! Do you ever go to bed feeling you would
not care if you never woke up? 77.8 41.2 4.88*
# #*
df = 1, two-tailed test, p< .05» p< *01
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B. States and Traits Measures
The analysis of variance tables of all measures (except
the symptom-sign Inventory) for all six groups are set out in
Appendix D. In the following comparisons, the bi-polar manics
(Bp.M.) and Unipolar depres3lves (Up.D.) groups consist of 18
subjects, each, while the bi-polar depressive group.; (Bp.D. )
consists of 16 subjects.
1. Intropunitiveness (delf-Criticism and Guilt);
The mean range and standard deviation of each ill group
on this measure are shown in table 7.8 below:
Table 7.8 Intropunitiveness aten scores
1 2 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.D. Up.D.
M 6.33 7.94 8.22
range ro 1 vo 4-10 6-10
S.D. 2.11 2.05 1.21
The significance of the differences are shown in table 7*9
below:
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Table 7.9 Significance of differences In Intropunitiveness
Comparisons Difference s,s*Diff. * ^
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 1.61 0.77 2.09 <.025
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 1.89 0.67 2.81 <.01*
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 0.28 0.77 <1 N.S.
(df * 100» *one-tailed test)
thus, both depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) have high
levels of intropunitiveness (normal scores range from
4.5 - 6.5, since these are sten scores) and do not differ
between themselves, though the unipolars have a slightly
higher mean score. The rnanics (Bp.M. ) have a significantly
lower level of intropunitiveness than the two depressed
groups and their mean score is very close to the normal
mean.
2. Sictrapunitiveness (Criticism of Others and Aoting-out
Hostility and Delusion of Projected Hostility)!
Table 7.10 describes the scores of the 3 groups on
this measure:
Table 7.10 Sxtrapunitiveness 3ten scores
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.D. Dp.D.
M 7.67 4.89 6.00
range 5- 10 3-9 4-8
S.D. 1.57 1.84 1.19
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The following table 3hows the significance of the group
comparisons.
Table 7.11 Significance of differences in EXtrapunitivenesa
Comparisons Bifference S,EDiff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.3. 2.78 0.55 5.09 <.0005*
Bp.M* vs. Up.3. 1.67 0.54 2.18 < .005*




(df = 100, one-tailed, two-tailed test)
The manios (Bp.M.) show the highest level of extra-
punitiveness, higher than a normal mean and significantly
higher than both depressed groups. Though both depressed
groups (Bp. 3. and Up.3.) are average on this measure, the
unipolar depressives have a significantly higher mean
score than the bi-polar depressives.
Thus, hypotheses B i and B 1 that manics will be more
extrapunitive, but less intropunitive than both depressed
groups have been sustained(p-iyj.The third hypothesis on this
measure (B^) that the two depressed groups will not differ
in level of intropunitiveness or extrapunitiveness has only
partly been sustained. Intropunitiveness does not differ¬
entiate the two depressed groups, but extrapunitiveness is
significantly higher in the unipolars.
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3. Anxiety (16 P. F. second-order factor)
Table 7.12 below describes the scores obtained by the
3 ill groups on this personality test factor.
Table 7.12 Anxiety sten scores
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp. I). Up.B.
M 6.87 7.04 8.41
range 4>5 - 10 44 - 10 57 - 10
S.D. 1.83 1.99 1.47
The results of t-tests applied to these scores are
shown in table 7.13.
Table 7.13 Significance of differences in Anxiety
Comparisons Difference s*sJ)iff.
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 0.17 0.63 <1 N.S.
*
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 1.54 0.61 2.53 < .01
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 1.37 0.63 2.18 < .05
" 1
» 1 " ' "
(df =* 100, one-tailed, two-tailed test)
Table 7.12 shows that all three groups are high on the
anxiety trait factor as compared to normals (4»5-6.5 are
considered average). The unipolar depressives (Up.D.)
have the highest score of all, significantly higher than
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either bi-polar group. The two bi-polar groups do not
differ significantly on this factor.
Thus, this faotor behaves quite differently from
expected: It had been hypothesised (hypothesis C^) that
the two depressed groups would not differ on this measure
and would obtain higher mean scores than the manicsf/j/jsjlt
is surprising that the bi-polar manics see and report them¬
selves as highly anxious as the bi-polar depressives.
4. Extraversion (16 P.F. second-order faotor)
The means and other statistics describing the 3 groups*
scores on this factor are shown in table 7.14.








M 6.65 3.08 3.25
range 1.7 - 10 1.0 - 6.4 1.0 - 8.1
S.J) 2.14 1.77 2.49
Table 7.15 shows the results of group comparisons
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Table 7*15 Significance of differences in extraversion
Comparisons Difference S^ff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 3.57 0.78 4.7 <.0005*
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 3.40 0.76 4.36 <.0005
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 0.17 0.78 < 1 N.S.
(df « 100, *one-tailed teat)
The t-wo tables above show thr t the manics (Bp.M.) have a
high mean score on axtraversion which is outwith the
average range, and significantly higher than the mean score
of either depressed group, at a very high level of significance.
The two depressed groups (Bp.D. and Up.D.) have low
scores on this factor, lower than the normal mean, indicating
high introversion, and they do not differ between themselves.
Thus the groups behaved in accordance to expectation
on this factor, thus supporting hypothesis C2(Piss)-
Figure 7.1, on the next page, shows graphically how
the three ill groups compare on the four"states and traits"
measures reported above.
C. Thought-Process
The scores obtained by the three ill groups on the
four measures of thought-process are reported in this section.
1-b
PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS DURING ILLNESS:
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1. Repertory grid test
a) Table 7*16 describee the main characteristics of
the groups' scores on the intensity measure.
Table 7*16 IfltqQsity Soorfa
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.P. Up.P.
M 1133.83 1148.72 1113.61
range 361 - 2084 500 - 1916 623 - 2327
S.P. 492.62 440.96 506.97
Since the f-test for this measure was not significant (see
Appendix P), the t-test was not applied. This measure
does not discriminate the groups because of high within-
group variance. The mean scores from table 7.16 above are
well above the cut-off point of 1000 which Bannister and
Fransella (1967) recommend for discriminating thought-
disordered from non-thought-disordered subjects.
b) Table 7.17 describes the consistency scores
obtained by the groups.
Table 7.17 Consistency scores
1 2 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.P. Up.P.
M 0.63 0.70 0.56
range 0 - .96 .08 - .97 .04 - .94
S.P. 0.29 0.22 0.21
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The f-test (Appendix D) was not significant on this
measure either, so that no t-test was applied. The mean
scores on this measure are also above the cut-off point of
0.49 recommended by Bannister and Fransella (1967)# Thus
the tentative predictions on this test (hypotheses D 1 and
2) are not supported: The manics did not score low on
either measure and the two depressed groups did not score
particularly high, [p-13&)-
Because of the large within-group variance, it is
relevant to look at the distribution of scores within each
group. Figures 7«2 and 7.3 below show the frequency distri¬
bution of the groups1 scores on intensity and consistency
respectively. The wide scatter of the intensity scores is
common to all 3 groups. 22 out of the total 54 subjects
are misclassified on the intensity score above, i.e. nearly
41 per cent. But, surprisingly, it is not the manics who
obtain the worst scores}
Looking at the percentage of each group scoring below 1000
we see that 8 out of 18, or 44*^per cent of unipolars score
below 1000, whereas only 6 out of 16, or 3|yper cent of the
bi-polar depressed (Since the 2 mi33ing values in this group
wa3 replaced by mean values it i3 proper to calculate per¬
centages on 16 cases only), and 8 out of 18 or ijj^per cent
of the manics score below the cut-off point.
The consistency scores are less widely scattered





Up. M (Bipolar Manics)
Bp. D. (Bipolar Depr.)
l.'p. D. d'nipolar Depr.)
1200-1199 1300—
Frequency distribution of ill groups on intensity score. (2 missing values replaced by mean
scores)
Ft qf 7-3>
Frequency distribution of ill groups on consistency scores. (2 missing values replaced by mean
scores).
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together score below the cut-off point of .49* And again
it is not the "distractible", mercurial manics who fare
worst, but the unipolar depressives: 33 per cent of uni¬
polar depressives, as compared with 12£ per cent of bi¬
polar depressives and 22 per cent of manics 3core below the
cut-off point of .49*
Using both scores together a3 a measure of thought-
process disorder typical of schizophrenia, ? manics (Bp.M.)»
2 bi-polar depressed (Bp.D.) and 4 unipolar depressed
(Up.D.) score a3 thought-disordered, that is per cent of
manic3 (Bp.M. ),^12£ per cent of bi-polar depressed (3p.D.)
and 22 per cent of unipolar depressed (Up.D.) show looseness
and inconsistency in their construct system.
2. Object-Classification lest
a) She number of normal responses (A-responses)








M 2.28 2.94 3.5
range 0-6 0-5 1-6
S.D 1.84 1.53 1.82
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Again the f-test for this measure was not significant
(see Appendix D), 30 no t-test was made to follow.
b) The abnormal or Non-A responses, however, showed
high discrimination. Because of the skewed nature of the
varlate values, the raw scores were logged for the analyses
of variance. The table below shows the mean logged scores
(log of variate * 1 ) and their range for all three groups.
Table 7.19 Non-A responses (loa of "variates + 1")
Groups 123
Bp.M. Bp.D. Up.D.
M 1.37 0.42 0.79
range (raw scores) 0-9 0-3 0-4
S.D. 0.29 0.19 0.20
The results of t-tests applied to these scores are shown in
table 7*20 below.
Table 7.20 Significance of difference in Non-A scores
Comparisons Difference S,;SDiff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 0.95 0.18 5.59 <.0005
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 0.58 0.17 3.40 <.001*
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 0.37 0.18 2.19 < .05
df = 100, one-tailed, two-tailed test.
- 155 -
The bi-polar depressives (Bp.D.) have the lowest score
of all and the manics (Bp.M.) the highest score, with the
unipolars (TJp.D.) intermediate, all differences being
significant.
Hypothesis El (p,/3^) that manios will obtain a higher
Non-A score than both depressed groups is supported, but
not hypothesis E3 that they will also obtain a high A-score*
Hypothesis E2 that the two depressed groups will not
differ in A-respon3es is supported, but not that they will
also not differ in Non-A responses. The unipolars obtain
a higher mean IIon-A score than the bi-polar Figure 7*4 shows
the frequency distribution of the raw Non-A scores.
It can be seen that neither depressed group had raw
scores greater than 4, whereas 6 of the manics had scores
greater than 4. Payne and Hewlett (I960, fig. 1.3, p.37)
found that scores over 4-5 discriminated their schizophrenics
from normals, dysthymics, depressives and hysterics. If
the raw scores are transformed to make them comparable with
Payne and Hewlett's transformed scores, the manics mean
Non-A transformed score is 0.94, which is lower than the
schizophrenics' mean of 2.05, but higher-thantie means these
authors quote for their control groups.
P. Speed
The following tables show the three ill groups compared on
the different speed variables.
FrG-1-




1. Paychomotor-Sp e ed
a) First, the scores obtained on a psychomotor speed
task, without distraction* denoted by U, are shown in
tables 7*21 and 7«22.
Table 7*21 Motor-Speed T scores (U)
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.P. Up.P.
M 42.78 68.11 44.89
range 26 - 62 31 - 95 25 - 62
S.P. 14.52 21.78 12.86
Table 7.22 Significance of differences in Motor Speed T scores (U)

















df = 100, one-tailed, two-tailed test
The scores of table 7.21 are raw scores in seconds, so
that cue highest the group mean score, the slowest is that
group. Thus, the bi-polar depressives (Bp.P. ) are signi¬
ficantly the slowest group, the unipolar depressives (Up.D.)
being as fast as the manics (Bp.M.). If slowness on this
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measure Is taken as equivalent to what clinicians call
"retardation", then the bi-polar depressives can he said
to be showing retardationf while the unipolar depressives
don't: Gibson (1965) quotes a median time score of 61*00
seconds for his depressives (median age : 55 yrs.) before
treatment, and 42*00 seconds after treatment* These
scores are similar to the bi-polar depressives' scores and
the bi-polar manic's and unipolar depressives' soores
respectively. The mean score was computed here as the
data distribution was not skewed.
Speed scores are known to be significantly related to
age : here the two depressed groups did not differ signi¬
ficantly in age (mean age of 50.6 - 6.5 and 48.6 - 8.21 for
Bp.D. and Up.D. respectively). The manics (mean age
37*1 - 12.7) were, however, significantly younger than
both depressed groups.
A product-moment correlation within the manic group
between age and motor-speed (U) score was 0. iIflL, which is
not statistically significant (p > -OS , df » ik ). It was
therefore deduced that the age factor did not have a signi¬
ficant influence on the discriminative power of this
parameter.
b) With the "internal distraction" (counting) situation,
here denoted by (G), the following table describes the gain
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soores obtained by each group: they are difference scores
(o - C) in seconds, i.e. mean time taken to perform the
motor task without distraction minus time taken while
counting. Positive scores indicate that a shorter time
was taken with an internal distraction (counting).
Table 7.23 Gain in psychomotor speed with "internal distraction"
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.P. Up.D.
M 2.11 6.00 0.33
range -22 - 18 -14 - 31 -25 - 20
S.D. 9-31 13.86 14.45
The F-test (Appendix D) was not significant for this measure,
so no t-test was made to follow.
It can be seen from table 7.23 that all mean scores
are positive, the bi-polar depressives (Bp.D.) showing the
biggest gain, but not significantly so. This distraction
does not seem to have been potent enough to act as a real
distraction situation which would interfere with whatever
internal process was retarding the bi-polar depressives,
though the trend is in the right direction.
c) The external distraction situation (listening to
a tape-recorded story while performing the psychomotor task)
here denoted by (S), had more effect, as the two following
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tables will show. The scores indicate gain with external
distraction, i.e. they are difference scores (U - 3) in
seconds. Positive scores indicate that the "external
distraction" caused an increase in 3peed, and negative
scores indicate a decrease in speed.
Table 7.24 Gain in psychomotor speed with "external distraction"
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp. I). Up.B.
M 3.94 8.28 -8.44
range -10 - 20 -40 - 43 -38 - 12
3.D. 8.16 17.62 12.56
Thus, both bi-polar groups (Bp.M. and Bp.D.) tend to gain
in speed with an external distraction while the unipolar
depressives (Up.J).) slowdown.
Table 7.25 reports the t-tests applied to these scores.
Table 7.25 Significance of difference in gain in psychomotor
speed with "external distraction"
Comparisons Difference Q 7?"Biff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 4.34 4.58 < 1 N. S.
Bp.M. vs. Up.D. 12.38 4.42 2.8 <.01
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 16.72 4.58 3.65 < .001
df = 100, two tailed test
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The difference between the unipolars and each bi-polar
group is highly significant. Thus, it seems that the uni¬
polar depressives are distracted by an external stimulus,
while the bi-polars,whether manic or depressed^ improve
their performance, the stimulus having a facilitating effect
on their psychomotor speed. Again, as in the "internal
distraction" experiment, the bi-polar depressives gain
most in speed.
Thus, the predictions on this measure have not all been
sustained {>. >37].
Hypothesis F.l that manics will be faster than both
depressed groups is only supported in parts the manics
are faster than the bi-polar depressives, but not faster
than the unipolar depressives.
Hypothesis ff.2 that the two depressed groups will not
differ in psychomotor speed is not supported: the bi-polar
depressives are significantly slower than the unipolar
depressives.
Hypothesis F.3 that external distraction will facilitate
psycho-motor speed in both depressed groups, but slow down
the manics, so that the two depressed groups will show more
gain in speed than the manics is not supported: it i3 the
unipolars who are slowed down, while the manics and the bi¬
polar depressives gain in speed. The two bi-polar groups
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do not differ, and are significantly different from the
unipolar3.
hypothesis ff«4 that internal distraction will affeot
the groups in the same way as external distraction is not
supported. It caused a slight gain in speed in all three
groups, with no significant differences.
2. Mental Speed
The tables below show how the groups performed on the
mental speed parameters.
a) Table 7.26 describes the groups' scores on
unstressed speed. SP.U.
Table 7.26 Unstressed speed (Sp.U.) scores
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.D. Up.D.
M 195.50 178.33 180.61
range 170 - 217 132 - 216 130 - 225
S.D. 14.62 21.26 23.64
Table 7.27 Significance of differences in SP.U.
Comparisons Difference S*®&iff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 17.17 6. 90 2.64 < .01
Bp.M. vs. Up.13. 14.89 6.30 2.36 <•025
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 2.28 6.50 < 1 N.S.
df = 100, one- tailed test
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High scores on this measure indicate high speed of work.
Thus, when left to work at their preferred speed of work,
the two depressed groups do not differ in speed of problem-
solving, hut the manias (Bp.M.) are significantly faster
than either group.
Compared to the normative data for an unselected
general population (Nufferno Manual/?^ ), the mean manic
Sp.U. score is slightly above the 50th per centile (Sp.U. =\U^
while the depressive groups* means are at about the 42nd per¬
centile. So, compared to normals, the manics were not
particularly fast, nor the depressives particularly slow.
Within the manic group, the product-moment correlation
of age with test scores is -0.3& (p >-oS , df = lk ). This
indicates that the older subjects in the group tended to
have lower scores. However, since the correlation is not
significant, it was decided that the age factor did not
influence the results to a significant degree.
b) The stressed speed scores (SP.S.) below show
clearly that age was not important in accounting for speed
differences, as all three groups perform at the same speed
when stressed.
Table 7.28 Stressed Speed (Sp.S.) scores
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.D. Up.D.
M 211.67 208.67 204.00
range 18 5 - 232 180 - 238 160 - 240
S.J). 17.48 17.54 21.88
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The F-test (see Appendix D) was not significant for this
measure, so no t-tests were made to follow.
Thus, when stressed to work quickly, the depressives
can solve problems as fast as the manics. The mean scores
from table 7.28 are all slightly above the 50th percentile
when compared to the Sp.S. normative data for an unselected
general population (Nufferno Manual).
c) The tables below show the Stress-Gain scores of
the three ill groups, i.e. (Sp.S. - Sp.U.).
Table 7.29 Stress-Gain Scores
12 3
Groups Bp.M. Bp.D. Up.D.
M 15.61 29.67 23.39
range -17 - 44 8 - 88 1 - 40
S.i). 14.92 20.29 11.83
Table 7.30 shows the results of t-tests applied to
these scores.
Table 7.30 Significance of Jifferenoes in Stress-Gain
Comparisons Difference S' ®Diff. t P
Bp.M. vs. Bp.D. 14.06 5.00 2.81 < .005
Bp.M. vs. Up.I). 7.78 4.85 1.60 N.S.
Bp.D. vs. Up.D. 6.28 5.00 1.26 N.S.
df a 100, one-tailed test
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Tables 7.29 and 7.30 show that all three groups have a
positive mean stress-gain score, but the bi-polar depressives
(Bp.D.) who were the slowest, when left to work at their
preferred speed of work, respond best to stress. They
gain significantly more speed than the manics, but not more
than the unipolar depressives. Though the unipolar
depressives gain more speed with stress than the manics,
the difference between them does not reach significance.
Thus, the specific hypotheses relating to the perform¬
ance of the groups on this measure have been, on the whole,
supported { pr.i 3 •? -'' ?*)
hypothesis C.l that manics will have higher unstressed
speed scores than both depressed groups is fully borne out.
hypothesis C.2 that the two depressed groups will not
differ in unstressed speed is also supported.
hypothesis C.3 that all three groups will respond
positively to stress, and that the two depressed groups
will gain more than the manics is supported, except that
the depressed unipolars do not gain significantly more than
the manics.
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II COMPARISON OF RTCOVORRD GROUPS
This section will compare the results on all the measures,
of the three recovered groups. There are 18 subjects in each
group.
A. Symptom-Sign-Inventory (S.S.I.)
Very few symptoms were endorsed by the three recovered
groups; R.Bp.M. (group 4), R.Bp.D. (group 5) and R.Up.D. (group 6).
The following table 3how3 the group distributions on the Personal
Disturbance Scale (PD).
Scores of 0-1 are considered normal, k:-4 borderline, 5 and
above Personally Disturbed.











(2-4) 5 3 6
PD
(5+) 0 0 2
?LC » 5.8, df = 4, not significant
The S.S.I, results are in close agreement with clinical
judgements of recovery. Of the 54 clinically recovered sub¬
jects, only 2 of the unipolars score as personally disturbed,
14 altogether are still borderline disturbed, and 38 score as
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normal. Thus hypothesis A.4 that the clinically recovered
groups will have normal scores on the PD scale is, on the whole,
supported (p.
Since there were no group differences, these results were
not analysed further.
B. States and Traits Measures:
1. Intropunitivenesa (Self-criticism and Guilt)
Table 7.32 below describes the scores obtained by
each recovered group on this measure.
Table 7.32 Intropunitiveneas sten scores
4 5 6
Groups R.Bp.H. R.Bp.D. H.Up.D.
M 6.0 4.5 5.5
range 1-10 1-7 2-10
S.J). 2.91 2.12 2.71
Table 7.33 shows the results of t-tests applied to
these scores.













df * 100, two-tailed test
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Table 7-32 above shows that all the mean scores are now
within normal limits, but the recovered manics (R.Bp.M.)
have switched to a higher level of intropunitivene3s than
the recovered bi-polar depressives (R.Bp.D.), which is a
complete reversal of the relationship between these two
groups during illness. The recovered unipolar depressives
(R.Up.D.) are not significantly different from either bi¬
polar group.
2. Rxtraounitiveness (criticism of others and acting-out
hostility and Delusional Projected hostility)
Table 7.34 shows the scores obtained by the recovered
groups on this measure.
Table 7.34 Rxtrapunitivenes3 sten scores
4 5 6
Groups R.Bp.M. R.Bp.D. R.Dp.D.
U 4.89 4.67 5.00
range 2-10 2-7 3-7
3.D. 1.78 1.57 1.53
The highest difference here is R.Up.D. - R.Bp.D., which is
only 0.33 sten and not significant with an of 0.76.
All three groups are equal on extrapunitiveness and
obtain mean scores within normal limits.
Iu3 -•
Hypothesis 3.4r».that all three groups will not
differ in either intropunitiveneas or extrapunitivenesa io
therefore nearly wholly supported with the exception that
panics are significantly more intropunitiva than bi-polar
depreaaivea. However* since both scores ware within
normal limits (4.5 - o.5)» it is probatory logical not to
attach too much importance to the difference.
3. Afl&LlSX (19 p.?ff JJUmteSJ&UL faotpy)
'fable 7*35 describes the groups* scores on this factor.
Table 7.35 hnxietY aten scoroo
4 5 6
Groups ii.Bp.ia. R.Bp.J. R.Up.3.
M 5*96 4.91 6.33
range 2.3 • 3.4 1.0 * 7.7 2.1 • 10.0
S.J. 1.73 1.65 2*26
The results of t-testa applied to these scores are
shown in tnble 7.36 below.
W? 7t36 —-herences iq an^ty
Comparisons .difference 3*^2>iff. * ^
R.Bp.M. vs. R.Bp.D. 1.07 0.61 1.75 N.S.
R.Bp.M. vs. R.Op.O. 0.40 " <1 N.S.
R.Bp.B. vs. R.Up.J. 1.47 " 2• 40 ^.02
df * 1QG» two-tailed test
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As with intropunitiveness, recovered bi-polar
depresaives have the lowest mean scores on anxiety, signi¬
ficantly lower than the recovered unipolar depressives who
have the highest score of all. However again since all
the scores are within normal limits (4.5 - 6.5)» group
differences are not meaningful.
4. Hetraversion (16 P. F. second-order factor)
Table 7.37 describes the groups1 scores on this
factor.
Table 7.37 Hetraversion sten scores
4 5 6
Groups R.Bp.M. A. Hp.J. R.Up.D.
M 5-05 5.38 3.44
range 1.1-10 3.1-6.9 1.0 - 7.8
5.D. 2.82 1.57 2.50
When t-tasts are applied to these results, the following
differences emerge:
Table 7.38 Significance of differences in Hetraversion
Comparisons Difference s*^Diff ^ ^
R.Bp.M. vs. R.Bp.D. 0.33 0.76 <1 N.3.
R.Bp.M. vs. R.Up.D. 1.61 M 2.12 <.05
R.Bp.D. vs. R.Up.D. 1.94 " 2.54 <.02
df =» 100, two-tailed test
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Thus extraversion discriminates clearly between
recovered bi-polars and recovered unipolars. Both re¬
covered bi-polar groups have normal scores on this trait
measure, but the recovered unipolars are highly introverted
as as a group, their mean score being l-l£ standard devia¬
tion below the normal mean*
The prediction on the two 16 P. F. measures* Evoothesis
C.3, was that t with recovery the two bi-polar groups will
be alike and different from the unipolarsjA/#- This is
supported for extraversion-introversion, but though the bi-
polars tend to be less anxious than the unipolars, the
difference did not reach significance.
The mean scores of the three reoovered groups on the
four trait and state measures are shown in Figure 7*5 below.
All the other measures used did not discriminate among the
recovered groups. The following tables list the means, standard































































Table 7.40 below describes the groups* scores on all the
speed measures.








1. a. T (U) Mean 49.44 41.11 42.33
Psycho¬ " Range 23 - 68 18 - 69 18 - 79
motor " S.D. 12.42 15.10 15.80
speed b. T (U-C) Mean 2.11 0.61 2.17
Range -24 - 29 IH VJ1 1 H VJ1 -13 - 31
S.D. 13.42 9-96 10.94
c. T (U-S) Mean 1.78 -3.72 1.56
Range -33 - 21 -49 - 16 o%CM15i











































T (U) indicates time in seconds for the usual administration of the
Gibson Spiral Maze test, i.e. without distraction; J2. indicates time
in seconds with internal distraction, i.e. counting, so that T (U-C)
* gain with internal distraction; J> indicates time in seconds with
external distraction, i.e. story, so that T (U-S) = gain with
external distraction.
Sp.U. » unstressed speed score
Sp.S. = stressed speed score stress-
(So.S.-Sd.U.^ « *:ain H n armed a-p nw»hi amr-ao"1^ "Mr
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Thus several of the measures, which differentiated among
the ill groups, now provide homogenous scores for the
recovered groups.
As the "ill manics" (Bp.M.), the recovered manics
(E.Bp.M.) were significantly younger than the other two
recovered groups, but sinoe no significant differences emerged
with respect to the speed measures, the age factor does not
seem to have played an important role.
Thus., hvjothesfcs D.2. B.3. F. 5. G.4.. that the recovered
groups will not differ on the thought-process, psychomotor
speed and mental speed measures, have been supported5(pisi
Only the "traits and states'* measures differentiated
the recovered groups, principally extraversion - introversion.
Anxiety-Adjustment and Intropunitiveness tended to differ¬
entiate, but it was stated that since all scores were within
normal limits, no great importance should be attached to
the difference.
Ill BFF5CTS OF ILLNESS
This section will show what sort of changes occur with ill¬
ness in each group, by comparing levels and ways of functioning
after recovery with levels and ways of functioning during illness.
For this purpose, each group will be looked at separately,
first the manics versus the recovered manics (Bp.M., group 1, vs.
R.Bp.M., group 4), then depressed bi-polars versus the recovered
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depressed bi-polars (Bp.D., group 2, vs. R.Bp.D., group 5), and
finally the depressed unipolars versus the recovered unipolars
(Up.D., group 3, vs. R.Up.D.i group 6).
A. First, the comparison of Manios with Recovered Manios:
Here, all the comparisons will be shown in one table.
Since the range and standard deviations have already been quoted
in the previous two sections about illness and recovery compari¬
sons, only the standard error of the difference of the respective
comparisons will be listed. The two groups consist of 18 sub¬
jects each.
Table 7*41 shows that with a manic illness, patients become
very highly more extrapunitive and more extraverted. They also
produoe more abnormal sortings (Non-A scores) on an object-
classification test. All three changes were predicted in
hypotheses B.6, C.4, E.4. The direction of change for extra-
punitiveness and Non-A sortings was predicted, but not for
extraversion^ (P / is - / 3 6)
It had been predicted that intropunitiveness would go up in
manios with recovery (hypothesis B.5), but this is not sustained*
In fact, intropunitiveness went slightly down. Anxiety went
down with recovery by nearly one sten score, but this difference
does not reach statistical significance.
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Table 7*41 Significance of differences between mean scores of







State 1. Intropunitiveness 6.33 6.00 0,67 <1 N.S.
and 2. Sxtrapunitiveness 7.67 4.89 0.54 5.14 4.OOO5*
Trait 3. Anxiety 6.87 5.98 0.61 1.45 N.S.
-**
4.O54. Sxtraversion 6.65 5.05 0.76 2.09
Thought la. Intensity 1133.83 1015.00 F-test
*r q
- -
prooess b. Consistency 0.63 0.64
JNe be
fl - -
2a. A sortings 2.27 3.56 tt - -
b. Non-A sortings
(logged)
1.37 0.82 0.17 3.24 <.005*
Speed la. T (u/ 42.78 49*44 5.19 1.28 N.S.
psyoho- b. T (U-C) 2.11 2.11 F-test mm -
motor
0. T (U-S) 3.94 1.78
N. s.
4.42 <1 N.S.
Mental 2a. SP.U.7^ 195.50 191.39 6.30 <1 N.S.




0. (Sp.S.-Sp.U.) 15.61 21.61 1.24 N.S.
#
df * 100, one-tailed, two-tailed.
JL JUL x
(~ and as in table 7.40 above).
It is interesting to note that the differences in speed, both
psyoho-motor and mental speed do not reach significance. The
manios perform a psycho-motor task faster when they are ill than
when they are well, but not significantly so, and similarly for a
mental speed task. Correspondingly, when well, they gain more
speed with stress, indicating that their unstressed speed is, not
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as near Its maximum as it is with the influence of illness, "but
again the difference in stress-gain between illness and recovery
is not significant.
The hypotheses about the effect of a manic illness on psycho¬
motor and mental speed (hypotheses F.5 and G.5) are therefore not
supported here, though the trend is in the expected direotion^/o-
B. Comparison of Bi-polar and recovered Bi-polar Depressives
The results will be presented in the same way as for the
manics. The bi-polar depressives (Bp.J).) group consists of 16
subjects and the recovered bi-polar depressives of 18 subjects.
Table 7.42 Significance of differences between mean scores of








State 1. Intropunitiveness 7.94 4.50 0.77 4.46 <.005*
and 2. Extrapunitiveness 4.89 4.67 0.55 <1 N.S.
#
<•002trait 3. Anxiety 7.04 4.91 0.63 3.38
4. Extraversion 3.08 5.38 0.78 2.95 <.01
Thought la. Intensity 1148.72 1259.11
It
- -
Process b. Consistency 0.70 0.76 - -




0.42 0.92 0.18 2.78
Speed la. T (Or 63*11 41.11 5.35 4.11 <.0005




















0.(Sp.S.—Sp.U.) 29.67 28.78 <1 N.S.
V and
df ® 100, *one-tailed, ** two-tailed test
as in table 7*40 above).
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Thus la the bi-polar depressive group there are far more
changes with illness than in the bi-polar manic group* All per¬
sonality variables* except extrapunitivenesa* change drastically:
intropunitiveness changes in the expected direotion (hypothesis
B.5). anxiety goes up and extroversion goes down* supporting
hypothesis 0*4. The direotion of change was not predicted for
the two 16 P.F. factors* It had been expected (Hypothesis B.6)
that extrapunitlveness would go slightly up when bi-polar depress¬
ivea recover* This is not supported here: extrapunitlveness
deoreases minimally with reoovery* (p .
Thought-process measures are stable* except that unexpectedly
recovered bi-polar depresslves produce significantly more abnormal
responses (Non-A sortings) on an objeot-olassification test*
In this way they seem to behave more like their polar counterparts
during illness*
Bi-polar depressives are significantly slowed down during
illness when performing a psychomotor task* thus supporting
hypothesis F.A.prv?.Interestingly. whereas an external distraotion
quickened*their pace of work during illness* it slows them down
after recovery.
Similarly* unstressed mental speed of work is significantly
lower during illness than during recovery* thus supporting hypo¬
thesis G*5«c.,h ..Stressed speed does not change to any large extent*
The two groups did not differ in age* so that speed differences
can be unambiguously attributed to the effect of illness*
Retardation is more pronounced in bi-polar depression than
the corresponding increase in speed in mania* and* in parallel*
more personality changes occur with depression than with mania*
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0. Comparison of Unipolar Bepressives with Recovered Unipolar
Depresslvea.
Again* the results in this section will he presented in one
table as in the two previous illness-recovery comparisons* She
unipolar depressive(Up*D.) and the recovered unipolar depressive
(R.Up.D.) groups both consist of 18 subjects each.
Table 7*43 Significance of Differences between mean scores of








States 1. Intropunitiveness 7*50 5*35 0.67 3.98 £.0005*
and 2. Extrapunitiveness 6.00 5*00 0.54 1.85 N. S.
<.002Traits 3* Anxiety 8.41 6.38 0.61 3.33
4. Extraversion 3.25 3.44 0.76 <1 N.S.
Thought la* Intensity 1113*61 1109.17 F-test mm -
Process b. Consistency 0*56 0.74
N. S.
« mm -
2a. A-sortings 3*50 3.38 M - -
b* Non-A sortings
(logged)
0*86 0.88 0.17 <1 N.S.
Speed la* T (u/ 44*89 42.33 5.19 <1 N.S.
psycho¬ b. T (U-C) 2.81 1.61 F-test mm •
motor c* T (U-S) —8*44 1.55 4.42 2.26
_ _**
.05
Mental 2a. Sp.U.^ 180.61 188.39 6.30 1.23 N.S.
b. Sp. s* 204.00 212.89 F-test - •
0. (Sp.S.-Sp.U.) 22.89 25.00 4.85 41 N.S.
df » 100, one-tailed, two-tailed test.
/ ±i
and " as in table 7*40 above).
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This depressive group, the unipolars, shows a different
pattern of change with illness from the previous group,the bipolar
depressives.
As expected, when depressed the unipolars have a significantly
higher level of intropunitiveness than when recovered (hypothesis
B«5)4p they are also more anxious to a significant degree, thus
supporting hypothesis 0.4. Both these changes with illness re¬
semble the changes in the bi-polar group. However, contrary to
the bi-polars they are as low on extraversion when ill as when
recovered. Thus, the change predicted on this factor in hypothesis
0.4 is not supported,p ,35 .
Extrapunitiveness goes down in the unipolars with recovery,
but not to a significant degree. Thus, though the trend is
right, hypothesis B.6 is not properly supported,p> a s ,
As with the two bi-polar groups, thought-process measures
remain on the whole stable between illness and recovery.
The hypotheses concerning the effect of illness on speed
were completely unsupported with the unipolars: Unipolar Depressives
do not perform a psychomotor task slower or solve mental problems
less quickly when ill than they do when recovered (hypotheses F. 5
and G.Contrary to the bi-polar depressives, unipolar depress¬
ives do not show retardation on the measures used in this study.
An external distraction (S) causes the unipolars to slow down
during illness, acting as a proper distraction, whereas it induces
a small gain in speed in the recovered group, thus giving a
significant difference in gain in speed with an acternal distraction.
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IV.Summary of results:
In view of the several significant differences found between
the various groups and the necessity of reporting them separately
above?the overall results will be summarised in the following
table to faoilitate assimilation#
To recapitulate, the groups were denoted as follows:
Group 1 : manic bi-polars (Bp.M.)
I
Group 2 : depressed bi-polars (Bp.D.)
Group 3 t depressed unipol&rs (Up.D.)
Group 4 • recovered manic bi-polars (K.Bp.M.)
Group 5 » recovered depressed bi-polars (R.Bp.D.)
Group 6 : recovered unipolars (R.Up.D.).
The sign-^, indicates that there was no significant difference,
the sign > indicates that one group exceeded the other significantly
in mean score, - indicates that no comparison was made#
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R. Up. D.—R. Bp.M
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COMPARISONS COMPARISONS OF ILLNESS
lc. Gain in psycho¬ Bp.M.'^-Bp.D. Bp.M.^R.Bp.M.
motor speed with Bp.M.>Up.B. Bp.D.> R.Bp.D.
external Bp.B*> Up.D. Up.D."^Jp*D.
distraction
2a. Mental Speed Bp*M«>Bp.B. Bp »M."—R.Bp. M.
(unstressed) Bp.D.-^Ip.D. -Am R.Bp.D* >Bp.D.





o. Stress Gain Bp.D*>Bp.M. Bp.M.^.Bp.M.
Bp.D.^p.D. Tfe Bp.B/^&.Bp.D*
Up.jD.^Bp.M. Up.D.^E.Up.D*
These results are discussed further in the next chapter*
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CHAPI3R 8
The discuss ion of the results will be osntrsd round the
four questions outlined in Chapter 5 in the Aims of the Study*
I. In ffhat tttur pffff "«"<» Differ Fron Bl-polar and tJnlaeler
ffwrwrtw?
Traditionally mania has been described as the polar opposite
of depression» as we saw in the literature surrey* Falret*s
* folic circulaire", £raepelin's manic depressive concept, the
psyoho-analysts' model of biological polarity, the dynamic view
of mania as a defence against depression, Leonhard's oonoept of
bi-polarity, all in turn stress the antithetical characteristics
of mania and depression* Recently, however, Court (1988) has
put forward a continuum model of manic-depressive illness as
opposed to a bi-polar model* Using arguments derived from
olinioal picture, drug treatment, electro-shook therapy, bio¬
chemical studies, reaction-time studies, he comes to the conclusion
that •'the most economical interpretation is that manlc-depreasivt
psychosis should be conceived as a reaction in which the depressive
component oonstltutes the first level of breakdown, while mania
is ths more seven condition* Such a proposal does not in any way
out aoroas the oonoept of a cyclic psychosis, but it does put the
components of the cyole in a different relationship from that
whioh has been traditionally proposed of implicitly assumed**1
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The rsaults of the present study show that manioa behave
differently from the two depressive groups on several but not all
of the objective measures used* The differences, as much as the
similarities, are interesting to look at*
From the summary of results,table 7*44, it can be seen that
mantes when ill (Bp*K*) are less personally disturbed (PD) than
either depressive group* The Personal Disturbance Scale, as
described in the methodology seotion (p* ), is Intended to
identify personally disturbed or psychiatrioally ill individuals
from normals* The manios in this study obtain a mean PD score
of 2.56 - 1.42, which is only jflE&M&tal Wforyefo and lower
than the mean figure of 3.80 for manio women given in the manual
of the Sympton-Sign Inventory (S.S.I.). The manios are there¬
fore not properly differentiated from normals on this soale. It
seems that whereas Mayo (19ot>) had identified a group of normals
with many symptoms and signs of personal illness who had not sought
psyohintrio help, here we have a group of individuals who are
decidedly payohlatrieaily ill olinioally, but who do not soore
as such on this seals.
The reason seems to be in the nature of the Personal Distur¬
bance (PD) Soale itself (p ^ ) which contains no manio (C soale)
item* On the whole 3.S.I. the manias (3p.M*) did in faat endorse
Just as many symptoms as the bi-pol&r dsprsssives (Bp.D*), though
significantly less than the unipolar depressives (Up.D. )♦ On
individual soales, however, the manias were definitely less
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depressed (scale 3 and scale K) than the two depressive groups#
and significantly more manic (scale C) than the two depressive
groups thus behaving according to expectation- On the other
hand, anxiety (A scale), obsessional (3 scale), Paranoid (3 scale)*
schizophrenic (J scale)#symptoms did not differentiate the manios
and the two depressive groups though hysterical symptoms (G scale)
differentiated them from the unipolar depros. ed group. It is
interesting and perhaps surprising to note that depr saives did
not differ from uanics in the number of prima facie anxiety-
symptoms which they endorsed.
The manioa (Bp.M.) are less intropunitive but more extra-
punitive than both depressive groups. Thus, though the manios
have an overall high level of general hostility (Hxtrapunitiveness
and Intropunitiveness), they channel their hostility predominantly
outwards, criticising others, projecting hostility and aoting-out
hostility, while feeling relatively little guilt and little self-
criticism. The manios• mean intropunitive score was, in faot,
within the average range (sten score 6.33), while their mean
extrapunitive score was wall above the normal mean (sten score
7.07). Few psychiatric groups have been identified with a pre¬
dominance of extrapunitiveness over intropunitiveness. According
to the teat manual (Caine at al.. 1967) only " aeleoted paranoids1'
are predominantly extrapunitive, i.e. paranoids with no history
of depressive episodes. Tven psychopaths, whom one would have
expeoted to be extrapunitivs, become predominantly intropunitive
when ill. Thus, manios seem to be, with selected paranoids, the
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only psychiatric group which channels its hostility aore outwards,
than towards the self.
The truly bi-polar fashion in which hostility diffsrsatiatss
manios both from bi-polar depreasives and from unipolar depressivsa
seems to indicate its importance in the expression and perhaps the
dynamics of these illnesses* Many of the psychoanalytic writers
referred to in ohapter 4» who stressed the importance of aggression
in affective illness seem thus to have bssn correct. However,
whereas they stressed the aggression turned towards the self in
depression (e«g« Abraham, Freud, Fenlchel, Sohwarts), was seen as
A
a denial or absence of aggression* Schwartz (1961), for example,
thought that the manic had no aggressive impulse because he denied
the motive for it* Freud (191^) had viewed mania as "expansive
3elf-inflation", Katan (1933) stated that the manic controlled his
destructive drive by keeping the depriving environment out of hie
awareness* However, the present results seem, on the contrary,
to suggest that the manic is very such oonsoious of his environ¬
ment and directs a lot of aggression towards it*
With regard to personality variables (table 7*44) the ill
manios (Bp«M*) are similar to the Bi-polar Depressivea (Bp*D*)
but different from the unipolar depresaivee (Up.D.) on anxiety,
and different also from both depressive groups In extraversion*
The manios soore higher on the personality trait 'anxiety' than
one would have expected (sten soore of 6*67, which is above average)*
This mean score is just slightly lower, but not significantly so,
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than the aean bi-poler depressives* score (sten 7*04)# but very
much lower than the unipolar dopresalves mean soore of 8.41.
Anxiety, which is contributed to by the first order factors of
emotional Instability, sh/necs, suspiciousness, apprehensiveness,
self-conflict and tension (see p no ) has been found by many re¬
searchers to be similar to Hysenck;*s Neuroticism (II) faotor (see
Pp j.s. , above).
In the same way as extrapunitiveness distinguishes the
manics from the two depressive groups, so does extraversion. The
two depressive groups are highly introverted (stens 3.08 and 3*25
respectively), whereas the aaaios are slightly above average in
extraversion (mean aten of Iu65.). This seoond-order faotor is
contributed to by the first-order factors of outgoingnese,
dominance, enthusiasm, uninhibition and group dependency. Again,
as was pointed out in the methodology section, Gattell'e Tbctra-
veraion-Introversion (SI) second-order faotor is similar to
3ysenok*s Extroversion (1) factor, correlating more highly with
the sooi&ble half of the S faotor than with the impulsive half
(see p. i\>r )• The difference between the two bi-polar groups is
particularly impressive, since they oan be regarded as coming
from the same pool of patients, some having developed mania, others
depression.
To sua up, the manias differ from both depressed groups, not
only in symptomatology but also in personality.
As a group, manica are not thought-crooeas disordered. In
Bannister and fransella's (1967) sense of showing looseness and
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inconsistency in their construct system as measured by the grid
test# and do not differ from either depressed group in this para¬
meter# Mellsop et al., (1971), found a mean intensity soore of
1497 and mean consistency soore of *56 for their group of lk monies,
which did not differentiate them from a control group* The
intensity soore was significantly different from that of thought-
disordered schizophrenics* The mean scores obtained from the
manic group here were 1133*83 and 0*63 respectively for intensity
and consistency* These results are in close agreement with
Mailsop * a et al* findings* Zt seems that in spite of clinical
impressions that loose and casual associations are characteristic
of the mimic* s talk and thought, he can, oh the whole, think
systematically and consistently when faced with an obdactive task
of short duration*
Looking at the individual soores of the 18 manios (fig* 7<?7*s),
it oan be seen that eight obtained intensity soores below 1000
and three obtained consistency soores below 0*49* If an intensity
soore of 1000 and consistency soore of 0*49 are taken as the cut¬
off points for distinguishing thought-disordered schizophrenics
from other patients and non-patienta, as suggested by Bannister
and Fransella (1967), three of the raanics are misolassified or
16*7^* Mellsop et al* (op«cit*) found the same percentage of
miaolasaification in their manic group* When the individual
scores of the two depressed groups are scanned it is found that
two of the bi-polars (Bp*D«) and four of the unipolars (Op*D*) are
misolassified as thought-disordered schizophrenics* This is
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respectively 12* (there were only 16 bi-polar depressives) and
22*2£. Thus, comparing individual scores, the unipolar depresaivee
(Up.D.) perform slightly worse on this measure of thought-prooees
than the sanies (3p*M.)* The unipolar depressives* group mean
scores were also marginally the lowest of the three ill groups
(intensity * 1113*61, oonsistenoy 0*56), compared with 1133*83
and 0*63 for the manioe, and 1148*72 and 0*70 for the bi-polar
depressives*
On a different measure of thought-process, or form of thought -
the Object Classification Test (Payne, 1961, Payne and Hewlett,
I960} - the manlcs produce significantly more abnormal (Ifon-A)
responses than the two depressive groups, but no mors normal (A)
responses* The Hon-A score has been considered by Payne and his
co-workers to ba a measure of schisophrenic overinclusive thinking*
However, if the Object Classification Tsst is taken as a measure
of fluency of assooiation, as was argued on page '22 above, then the
Non-A aoore oan be regarded as a measure of ft*
thought and perhaps an equivalent of the ollnloal symptom " flight
of ideas*. Hawks and Marshall>s (1970) finding that non-over-
inoluaive schisophrenics could bo made " overinclusive by speeding
their rate of response to a card sorting test, and overinclusive
schizophrenics made less overinolusive by retarding thalr rata
of response, and their suggestion thafoverlnoluolveness in schiso¬
phrenic ie associated with a superoptimal rate of responses (p 669,
op olt), seem to fit in very wall with the manios* performance*
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The results of this study have shown that on objective tasks* as
well as clinically* nanios* mental and psycho-motor processes
are speeded up to a certain extent* It may be that their excessive
speed (excessive in relation to their own optimum speed) results
in a breakdown of the process of selection* l«e» in the selection
of appropriate responses from the stream of associations that
come to their mind with great speed* Hawks and Payne (op oit.)
call this situation "a condition of information overload*• This
test seems to measure a form of thought-disorder common to some
schizophrenics and soma manica and it might be profitable to
study this relationship further*
As mentioned above* several of the speed measures discrimin¬
ated the manics from the two depressive groups* On a slsaple
asyoho-motor speed task, where stress is put repeatedly on speed,
amnios perform much faster than their polar opposites* bi-polar
depressives* but not any faster than unipolar depresaives*
When distracting stimuli are introduced* an "internal* dis¬
traction (counting) improved the psycho-motor speed of all three
ill groups marginally, giving no signifloant differences in gain*
But with an external distracting stimulus (story), the manics
improve their performance, that is become faster* while the uni¬
polar depreaslves become slower* The bi-polar depreesives gain
even more speed than the aanios* but not significantly more* On
this measure the two bi-polar groups (Bp.M* and Bp* 3*) perform in
the same fashion* thus performing differently from the unipolar
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depressives. It may wall be that the mariles gain in speed for
different reasons from the bi-polar depreusives: for example,
manlos may react to over-stimulation or the * Information overload"
mentioned above by increasing their speed still further while the
bi-polar depressivea gain in speed because the distracting
stimulus Interferes with whatever internal process (e.g. painful
thoughts) might be retarding them and thus causes temporary .. u.
improvement^
Mental speed of work (unstressed) distinguishes the aanloa
from both depressed groups: monies solve mental problems signifi¬
cantly faster than depressives* when left to work at their own
preferred speed of work« but when told to work ae fast as possible*
i.e. under stress* their superiority over the depressives disappears.
The bi-polar depressives (Bp.2.) specially gain far more with
strese than the other two groups. It seems that the manios*
speed is already at its optimum* possibly above optimum level* and
they cannot quicken their speed of work anymore* whereas both
depressive groups are working at a lower than optimum level.
To sum up: the manios differ from both depressed groups on
most of the measures used in this study. Symptomatlcally, they
are less personally disturbed than both depressed groups; they
endorse fewer symptoms than the unipolar depressives: and are
more aanlo and less depressed than the depressives. They are
more extrapunitlve than both depressed groups, and lees intropunltlve;
they tend to be less tense and overwrought than the unipolars only;
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and are more extr&verted than both depressed groups* The^ give
more abnormal responses on an object classification test? perform
a motor test quicker than the bi-polar depreaaivea, but not
quicker than the unipolar depressivea. They £&in aore in psycho¬
motor speed when an external distraction is introduced than the
unipolar depressives but not more than the bi-polar depressives;
they perform a mental task faster than both depressed groups* but
not any faster when stressed to work faster* Thus in some ways
manias are more like unipolar depressives (e.g. in motor speed)
than bi-polar depressives, and sometimes more like bi-polar
depressives (e.g. on the second-order trait faotor of anxiety
and responses to external distraction when doing a psycho-motor
speed task). On the whole* however* they are equally different
from both depressed groups, thus ?tipy9*14af.r fieqgral frrpothoai,,? A
(p3£ )• mi amim mUL mm Um llaaMfliiiadi mltttiac
qfff^ss^v^a sqvera; paya^flrs: aqd of
perapqajilty attitudes,
From just these comparisons* it oannot be deoided whether
mania is a more severe psychological disorder than depression* or
vice versa, but a tentative answer to this question will be
attempted later.
IX In what way does Bi-oolar depression differ from Unipolar
Ssmatisa^
This is one of the most crucial comparisons of this study.
As was seen in the review chaptors, these two types of illnesses
- 194 -
have very often been grouped together under the rubric of manie-
depressive illness or affective disorders. This study hypo¬
thesised that the two will d iffor on various parameters - general
hypothesis 3 (p£8 ).
It has been shown that the two groups differ in only a few
aspects of symptomatology (see table 7.44): The unipolar deprese¬
lves do not differ significantly from the bi-polars on most of the
a-priori scales of the 3.1.1. i.e. the two groups do not differ in
anxiety * neurotic depressive, paranoid, schizophrenia,
obsessional, non-paranoid schizophrenic, or psychotic depressive
symptoms,the only differencesbeing hysterical symptoms. Neither
A
do the two groups differ on a Personal disturbance scale. However,
the unipolarc, on the whole, h- ve significantly .uore symptoms than
the bi-polarn. Specifically, -im symptoms differentiated the two
groups at a significant level (table 7.7). It was pointed out that
since some significant differences are expected to occur by chance
(4 at the 55 level), these results require to be repeated before
they can be accepted as valid. On the other hand, it is interesting
to note that the differences are all in the same directions, i.e.
whenever a symptom differentiates between the two groups, it is
always the unipolara who endorse it more often. It is also
striking that three of the differentiating symptoms are from the
a-priori hysteria scale (0 scale), and that together with the
one anxiety item which differentia tad, they are all somatic com¬
plaints: The unipolara are more worried about their physical
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health, complain of blurring of vision or other vague sight trouble,
burning and tingling sensation in the skin, lose of feeling in
parts of the skin and palpitations and breathleanesa. These are
all items from the somatic soale that Poulds (1966) extracted
from hia Symptom Sign Inventory. He found a alight but oonoiatent
tendency for older patients to endorse more somatic symptoms than
younger patients* However, the two depressive groups here did
not differ significantly in age*
FoulJs (1966) also found a relation between somatisation of
symptoms and hostility! he found that patients with predominantly
somatic symptoms are less generally hostile and less intropunitive
than patients with predominantly payohio symptoms* He ooncluded
that 11 In this way somatisation of symptoms could be regarded as
an alternative outlet for intropunitiveness at a more oovert
level" • This relationship does not quite hold in the study here*
The bi-polars and the unipolara are both equally high on Intro-
punitiveness (means of 7*94 and 8*22) respectively, with no signi¬
ficant difference between them* But the unlpolars are signifi¬
cantly more extraounitive than the bi-polars (means of 6*00 and
4*89 respectively)* Thus the unipolara have a higher level of
general hostility intropunitiveness + extrapunltlveness soore
than the bi-polara, though they had more soaatio symptoms, con¬
trary to Fould * a findings. However, their higher axtrapunitive-
ness may be consistent with his finding about direction of
hostility in 'somatic* vs *payohio* patients* Direction of
hostility was not direotly measured in this study, but sinoe
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both depressive groupa have an equivalent level of intropunitive-
neas, while the unipolara have higher extrapunitivenesa than the
bi-polars, it seems logical to infer that they are relatively
less intropunitive in direction (taking direction as 1-3, i.e.
intropunitiveaess - extrapunitiveneee^
On the personality measures, the unipolara show significantly
more anxiety than the bi-pol&rs (means of 3.41 and 7.04 respectively}!
but both groups are equally highly Introverted (means of 3. £5 and
3.03 respectively). Zt must be noted that both groups are high
on anxiety as compared to a normal mean (4.5 * b. 5) though the
unipolars obtain the higher mean score.
So recapitulate, anxiety in this study consists of high ergle
tension, high guilt pronenass, high protension (projection and
inner tension), low ego strength, poor self-sentiment and temper¬
amental threctla (shyness and restraint). Introversion consists
of aloofness, submlssivenees, desurgenoy (introspection and
worrying attitude), shyness (threctla) and self-sufficiency.
Cattail et al. (1970), view the factor of introversion as one of
social inhibition. It was nrau&S in the method chapter (p/'A. )
that these two second-order factors of Qattell, Adjustment vs.
anxiety and introversion vs. extroversion are equivalent to
H^eenok*s rieuroticiam and Extroversion factor. Perris (1971)
using the &.P.I., found that bi-polar and unipolar depreesives
did not differ in 3 and S scores at admission, though the tendency
was for unipolars to obtain higher K scores. The results here
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agree with his except that the difference in anxiety between the
groups is significant.
The two depressive groups, as expected, do not differ on
most of the measures of thought-process used, except for number
of abnormal responses (Non-A score) on the Object-Classification
test. The unipolars obtain a significantly higher Non-A score
than the bi-polars. As this measure was taken as one of disin-
hibition of thought, it seems that the bi-polar depressives show
the most inhibited thought-process with the manics at the other pole
(disinhibition) and the unipolar depressives as intermediate.
It had also been hypothesised that, contrary to thought-disordered
schizophrenics, depressives would show a tightening-up of their
construct system, that is that they would obtain very high scores
on the intensity and consistency measures of the Bannister and
Fran3ella Grid Test of Thought Disorder. This hypothesis is not
borne out: the bi-polars* scores of 1148.72 and 0.70 on intensity
and consistency respectively, indicate (from the normative tables
diS^rie.rM.
of the test manual) that 19$ of non-thought^subjects obtain lower
scores, whereas the unipolars* scores of 1113.61 and 0.56 indicate
that about 10$ of non-thought disordered subjects score lower.
Thus compared with 'normals1, the depressives'scores are not
particularly high. The bi-polar depressives tend to have slightly
tighter construct systems than the unipolar depreiJsives, but not
significantly so. It was pointed out in the results, that the
within-group variance is high on this measure, so that individual
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differences are more important than group differences. It may
be interesting to stud,, further those characteristics of high
and low scorers, on this measure, among affectively ill patients*
For example do low scorers have more delusions than the high
soorers, do they have more frequent and/or more severe reourrenoe
of illness?
Another marked difference between the two depressive groups
during illness is psycho-motor aceed. The bi-polar depreseives
are slower tlian the unipolar depressiveo at a highly significant
level. The unipolar depresaivea perform at the same speed as
the manias. Slowness is therefore a characteristic of bi-polar
depression and not of unipolar depression, in this study.
Interestingly, bi-polar depressivas g&in significantly more speed
than the unipolar depressive©, who in faot tend to loose speed,
when an external distraction is introduced during a paycho-motor
task. This suggests that gain in speed with external distraction
may be a good measure of retardation, that is of slowing down with
regard to habitual or optimum speed.
I.tental aneed, stressed and unstressed, does not differentiate
the two depressive groups.
To sum up; the differences between bi-polar depressive®
and unipolar depressive® during illness are loss extensive than
those between manias on the one hand and the two degressive groups
on the other, but several important differences are apparent, e.g.
unipolar depresoivea have more symptoms and signs of illnasa,
particularly more somatic symptoms, than bi-polar depressIves*
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Unipolar depressive© react to their illness by being more anxious
than the bi-polar depressive©, they are also more ©xtrapunitive
and give more abnormal sorting responses than the bi-polars.
On the other hand, bi-polar depressives are slower In motor
function than the unipolar depreasivos. Other measures did not
differentiate the two groups.
Hypothesis B; that differences between the two depressive
groups would be found, has therefore been supported.
Perris at al. (1964), report that ''Unipolar and bi-polar
depressions! apart from lack of manic phases in the unipolar,
show a statistically significant difference concerning certain
symptoms. Inhibition seems to be the main symptom in the bi¬
polar, whereas anxiety and hypochondria are usually more accentu¬
ated in the unipolar depressions'' • The retardation of the bi-
polars, the somatic symptoms and higher anxiety trait of the
unipolar©, as found in this study, may be taken as equivalents
of these authors* ♦inhibition* and 'anxiety and hypochondria* and
thua lend support to their finding.
Ill the Smga COTpayq hecpv^y^?
The importance of studying patients after recovery, especially
with regard to personality variables, has been stressed in the
literature survey (p 7 fe )• It is assumed that with illness tran¬
sient personality changes occur which then disappear after recovery,
leaving behind what is stable in the patient's character. It
was shown that this methodological point haa not always been
followed by clinicians and psychologists who have based their
personality assessments on olinioal interviews or psychological
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tests of ill patients (e.g. Eiloh and Garside, 1963, lysenokgr^-.
I'm)*
However, mora recently soma researchers have stressed the
necessity of assessing personality after recovery (Metoalfc#
1968# Ferris# 1964# 1966)* There are# of coarse# practical
difficulties: one is to decide whether the patient is properly
recovered or not* Special care was taken in this study to
assess whether the subjects were recovered clinically or not*
In addition# the administration of a diagnostic inventory accessed
the degree of recovery objectively (see table 7*31). With the
affective disorders# specially in the bi-polar type# special
care has to be taken to ensure as far as possible that the patient
has not started another cycle of illness*
Another point is that# although one la trying to measure the
premorbid characteristics of patients by studying them after re¬
covery# it la difficult to assess whether a history of psychiatric
illness# especially a recurrent one as in this study, changes the
personality at all, principally as self-reported* This aspect
will be discussed in the next section*
Column II of Table 7*44, summarising the results, shows that
when the three recovered groups are compared, all differences
disappear apart from some state and trait measures which differ¬
entiate the groups at a statistically significant level.
After recovery, the recovered sanies (zUBp.M.) are signifi¬
cantly more intropunitive than the recovered bi-polar depressed
(B.Bp.a*), which is a reversal of the state of affairs during
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illness# The two recovered depressed groups (R.Bp.B# and
Il.tJp.D.) do not differ in intropunitlveness. actrapunitiveness
does not differentiate the groups any more.
On the second-order factor trait of anxiety vs. adjustment,
the recovered unipolar depreoaivea are significantly higher (sten
0.38) than the recovered bi-polar depreaaiveu, hut not more so
than the recovered sanies# The two bi-polar groups do not
differ# Interestingly the recovered sanies are 1 aten (s S#D.)
higher than the recovered bi-polar depressives (5*98 and 4#91
respectively)•the order being again reversed froa the situation
during illness#
On the second-order factor trait of extravarsion vs# Intro¬
version, the two recovered bi-polar groups score very much alike
(5-05 and 5*38), whereas the recovered unipolers score as highly
introverted (3#44), thus being significantly different from the
bi-polars# The bi-polar deprosalvos are low on this factor
during Illness and the bi-polar manias high, and both change
with recovery, whereas the unipolara, who are low (introverted)
during illness, are also low in recovery.
Apc.rt froa comparing the three recovered groups among them¬
selves, they oan also be ooapared with **normals'4 as these are
sten scores (*'standard deviation stens*-) derived froa the normative
data of normal criterion groups. Normal scores range froa 4*5
to 6#5 and therefore all three recovered groups obtained normal
scores on intropunitivoness, extrapunitivsnesa and anxiety. On
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extraversion, both bi-polar groups obtain normal scores, but the
unipolara obtain a lower aoore than average, Indicating high
introversion* However, though the recovered unipolars art
higher than the recovered bi-polors on anxiety, they still score
just within normal limits (sten 6*38),
General Hypothesis C (p 3? > Pati^ts having rfbyrbufl,
from a hl-oolar affective illness will differ from patients having
recovered from a unipolar affective illneaa, mainly on personality
characteristics ha© therefore been supported*
Definition of Personality Differences between bl~polara and
unlotlarei
From Cattail's definition of his factor of extraveraion-
introversion whioh differentiated the groups most, the unipolara
tend to be introverted and the bi-polars have an average level
// "
of extraveraioa because of a corn-ilex feed-bask interaction of
the following characteristics; The recovered unipolars are "A"**,
i.e. they tend to be critical, aloof, precise, distrustful, rigid,
cold, prone to sulk and stand by their own ideas, whereas the
recovered bi-polars tend to be averagely easy-going, attentive
to people, casual, trustful, adaptable, warmhearted, laugh readily,:
and like to participate. Cattell at al. (1970 p.80) comment
that "tbi-< factor was initially thought to correspond most closely
to the basic traditional dichotomy in psychiatry between the
schizoid and the cyclical personality. There is much evidence
that, along with Factor II, it dooa cover the normal temperamental
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basis of the difference in pathological expression". Theas
authors also found "an appreciable hereditary influence in
determining a person's level" on this factor.
She recovered unipolara are also "J-*, i.e. submissive,
dependent, diplomatio, conventional, easily upset by authority,
humble, whereas the recovered bi-polars tend to be more assertive,
indoperaont-aladed, hostile, unconventional, headstrong, admiration
demanding* This factor la also appreciably Influenced by heredity.
The recovered unipolar© tend to be "F-* * 1*e* silent and
introspective, full of cares, worrying, refleotive, incommunicative
and cautious, whereas the recovered bi-polars are more talkative,
cheerful, happy-go-lucky, expressive and quick.
The recovered unipolar© are "ii-", i# e. shy, retiring, emotion¬
ally cautious, apt to be embittered, restrained, restricted in
interests and careful, whereas the recovered bi-polara tend to
be more adventurous, active, responsive, friendly, impulsive,
carefree and with wide interests. Of this factor, Cattell et al.
(1970, p 92) writest "Present evidence indicates it to be one
of the two or three most highly inherited of personality factors.
The H- person, according to this hypothesis, has, initially, an
over-responsive, sympathetic, nervous system which makes him
specially 'threat reactive'.
finally, the recovered unipolare are * Qg+" * *••• s*lf~
sufficient and resourceful, whereas the recovered bi-polars tend
to be more group-dependent and sound followers.
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Ferris (1964, 1966) found that his uaipol&ra, when tested
after recovery» were significantly more "sub-valid" (in Sabring1 a»
1963« terminology) than hie recovered bi-pol&rs. The sub-valid
personality features» as was described earlier on in the review
chapter* are psychoasthenic in character* insecure* sensitive
and obsessional# SJdbring describe® the sub-valid individual
as having "difficulty in immediate adaptation. He is therefore*
linked to routine, he finds it difficult to get out of his habits
and to seek new way®." Coppen (1966) describes the sub-valid
individual as "bound to routine* easily tired, cautious, tease
and meticulous", and he found his recovered depressives signifi¬
cantly sub-valid as regards to normals. Metcalfe (1968) also found
her recovered depressive® have a worrying, tense attitude to life#
deny fantasy and imagination, have a rigid, limited, habit-bound
personality, when compared to normals.
The results here, although couched in different terms,tend
to agree with those authors1 finding® in that unlpolars were
found to be precise and rigid (A-), conventional (B-), full of
cares (F-), restrained and restricted and cautious (H-) and self-
sufficient (Ci£+).
Ferris, (1964, 1966) found hi® recovered bi-polar depressives
scored high on sub-stability, again in Spring's terminology,
the sub-stable individual is, he says, "syntonic" in Bleuler#a
sense (1922) or "cycloid" in Xretachmer's sense (1929)s i.e.
he is active and sociable, "interested in his fellow men, frank.
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open, and weakly integrated" (Coppen# 1966)* The recovered
bi-polars, in this study, tended to be attentive to people and
trustful (A*), talkative and cheerful (?♦)• aotive and impulsive
(B+}« group dependent (Qg**)* ®bis also seeas to agree with the
description of the substable individual. She bi-polars in this
study scored as average rather than extremely high on the extras-
version second-order factor that makes up ths characteristics
mentioned above. Using the MPI, Ferris (1971)# found that
recovered bi-polars had significantly lower N scores than recovered
unipolara# and higher 3 scores though the difference in £ was
not as high as he expected. The recovered bi-polars gave the
results comparable with the normative data provided by "tysenok
(1959).Hwt The two group® did not differ in Anxiety vs. Adjustment
which is# as we saw, equivalent to I^senek's H factor, t iough
the trend was in the right direction? the recovered unipolars
obtained a high anxiety score. The Introversion vs. Ixtr&verslon
factor# which is equivalent to "ysenek'a I factor, as was our^uA<i
in the methodology (p»it ) on the other hand did differentiate the
groups significantly# contrary to Ferris*» results which were#
however# in the right direction.
There seems, therefore# to be an overall agreement among
the findings about personality differences between bi-polar and
unipolar affectively disordered patients during periods of
remission.
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17 Sffeota of Illness:
The changes associated with illness in each of the three
groups studied are summarised in column 1ZX of table 7*44*
This analysis of the results« in addition to the two previous
ones, whioh d ascribed the state of affairs in e&oh group during
illness and after recovery, can give acre understanding of
functional changes with illness within each particular group and
thus enhance the understanding of these illnesses. Furthermore,
such an analysis has great psychometric relevance in establishing
the stability of measures in these illness groups: that is
which ere measures of traits, states or symptoms, as defined
above (p 77 ).
A. attttgjj 9QWf4ftfi wjtfr
Only three of the variables measured changed significantly
between amnios and recovered manic®, these being: extrapunitivenese,
extraversion and number of abnormal sortings (Non-A) on an object
classification task. Sxtrapunisiveness, consisting of oritioiem
of others, urge to act out hostility and Projected Delusional
Hostility, goes up to a very higb^significant degree with mania*
Hxtraversion also goes up, but to a lesser degree: the number
of abnormal sortings produced is likewise inoreased significantly
with mania* It was unexpected to find that intropunitivenees
and anxiety both tend to increase with a manic illnese, although
not to a significant degree. The intensity and consistency of
thought process does not change significantly with mania.
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indicating that manics retain the ability to organise their
oonstract system meaningfully* More surprising was the finding
that, though psychomotor speed (without distraction) and mental
speed of work (unstressed) are increased in mania, the increase
is not significant when ooapared to motor and mental speed after
recovery. Mental speed (stressed) is, in faot, slightly higher
after recovery, gain in speed of problem-solving with stress is
also higher, though again not significantly. An external dis-
traotion produced le38 gain in speed during recovery than during
illness. It must be remembered that the ill and reoovered
amnios did not differ significantly in age. It seems, therefore,
that the clinical and subjective impression of increased motor
and mental speed with a manic illness is not supported objectively*
The trend is in the expected direction, but not very pronounced*
It may be that because these function* tend to be slowed down in
other illnesses, the minimal increase in speed in mania seems
relatively bigger* Thus only few functional changes ocour with
mania in this 3tudyr outward aggression, social extroversion
(it was argued above that Cattail's extroversion faotor is
mainly one of sooial extraversion) and disinhibition of thought
as measured by the object-classification*test. Txtrapunitiventss
has been found to be a stable measure over time in depressive
groups (Mayo, 1967, Philip, 1971) thus behaving as a trait.
However, in manics, it behaves as a state, i.e. it is *an
affective change from a previous condition, which endures for
weeks rather than days and where that changed condition is of a
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degree rarely found In any random sample of the general population"•
(Foulds, 1971).
The eeoond-order 16 P.?» factor of extraveraion behavee In
the same way as the extrapunitive soale, again showing that it
changes with illness, as a state. Such increases in extroversion
and extrapunitiveness have not been reported in the literature
in any ill group. It may be that aanica are the only group
that show changes in this direction during illness.
The increased number of abnormal responses on Payne*s Object-
Classification Test is similar to the inorease on this measure
found in some acute schisophrenics. This finding gives support
to Gathercole's (1965) argument that this test measures dis-
inhibition of thought rather than schisophrenic "over-inclusivtf4
thinking. It was argued that the high Non-A score (abnormal
responses) of manics on this test may reflect the olinioal
symptom of "flight of ideas" •
B. 9W,W aypreaelpjV
More changes ooour at the depressive pole of a bi-polar
affeotive disorder than at the manic pole. Comparing bi-polar
depressIves with recovered bi-polar depressives* the following
measures auow significant changes: intropunitiveneaa* anxiety*
extr&veiusion psycho-motor speed without distraction* gain in
psycho-motor speed with external distraction* mental speed
unstressed - all In the expected direction. Sxtrapuaitivaaesa
remained stable as it did in kayo's and Philip's studies mentioned
In the previous section. The thought process measures do not
- 209 -
differentiate the groups except for nuubar of abnormal (Hon-A)
responses which increases with recovery indicating perhaps less
inhibition of thought. It had been postulated that depressive®
would show a tightening-u? of their construct system as measured by
the Banaister-Fransella Grid Teat of Schisophrenic thought disorder
(1967). This la not supported by the findings of this study.
Of the significant changes, lntropunitiveness goes signifi-
cantiy up (p< .001) with bl-polar depression, so does anxiety
(p^.OOk) and extroversion goes down (p < .01) to a very introverted
level. Thus, as was argued in the previous section, these three
measures behave as state measures.
The change in intro ounit lvmogs suasorts Mayo* a (1967) and
Philips*a (1971) findings about the dramatic decrease in intro-
punitiveness with remission from depression: the former found a
drop at the Q.ljf level of significance in guilt and at the Id-
level in self-criticism, while the latter found that group and
occasion means differed at the 55 level.
The changes in anxiety • nd extroversion are parallel with
the findings of Goppen and Metcalfe (1965) who used the M.P.I.
They found a decrease in neurotiaciam score at the 0.1^ level in
recovered depresslves treated with 3.C«I. and fit the kv level in
those treated with drugs, and an increase in extroversion signi¬
ficant at the If in the recovered depressives of both treatment
groups. Since it has been argued that Gattell*s 16 P.P. second-
order faotors of anxiety and extroversion are similar to
l^senck*a Keuroticiam and Gxtr version factoro, it can be said
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that the results in this study support Coppen and Metcalfe's.
Perris (1971) similarly found a decrease in H and an increase
in 3 in his recovered bi-polar depreseivea with recovery.
She changes in the speed measures, in the expected direction,
with bi-polar depressive illness* suggest that they are valid
measures of retardation or slowness of motor and aental processes.
Recovered bi-polar depressives are quioker at a motor task than
ill bi-polar depressives at the 1> level of significance.
Interestingly# while external distraction causes the ill group
to increase their speed, the aaae situation causes the recovered
group to decrease their speed, the difference between the groups
being significant at the ilevel. Thus, external distraction
seems to be a sensitive measure of retardation. It seea3 to
interfere in some way with the process or aeckanism causing retar¬
dation and thus cause temporary increase in speed. Further ex¬
periments could perhaps be devised to clarify, if possible the
ways in which external distraction operates in facilitating psycho¬
motor speed.
Cental speed (unstressed) is significantly decreased during
illness, but not mental speed stressed. Again, the stress
factor, which is external in the sense that it comes from the
examiner who gives express directions to work as quickly as
possible and uses a 3top-watch very evidently, interferes with
retardation and causes it to disappear (there was no difference
in stressed mental speed among the groups).
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To return to the argument about the relative severity of
the poles of a bi-polar illness (p/%- )f Court (1968) was quoted
as putting forward an alternative model to the classical cyclical
one» which posited a continuum in which mania was a more severe
reaction than depression# In the comparison of ill groups, no
definite support could be given to Court's model# Here, looking
at the changes occurring with illness, it my be seen that acre
changes occur with depression than with mania. Of course, this
is only a partial argument, since quantitative differences,
rather than qualitative differences have been demonstrated# How¬
ever, it so eras more likely that the depressive pole of the ill¬
ness is the more severe, as it causes more dysfunction than the
manic pole#
c« ama&M witft UMtesti&sL
She changes that take place with unipolar depression are by
no means exactly parallelled by those occurring with bi-polar
depression# Comparing unipolar depressive® with recovered uni¬
polar depreasivea, the following measures showed significant
changesj intropunitiveneaa, anxiety, gain in psychomotor speed
with external distraction. Them are fewer in number than the
changes occurring with bi-polar depression#
Intropunitiveness and anxiety behaved in the same way as
witu tue oi-poiaras they both increase with unipolar depression,
the difference in level between ill and recovered groups oelng
at the #1$* and #x, level of ai^niiicance respectively# Xhey
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behavet therefore* as state measures in both types of depression*
As with the bi-polars* extrapunitivenese remains fairly stable
between illness and recovery* though the unipolars tend to go up
in exirapunitivoness when ill* far more than the bi-polars did*
The striking difference is in extroversion* The unipolars
remain low on this factor when recovered, not showing the rise
that the bi-polars in this study showed* which was comparable
with Coppen and Metcalfe's (1965) depressives. ferris (1971)
also found a smaller increase in Sxtreversion (using the SUP*I*)
in his recovered unipolars than in his recovered bi-polars but
the increase in score for his unipolara was significant. In
this study, sxtrapunltivoness and extroversion are stable in the
unipolars over time, thus fulfilling the criteria for trait
measures (p ).
The thought measures did not differentiate the ill unipolar®
from recovered unipolars, thus this group of depressives too do
not show a tightening up of thought prooesa, contrary to prediction*
Another unexpected finding was that unipolar depressivea do
not become slower with illness either in their psycho-motor or
mental functions. Thus, contrary to the bi-polara, they chow
no evidence of retardation. An external distraction slows them
up during a p >v, cho-aotor task when they are ill, and increases
their speed slightly when they are well, which is quite the
reverse of what happened in the bi-polars. The difference in
gain in speed with an external distraction between ill and re¬
covered unipolars is significant at the 59-' level, the recovered
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gaining mora* It seems that the unipolar depreaaives are dia-
tractibi© during illness or react to an external distraction in
some waj that decreases their psycho-motor speed#
Considering that these two groups of depresaivee are so
different in the effect that Illness has on their speed functions,
it is not surprising that the literature is full of conflicting
reports (see about whether retardation can be objectively
demonstrated in depreasives. If unipolar and bi-polar depress-
ives are seen together as one group of depressives, as the
studies referred to above seem to have done, the results of
effect of illness on speed measures will vary according to the
proportion of each type of depression making up the group# Thus
some studies will cos*? out with objective evidence of decreased
speed with illness, others not#
When comparing the three ill groups, bi-polnr manias, bi¬
polar depreasives, and unipolar dopres3ivea, with respective
recovered groupa, it has been shown that the effects of Illness
are marked in arch -roup, effecting both personality and co nitive
factors# and are illness specific, i.e. each illness brings about
different changes rather than a general chan :e common to all
■groups.
Thus hypothesis D (p88 ) has been supported.
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The results discussed above lead further support to the
validity of the classification of affective disorders into bi¬
polar and unipolar types* By using well selected* homogenous
A
groups* it has been demonstrated that* in addition to one group
developing manic and depressive episodes, and the other developing
recurrent depressive episodes only* iepreeeives who suffer from
a bi-polar illness differ from recurrent unipolar depreosivss
on several parameters. There was an indication that they differ
in signs and symptoms of illness, the unipolars expressing more
somntic complaints. The moat striking difference during illneee
wa3 the absence of retardation in the unipolars and marked re¬
tardation in the bi-polara, if decreased speed in test performance
on a psycho-motor task (when comparing ill and recovered groups)
is taken as indicative of what clinicians call retardation. The
absence of retardation in the unipolars does not seem to indicate
that they auffer from a predominantly agitated depression, as
those items of the symptom-sign-inventory which can be said to
denote agitation did not differentiate the two depressed groups,
for example, item H 9 : "Are you ever so worked up that you paoe
about wringing your hands?" and perhaps the a-pricri Anxiety
items, of which only one differentiated, namely A3: "Do you
suffer from palpitations and breathlesness?"•
The two depressive groups also seem to react to their ill¬
ness differently, in that the unipolars report themselves as more
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anxious on a measure of personality traits t and as more extra-*
punitiTs on a measure of hostility than the bi-polare. Both
groups, however, report as equally highly introverted and Intro-
punitive.
After recovery, the bi-polar depressivea and unipolar depress-
Ives were also found to be different in personality traitsi the
unipolars are markedly introverted, about one and half standard-
deviation below the average population norm, whereas the bl-polars
are averagely extroverted. The unipolars also tend to show
more anxiety than the bi-polars, although the mean scores of tooth
groups are within normal limits. Thus, if one guardedly assumes
that personality assessment after recovery tops premorbid person¬
ality, it oan be concluded that people with different types of
personality develop a bi-polar or unipolar illness*
Thus, the results of the present study indicate that bi¬
polar and unipolar affective disorders are different disease
entities and that people who develop one or the other illness are
different in personality. Perrla (1966) and Winoklar et al.
(1969) had stressed the genetic differences between these two
groups, and here an attempt h&a been made to map out the differ¬
ences in modes and levels of psychological functioning of these
two groups. Not much is yet known about bio-chemical differences,
if any, between bi-polar and unipolar depression and differential
response to treatment. Current research in the 1IHC Brain
Metabolism Unit in Edinburgh, using the same diagnostic criteria
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as this study, has produced tentavive results about differences
in amine metabolism. Bi-polar depressives have been found to
have normal levels of C.S.F. 5-Hydroxyindol Acetic Acid ( 5HIAA),
while unipolar have low levels (as compared to non-neurological,
non-psychiatric patients). These results are still based on
small groups, and need to be repeated. It is hoped that psycho¬
logical differentiae, as found in this study, can be used as
behavioural correlates for further bio-chemical research and per¬
haps give insight into bio-chemical processes.
However, it seems that even in the present state of knowledge,
it would be most desirable for future research, whether clinical
phenomenological, genetic, bio-chemical or psychological, to
study bi-polar and unipolar affective illnesses separately and
to move away finally from the Kraepelinan tradition of grouping
them together as one illness.
This system of classification does not, of course, really
nelp in the diagnosis of the single or first episode of depressive
illness. Is such a depression going to be recurrent, will it
recur in bi-polar or unipolar form? The genetic background of
the individual, his personality traits after remission, symptom
characteristics, for example somatic vs psychic,retardation or
absence of retardation, -nd perhaps bio-chemical findings, may
possibly give certain indications, but, in the long run, the
diagnostician would still be uncertain of his prognosis, as re¬
search findings, such as these reported here are only group
trends which may not be of great predictive value for individuals.
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In addition to the clarification of differences between bi¬
polar and unipolar depression! this study has provided a detailed
study of the menic pole of bi-polar affective illness. As was
made dear in the review,chapter 3» mania has been sparsely
studied in the psychiatric and psychological literature, partly
beoau e of the fhrity of mania so thPt only specialised research
unite can hope to collect enough oases for investigation,but also
because it is often said that monies are too disturbed to be able
to oo-operate on testing. However, this study has shown that
raanics are testable and able to co-operate, as they produce
results that make sense and have face validity in that they con¬
firm what can be predicted on clinical grounds. The findings
were that mnnics, when ill, diff r from both depressed -roups not
only in symptom) of illness, but also in the way they report their
personality characteristics and attitudes, and in their cognitive
functioning. With regard to symptoms, it was found that monies
tend, on the whole not to see themselves as ill, i.e. they only
score as borderline disturbed on a Personal >i turbance scale, so
that a symptom sign inventory which relies principally on self
report, is not really appropri- te, for eliciting symptomatology
in that group. The manics did, however, report manic symptoms
and it was surprising that they reported aa many anxiety symptoms
»u the two depressed groups. That the manias should be highly
extrapunitive and see tuenuelves aa .ighly extroverted is per¬
haps not surprising, but it was unexpected to find their level of
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intropunitivaneca and anxiety trait as high aa the results la
this study surest.
The apsad measures used seem to have reflected clinical diff¬
erences between oanice and deprassives in tha axpaoted direction,
though it was not expected that th© aanioa would not be faster
than th© unipolar depra-joivoa on a paycho-aotor task* Surprising
too was the finding that a diatraction stimulus helped to make
the manics faster, aa it did with the bi-polar depreosives,
though it tended to alow down the unipolara. The extra 3ti.:ulus
a©©as to help the -anios* concentration, perhaps by keeping it
temporarily fixed on one definite object, thus preventing it from
divorcing excessively.
It seams that the measures of thought-process used are not
appropriate for acnlydng the type of thought-disorder typical of
mania, except for the number of abnormal responses (Non-A score)
on an object-sorting task.
By comparing ill and recovered amnios, it was found that
only few changes occur with a manic illness, as compared with the
onangea which occur in bi-polar depression and unipolar depression,
as determined by comparing these groups with respective recovered
groups. It was suggested that this could be interpreted as
indicating that amnios present lose psychological dysfunction
than depressives, or that mania is a less severe condition than
depression. It could be said again t such an interpretation that
the manics in this study were less ill than the depressives, that
is that the manias in the group were relatively mild cases of
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mania, whereas the depressives ware severe oases of depression#
This study, unfortunately» does not make it possible to make suoh
comparisons. Only a rating scale of degree of illness, say as
a global rating, might have made this possible - even then the
logicality of such a procedure would be doubtful# Suppose, a
global rating scale of 1 to 9 had been used, could one say that
a score of 8 on depression indicates a more severe illness than
a score of 6 on mania? Probably not#
The comparison of the two recovered bl-polr groups, showed
the cycloid nature of the bi-polars:for example,after recovery the
manics become more introuunitive than the recovered bi-polar
depressivas and also tend to be more anxious, which is the revere#
of the situation during illness. Hie mean scores were, however#
within normal limits so that these differences can only be inter¬
preted as trends.
Finally, the comparisons of ill and recovered groups showed
that so called personality factors are not stable characteristic®,
but respond to illness and thus behave es what has been called
* states". The changes that occur in these factors with illness
vary with different populations. For example, extroversion-
introversion changes significantly in the bi-polara, but not in
the unipolar®. Measures of personality have been found, however,
to be more stable in neurotic groups (Foulds, 19o5, Adams and Foulda,
1962; Knowlea, I960) than in psychotic groups in whom a more severe
disruption of habitual behaviour seems to occur. This finding
is of particular psychometric relevance in that it should guard
2*0
psychological testers from making inferences about stable person¬
ality characteristics of patients when the latter are tested
during an illness phase.
vi« Im2&2£&2M £$m£Sbi
A. Though it has been argued that bi-polarlty and unipolar!ty
are important dimensions of classification in the affective dis¬
orders, it is possible that they, in turn, consist of different
sub-groups, e.g. psychotic and neurotic. The bi-polar-unipolar
dichotomy does not preclude further sub-classifications bl-
polarity and unipolarity would thus be superordi&ate claa.sifi-
oatory labels with subordinate groupings, for example neurotic
and psychotic bi-polars, neurotic and psychotic unipolara. One
could look &t deluded and non-deluded bi-polars, deluded and
non-deluded uaipolars on the Gyrapton-3 ign-Inventory and see
wheth r they differ on any other important parameters, for
example meesures of thought-disorder, retardation,&r response
to treatment. Traditionally, males and manic deprassives
(bi-polars) have been regarded as psychotic, but it is not at
all clear on what criteria, for example whether they necessarily
have delusions and/or hallucinations.
B* The groups in this study were identified on clinical
criteria, and it has not been possible to assess the severity
of individual symptoms. huch a procedure would have been use¬
ful for assessing how the variables found to be most affected
by illness, e.g. hostility, extroversion-introversion, speed of
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tracing and of problem solving, arc Influenced by the presence
and severity of particular symptoms* The us® of rating scales
in these disorders would therefore be mo3t useful for assessing
depth of illness as well as rea.onse to treatment. Although
several well validated, rating scales of depression are in current
use (e.g. Beck, et al. 1961, Bung, 1965), those for mania are
either out-of-date or lack validation or both (e.g. Wittenborn,
1^55^5 Iiildreth, 1946; Jasper, 1930). It is felt that it would
be rewarding to develop a proper rating scale of mania ^3 it
is seen to-day. Pictures of mental illness are well known to
change through the ages,as is usually illustrated by the topi¬
cality of schizophrenic delusions or the disappearance of text¬
book involutional melancholic. . Similarly, the manic of the
nineteenth century is not seen anymore and up-to-date rating
scales are needed to assess the present—day one.
C. This study was based on a cross-sectional research design.
In view of the cyclical naturo of a bi-polar illness, and the
recurrence of both unipolar and bi-polar affective illness,
follow-up studies would help to ascertain the constancy or
variability of symptoms from one episode to another. They would
help the investigation of the long term effect of repeated
episodes of• affective disorders on ,o&y, personality or length of
remission, and enhance the understanding of the genesis of these
illnesses, specially in relation to precipitating factors.
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D. Finally, though this study has tried to be as widely based
as possible, it has not been possible to look at certain important
aspects, for example, the use of affective constructs (Kelly, 1955)
in eaoh group* The affeotive change is regarded as the central
feature of depression and mania: Do patients react to such a
change by using more or less affeotive constructs and/or by
changing their oonstruot system? The extraverted, extrapunltive
manic probably construes other people, himself and his environ¬
ment quite differently from the intropunitlve, introverted
depressive* This study showed that manics and depressives do
not differ in the eonslstency and degree of inter-correlation of
their oonstruot system (as measured by the Grid Test, Bannister
and Fransella, 1967), but it has not dealt with the oontent and
type of constructs used by the different groups*
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MARITAL STATUS S M W D Sep
REFERENCE NUMBER
DATE OF TESTING
This form should be filled in by a qualified psychologist.
It should not be put into the hands of the patient.
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON PRESS LTD
If an item is scored positively, a tick should be placed to the left of that item's number.
A1 Does your hand often shake when you try to do something?
2 Do you sweat very easily, even on cool days ?
3 Do you suffer from palpitations or breathlessness ?
4 Are there times when you feel anxious without knowing the reason?
5 Are you afraid of being in a wide-open space or in an enclosed space?
6 Are you afraid that you might be going insane?
7 Have you a pain, or feeling of tension, in the back of the neck?
8 Have you any difficulty in getting off to sleep (without sleeping pills)?
9 Are you afraid of going out alone?
10 Have you any particular fear not mentioned above?
B1 Do you cry rather easily?
2 Have you lost interest in almost everything?
3 Have you ever attempted to do away with yourself?
4 Is the simplest task too much of an effort?
5 Are you depressed because of some particular loss or disappointment?
6 Have you found it difficult to concentrate recently?
7 Does the future seem pointless?
8 Are you more absent-minded recently than you used to be?
9 Are you slower recently in everything you do?
10 Do you ever seriously think of doing away with yourself because you are no longer able to
cope with your difficulties?
Past week
C1 Do you ever feel so confident and successful that there is nothing you can't achieve?
2 Do you ever become very excitedly happy at times, for no special reason?
3 Are you ever so cheerful that you want to laugh and joke with everyone?
4 Are there times when exciting new ideas and schemes occur to you one after the other?
5 Are you ever so full of pep and energy that you carry on doing things indefinitely?
Past week
6 Do you ever become so excited that your thoughts race ahead faster than you can express
them ?
7 Are you ever so cheerful that you want to wear lots of gay things, like button-holes, flowers,
bright ties, jewellery, etc. ?
8 When you get bored, do you ever like to stir up some excitement?
9 Do you ever feel so full of energy and ideas that you don't want to go to bed ?
10 Are you a much more important person than most people seem to think?
D1 Are people talking about you and criticizing you through no fault of your own?
2 Have you an important mission to carry out?
3 Are there people who are trying to harm you through no fault of your own?
4 Is someone trying to poison you or make you ill in some way?
5 Have you some special power, ability or influence which is not recognized by other people?
6 Is someone, other than yourself, deliberately causing most of your troubles?
7 Are people plotting against you through no fault of your own?
8 Do you ever take strong action against an evil person for the sake of a principle?
9 Do you ever see someone do or say something which most people do not take much notice
of, but which you know has a special meaning?
10 Can people read your thoughts and make you do things against your will by a sort of
hypnotism ?
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E1 Are you distressed by silly, pointless thoughts that keep coming into your mind against your
will?
2 Are you compelled to think over abstract problems again and again until you can't leave them
alone?
3 Are you unnecessarily careful in carrying out even simple everyday tasks like folding up
clothes, reading notices, etc.?
4 Are you unable to prevent yourself from doing quite pointless things, counting windows,
uttering phrases, etc.?
5 Are you afraid you might do something seriously wrong against your will ?
6 Do distressing thoughts about sex or religion come into your mind against your will?
7 Do you feel you just have to check things again and again—like turning off taps or lights,
shutting windows at night, etc.—although you know there is really no need to?
8 Have you an unreasonable fear that some careless act of yours might have very serious
consequences?
9 Are you excessively concerned about cleanliness?
10 Do you have an uneasy feeling if you don't do something in a certain order, or a certain
number of times?
F1 Do you feel that there is some sort of barrier between you and other people so that you can't
really understand them?
2 Do you ever see visions, or people, animals or things around you that other people don't seem
to see ?
3 Do you often wonder who you really are?
4 Do you ever have very strange and peculiar experiences ?
5 Do you think other people regard you as very odd ?
6 Do you often feel puzzled, as if something has gone wrong either with you or with the world,
without knowing just what it is?
7 Do you ever hear voices without knowing where they come from ?
8 Do you feel you cannot communicate with other people because you don't seem to be on the
same 'wave-length' ?
9 Do you have very strange and peculiar thoughts at times?
10 Is there something unusual about your body—like one side being different from the other and
meaning something different?
G1 Do you ever lose the use of an arm or leg or face muscle?
2 Do you ever have fits or difficulty in keeping your balance?
3 Do you ever completely lose your voice (except from a cold)?
4 Do you ever lose all feeling in any part of your skin—so that you wouldn't be able to feel a pin
prick—or do you ever have burning or tingling sensations?
5 Do you ever have 'black-outs', dizzy spells or faints?
6 Have you been in poor physical health during most of the past few years?
7 Do you often suffer from blurring of vision or any other difficulty with your sight which no one
seems to be able to put right?
8 Are you often bothered with pains over your heart, in your chest or in your back?
9 Do you ever do things in a dream-like state without remembering afterwards what you have
been doing?
10 Are you worried about your physical health?
H1 Are you worried about having said things that have injured others?
2 Are you an unworthy person in your own eyes?
3 Have you some bodily condition which you find disgusting?
4 Are you a condemned person because of your sins?
5 Are you troubled by waking in the early hours and being unable to get off to sleep again (if
you don't have sleeping pills)?
6 Because of things you have done wrong, are people talking about you and criticizing you?
7 Are you ever so low in spirits that you just sit for hours on end ?
8 Do you cause harm to people because of what you are ?
9 Are you ever so 'worked up' that you pace about wringing your hands?
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P. AND P.I. QUESTIONNAIRES
PERSONALITY QUESTIONNAIRE
(HDHQ) *
by T. M. CAINE









Please fill in this form by putting a circle round the " True " or the
" False " after each of the statements overleaf. If you find it difficult to
decide, ask yourself whether you think the statement is on the whole true or
false and put a circle round the appropriate word.
1 u
Remember to answer each statement.
1. Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them . True False
2. I do not blame a person for taking advantage of someone who lays himself
open to it ........... True False
3. I usually expect to succeed in things I do True False
4. I have no enemies who really wish to harm me ..... True False
5. I wish I could get over worrying about things I have said that may have
injured other people's feelings ........ True False
6. I think nearly anyone would tell a lie to keep out of trouble . . . True False
7. I don't blame anyone for trying to grab everything he can get in this world True False
8. My hardest battles are with myself . True False
9. I know who, apart from myself, is responsible for most of my troubles . True False
10. Some people are so bossy that I feel like doing the opposite of what they
request, even though I know they are right True False
11. Some of my family have habits that bother and annoy me very much . . True False
12. I believe my sins are unpardonable . True False
13. I have very few quarrels with members of my family . .... True False
14. I have often lost out on things because I couldn't make up my mind soon
enough True False
15. I can easily make other people afraid of me, and sometimes do for the fun
of it. . True False
16. I believe I am a condemned person . True False
17. In school I was sometimes sent to the principal for misbehaving . . True False
18. I have at times stood in the way of people who were trying to do something,
not because it amounted to much but because of the principle of the thing True False
19. Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught . . . True False
20. Sometimes I enjoy hurting persons I love True False
21. I have not lived the right kind of life True False
22. Sometimes I feel as if I must injure either myself or someone else . . True False
23. I seem to be about as capable and clever as most others around me . . True False
74. I sometimes tease animals . True False
2 U
25. I get angry sometimes
26. I am entirely self-confident
27. Often I can't understand why I have been so cross and grouchy
28. I shrink from facing a crisis or difficulty ....
29. I think most people would lie to get ahead
30. I have sometimes felt that difficulties were piling up so high that I could not
overcome them...........
31. If people had not had it in for me I would have been much more successful
32. I have often found people jealous of my good ideas, just because they had not
thought of them first ..........
33. Much of the time I feel as if I have done something wrong or evil
34. I have several times given up doing a thing because I thought too little of my
ability ............
35. Someone has it in for me
36. When someone does me a wrong I feel I should pay him back if I can, just
for the principle of the thing ........
37. I am sure I get a raw deal from fife.
38. I believe I am being followed
39. At times I have a strong urge to do something harmful or shocking .
40. I am easily downed in an argument.......
41. It is safer to trust nobody
42. I easily become impatient with people ......
43. At times I think I am no good at all
44. I commonly wonder what hidden reason another person may have for doing
something nice for me ........
45. I get angry easily and then get over it soon
46. At times I feel like smashing things .
47. I believe I am being plotted against.
48. I certainly feel useless at times
49. At times I feel like picking a fist fight with someone .
50. Someone has been trying to rob me
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THE GIBSON SPIRAL MAZE
Copyright © H. B. Gibson 1961
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News Clip played back on taps for " external gistr&otlQn"
Vm'% gwft m i £S£jl JToyf a IV t *ymlt
It may wall have bean just a mistake that Vincent Pagan*
25-year-old carpenter, parked his car on a policeman's foot*
But the conversation that followed, as recalled in the High Court,
London, yesterday, went like thisi-
•Got off, you are on ay foot,' said the constable*
1 - you, you can wait,1 said Mr# Pagan.
In spite of the constable's protests, Mr. Pagan stayed where
he was.
And in the High Court three judges disagreed on whether that
amounted to assaulting a policeman in the execution of his duty.
But by 2-1 they upheld the decision of magistrates and quarter
sessions that an assault was proved against Mr. Pagan.
The incident happened last August when My. Pagan was reversing
his oar in a North London street. PC David Morris directed him
to drive the oar forwards to the kerbaide and, standing in front
of the oar, pointed out a suitable spot to park.
mn
At first Mr. Pagan, of Wembley, Middlesex, stopped too far
from the kerb for the constable's liking and he was asked to park
closer. He drove forwards and stopped his oar with the off-aide
wheel on the oonstable's foot.
• 253 -
PC Morris repeated several times; 'Get off ay foot* • and Mr*
Pagan said reluctantly; 'Okay# sent okay** Then he slowly turned
on the ignition and reversed off the foot*
At the quarter sessions it was found there was doubt as to
whether the mounting of the wheel on to the officer*s foot was
deliberate or accidental*
But the court was satisfied that Mr* Pagan •knowingly# pro-
voostively and unnecessarily allowed the wheel to remain on the
foot* after the offioer told him to get it off*
1.
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HDHQ Sten scores for "/OLl^T (n = 372, Age 22.87 - 8.35)
im ,ycpm
Total * r lactra- - r Intro- * r Severs# Hostility /v punitive ' punitive * Sten
1 0 - 3 2 0 1 0 - 1 3 10
2 4 - 0 5 1-2 5 2 4 9
3 7 - 9 11 3-4 13 3 0 3
4 10 - 12 18 5-0 16 4 - 5 17 7
5 13 - 15 18 7-8 17 6 - 7 23 6
6 10 - 19 10 9-10 20 8 — 9 17 5
7 20 - 22 15 11-13 10 10 - 11 17 4
8 23 - 25 8 14 - 16 6 12 7 3
9 26 m 29 4 o>H15 4 13 - 14 4 2
10 30 - 51 2 **rO1oCM 2 15 - IS 1 1
K!33f (n * 154, Age 27.74 - 8.26)
1 0 - 2 0 0 0 0 4 10
2 3 4 6 1 1 1 8 9
3 5 • 7 6 2-3 9 2 12 8
4 8 mm 9 13 4-5 14 3 12 7
5 10 - 12 19 6-7 25 4 - 5 21 6
6 13 - 15 19 8-10 20 6 — 7 19 5
7 10 - 19 15 ri13 15 8 — 9 10 4
8 20 - 23 11 14 - 16 9 10 - 11 6 3
9 24 - 27 4 17 - 18 4 12 - 13 5 2
10 20 mm 51 3 19-34 1 14 - 18 1 1
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Appendix c
n{ tvnic?:1 ffX?lr-lGfj of hi—nplar and unipolar affective
illness* and of more ambiguous caues for whom final diagnosis
was less certain*
These short case histories do not give much detail about
personal historyf but stress instead episodes of illness and
treatment received as the relevant aspects for this study*
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7:/;;ical 31-solar Affective cases
1* i).Mj (housewife, trained nurse, 55 yra., married)*
Seen at 14th episode of illness with a diagnosis of
hypomania-^aanio-depro o & ive] psychosis*
Paragon! his tor:/: Childhood normalt no neurotic traits» average
scholar, was trained as a nurse, hot on quite well. Married at
age 25 yrs., happy marriage; has two children.
iMSbtetite Malagas
1927 - depression for three months - no treatment.
1936 - depression for five months - no treatment.
1945 - woven months after the birth of her second child -
degression for u months — admitted to hospital*
1946 - Lypomanla, with elation, pressure of talk and
insomnia* Admitted to hospital* *pont&nooue
recovery in five weeks*
1955 - hypomania in April, followed by depression in
August, which lasted until February 1956, when
overactivity and pressure of talk returned*
Affect at this time was normal* she was auditorily
hallucinated and expressed paranoid delusions
against her sister-in-law when admitted to
hospital in May 1956* discharged again*t medical
advice in June 1956.
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1956 (July) - Mania - with excitement, irritability, pressure
of talk, disinhibition, anorexia and insomnia.
Treated with reserpine. Discharged May 1957.
1957(December) - hypomania - overactive, demanding, didactic,
talkative. Admitted to hospital 15.12.57, and
discharged against advice on 16.1.58.
Readmitted on same day as a certified patient, and
given chlorpromazine. Remained hypomanic for
3 months.
1959 - Depressed, in bed at home for 3 weeks.
Readmitted to hospital. Treated with Tofranil.
1960 - Mixed affective state, progressing to hypomania.
Treated with largactil.
1961 - Hypomania : treated in hospital with chlorpromazine
and Melleril.
1962 - Hypomania, treated in hospital with Melleril.
1967 - Hypomania. Admitted to hospital.
1968 - Depression - admitted to hospital in April.
Very retarded and uncommunicative. Low spirits
and paranoid delusions. Treated with
Tryptizol. Discharged in July.
1968 (October) - Readmitted - Hypomania.
The patient was seen at this last admission.
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Admission Hotas: "Che shows pressure of speech and flight of
ideas, She occasionally jokes inappropriately to her circum¬
stances but consistentjywith her mood which is essentially labile#
fluctuating wildly from jocularity to tears and anger when talking
about her sister-in-law. She is overactive and restless* Since
admission# her mood has not stabilised despite Lithium Carbonate
and Phenothiazines. She rear ins overactive# overtalkative#
restless and at times irritable# provocative to other patients
and interfering. Her talk is dislnhibited and she occasionally
swears and talks openly of sexual difficulties in the marriage*
At times she has been vaguely paranoid and upset by believing the
other patiento to be talking about her* On ocoaoion she hears
•Pakistani voioea* talking at night when she is in bed* The
voloe is that of Dr. A, who formerly looked after her* The
other night in bed, she believed she heard the ward consultants
voloe in the corridor sayings •There*a that no good woman with
her no good husband and horrible son'* Her sleep is still
disturbed."
IfcaatettHalgsai Became Lypooanio while on Tryptizol
following hor admission earlier in the year for depression* The
immediate precipitants were firstly worry about her husband who
was about to be operated on* Secondly, her daughter had become
engaged a few days before*
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2. J.T. (male, 48 yrs., married, oivil servant)
Seen at 5th episode of illness with a diagnosis of
hypomania-aanic depressive psychosis.
Personal history? No siblings, unhappy home background: parents
fought a lot. Left school at 15 after doing very well. Joined
the oivil service where he has reaohed middle management level
currently. Married age 30 yrs. Two children.
Personality; a worrier - but can be cheerful and talkative.
Psychiatric History;
Sept. 1965 Depression - out-patient treatment with tr/ptizol
and librium.
Dec. 1965 Admitted to general hospital with haenatemeris.
Became elated, mind racing, also weepy, and flirt¬
atious. Admitted to psychiatric hospital.
Settled on Mellaril.
Feb. 1966 Depressed. Treated as out-patient with tryptizol.
June 1966 Depressed again and improved on tryptizol.
MSubsequently, swings of mood: some control with
Mellaril and Tryptizol. When elated, is very
active, over-talkative, flirtatious, overspends.
During depressed phases, stays in bed, is tearful,
lacks energy.
Oct. 1968 liypomania, in-patient treatment with Mellaril and
discharged on Lithium Carbonate.
The patient was seen at this last admission.
- 261 -
Admission Notes: He had become progressively more elated after
stopping Tryptissol. "He became over-talkative, dielnhlblted and
overactive. He liked to rise at 6 a.m., sing in the bath and
then, wearing running shorts he would go out for a run or bird*
watohlng through hla binoculars. He was not really 'happy* and
indeed was easily moved to tears e.g. by the sudden thought
♦Dear old teacher*. He described himself as * ready for anything
or anybody*, would organise games, eto. and began a large abstract
painting on whioh he lavished great attention in an intermittent
way, after having been to an exhibition of modem art. At inter¬
view he was usually armed with copious notes and his diary, and
would write down all comments or advice given. He could talk
non-stop for literally, several hours. The content was rational
and there was no delusional material. Insight exceptionally
good and intelligence probably high."
flrMlPlWFK tWKV withdrawal of tryptizol.
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Query 31-colnr Cases
1* 3.P. (single* uO yrs.t charity worker)
wean as recovered depressed bi-poiar - ii.Bp.i3.
Personal History: Youngest of 3 sisters, left school at 171
parents now dead. father was a consulting engineer. Spoilt
by parents. described by older sister as vory gay and sociable*















Became decreased after grossly over-spending on
new house. Depression continued till June 1956.
Depressed, again after running up large bills.
Became increasingly depressed, anorexic and sleep¬
less, wept occasionally. On admission, appeared
depressed, agitated, timid, frightened and uncom¬
municative. Treated with 4 x T. C. T.
After last D.G.T., for about a week was somewhat
elated and niscLivoous.
Depressed: trerted with in-patient l.C.T.
Depressed: in-patient treated with Trfranil and
and T.0.T. Discharged Sodium Amytal for mild
hypotonia.
Depression. In-patient 1. C. T.
and Tofranil.
Depression. In-patient treatment with Nortriptyline.
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Notes read: "Miss P. had a period of very labile
emotions, swinging from fairly severe depression
to definite elation although the depressed state
was the most persistent."
Aug. 1966 Depression treated with out-patient Tofranil.
1966 - "She had no prolonged periods of illness between
August 1966 - March 1963, and for long periods
she appears to hr ve been perhaps mildly hvpoaanio
involving herself in running her hoarding house,
doing market research for the 3.B.C., working with
the W.V.3., and involving herself in voluntary
work in hospitals and in the church.'
May 1963 - "Prior to admission she seems to have bean mildly
apt. 1968 kvooaanic. She had driving lessons and bought
a car without her sister's knowledge - succeeding
in hiding the fact for four months.'
Admitted with depression which quickly changed to
mild hvoomenia: "patient laughing, over-talkstive,
skittish - mood elevated and an obvious awing to
mild elation had occurred.
Treated with Tofranil, "Cpanutin and Lithium
•Carbonate. Discharged on same drugs.
Uiaa J?« was seen as an out-patient for the research project on
k.9.69* Though her illnesses h.ve bean predominantly depressive,
she has also had frequent bout ^ of with over-talk: tiveness,
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e lava tad mood, over-spending and excess of energy. She was
never treated in hospital for hypomania, but has often needed
out-patient drug treatment, for example sodium aaytal. She is
quoted as a vAuery bi-polar case, but the alternative diagnosis
could be unipolar recurrent depression.
2. P.F. (married: 33 yrs., nurse, now housewife)
Sean as recovered bi-polar manic after 12th episode of
illness.
Personal History: Third youngest of seven children, left school
at 16, qualified as S.R.N. married at age 24 yrs., has four
children. Happy marriage. describes herself as a leader, not
a follower.
xJsvohiatrio History:
1954 Reaction to dexedrine^became ■* heoticf', then
depressed.
1955 Depression and Anxiety (before and after marriage)
Recovered with B. 0. T.
1957 Depressed after birth of first ohild. Recovered
with 13. C. T.
1958 Depressed 4 months after birth of second child.
Suicidal attempt.
1959 Admitted and diagnosed as "sohizo-affactive psychosis"
Had B.0.T. Discharged and readmitted with
depression and suicidal ideas.
- 265 -
1959 Depression* In-patient Tofranil.
1960 Hypomania 2 months after birth of third child.
Largactil and Veractil.
1961 Depression - Veractil, "3. 0. T. and Tofranil.
1964 Depression - in-patient Tofranil and veractil.
Became hypomanic and then depressed again.
Pregnancy diagnosed.
1965 Bxcitable, over-talkative and sleepless before
and after birth of 4th child. Settled on Veraotil
and amytal. Depressed several month3 later -
Par3telin and Veractil. Became restless and
aggressive. Admitted and diagnosed a3 query
mixed affective state. Settled on Veractil and
Librium, but became depressed and was treated with
Tofranil. Continued on Veraotil.
1967 Admitted with increasing restlessness and irrit¬
ability, talks and paces incessantly, talk is rapid
and mostly connected with clang associations.
"Txpresaes soma paranoid ideas. Treated with
IJelleril and Lithium. Final diagnosis schizo¬
affective pa./ohoais.
1969 Admitted with hypomanlat treated with Melleril.
Discharged on Lithium.
Mrs. P.P. was seen on 5.11.69 as an out-patient. her case is
quoted here as a doubtful oase of bi-polar affective illness,
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because in her long psychiatrics history she had sometimes been
diagnosed as mixed affective state or eohiso-affeotive psychosis.
The latter diagnosis was made because of some biz&re symptomatology,
such as paranoid ideas about the ataff« mis-identifying people,
having M symbolic dreams'*. hearing voices which were somewhere
above her and talking in "Noddy language^ (These were not commen¬
taries and the voices were not distinguishable as persons). How-
aver. since she has both elated and depressive episodes whioh
respond to Mellaril and 1.C. T. or antidepressants, she is considered
as a bi-polar affective case.
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Typical Unipolar Affective Cases
1. M.P.W. (Housewife, 58 yr3., worked as office secretary,
married.)
Seen as a recovered unipolar depressive patient.
Personal History: One of twins in family of eight children.
Happy home life. frained at Secretarial College after leaving
school at 15. Married age 29. A happy marriage. Husband is













Depression. Treated as an in-patient with 3.C.T.
Discharged after 3 months.
Suicidal attempt by ingestion of Soneryl tablets,
in-patient for 2 months, treated with 3.C.T.
Depression - in-patient treatment.
Depression five months after birth of daughter.
3.C.T.
Recurrence of depression. Course of 10 3.C.T.
2 episodes of depression (March and October).
Treated with Tofranil as an out-patient.
2 episodes of depression (January and June).
Treated with Tofranil. Changed to Tryptizol.
On Tryptizol almost continuously.
In-patient treatment with Tryptizol.
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3qc. 1966 - In-patient 3. 0. T.
Jan. 1967
April - July 10 x 3. C. T. as in-patient. hisoharged on
^67 lithium carbonate.
Since 1967• until the time when -sue was seen in October 1969 lor
psychological assessment, the patient had remained on lithium
and had nuiaer us episodes of depression but the general impression
was that they had diminished in frequency and also that she had
managed at home. They usually lasted one or two weeks and were
nearly always triggered off by events involving travel and the
family, e.g. children going away, self returning home, holidays etc.
Typical Admission Notes; "Tearful, depressed-looking, siuiet and
withdrawn but given the opportunity, able to pour out her worries
and floods of tears. ^ery self-oritical and almost guilty
regarding her marriages e.g. 'I shouldn*t have married him, it*s
not fair to him, the poor soul*. Thoughts vary gloomy at times,
wishing she were dead. Tendency to wake early and 'feel dreadful*,
worse in the morning."
2# M.M# (housewife, 43 yrs., married, worked as domestic help
and shop assistant)
dean as recovered unipolar depressive after 6th episode
of illness.
Personal History; Born illegitiiintely, lived with maternal grand¬
parents until age 9« Then lived with natural uncle and aunt.
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Mother and uncle may have died in a psychiatric hospital. left
school at 14 years to start work in hotel. Deoame pregnant at
age 20 and pregnancy terminated at about months. Married
at 29 years. happily married. 3 children.
x'ayohlatrio History;
Oct. 1965 Jepreaaion. in-patient treatment with 3.C.2.
Discharged in December.
Mar. 19o6 Aecurrenca of Depression. Out-patient 3.0.2.
Oct. 1966 " " 11 Out-patient 3.0.2.
Jan. 19o7 iiecurrenoe of Depression* attempted suicide.
in-patient. 3. J. 2.
July 1968 Depression - out-patient treatment with Tofranil.
Sept. 19o8 Depression - treated with Topranil on out-patient
basis.
Oct. 1969 Admitted with severe depression after mild
suicidal attempt. Treated with Tofranil.
Apr. 1969 Depression - treated with 3.0.2. as an out¬
patient. ^tartod on lithium carbonate after
8 x 3.0.2.
Typical Admission Notes: Mrs. M. looks the picture of misery.
She is hardly able to complete a sentence coherently .... At
times she appears on the verge of stupor. She was very reluctant
to eat at all. Wakes up early.
Mrs. M. is very retarded. It takes her a long time to get
any thought content out at all. She is so retarded that it is
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not possible to say whether she has any thought blocking. At
times she becomes almost mute an! motionless*
When she Is able to describe her thought content, it reflects
her depressive mood* Che is consumed with guilt about her pre¬
marital affair and has paranoid ideas on the basis of this9 that
she is going to be locked away for ever and that her husband will
never come and see her* She expresses delusions of guilt and
unworthiness, thinking that her house is dirty and that she has
neglected her family (her husband says that this is not so)*
She has paranoid delusions about her neighbours, thinks that they
say unpleasant things about her and that one has interfered with
one of her children. She thinks that one of her children has
leukaemia. She is very pre-occupiod with her mother's history
of mental illness ...»
Mrs. M.*s mood is one of unremitting depression* "he shows
no diurnal variation at present."
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1* CUR* (Housewife# 52 yrs»)
Seen at 4th admission as a recurrent unipolar depressive*
f.r.ontl Hlatomr; Horaal happy childhood. Ho ohildhood
nsurotio traits* Only child* Married business aan at ago
26 yra. Two grown up ohildrsn*
Pa/ohlatrla Hlotonri
I960 Depression: in-patient treatment with Tofranil
and 13* C*T* x J*
1969 Depression* Serious suicidal attempt* in¬
patient 3*0* T* X 7*
Feb* 1970 Depression* Treated with Trytiaol and Valium
at out-patient*
Apr* 1971 Depression* In-patient treatment with nortryptlline
and Valium*
The patient was seen at this last admission*
AflalPttlfttt *h« patient had become progressively acre
depressed sinee January 1971* She felt extremely tense and
agitatedy and reported some difficulty in getting off to sleep*
She admitted to being depressed in mood and commented that this
tended to be worse in the afternoons but tendsd to lift again to¬
wards the evening* She felt that her concentration and appetite
had deteriorated slightly* and she tended to be very weepy*
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i-r.olalt.tlng F>otor.i Dm pati.nt's faalljr situation bad bssn
somewhat stressful in th# reosnt past: Bar husband had also
bssn treated for depression, the business (garage and oar sale)
was not doing very well, the daughter had married against
parents' wishes, while the son had been in sane trouble*
This oase is quoted as a query unipolar, beoause of the
following ooramsnts from her oaae-notesi " This lady, as will be
seen from her oase notes, has a long history of depressive ill¬
nesses, mainly of the neurotio type, but frequently requiring
fairly vigorous anti-depressant medication, and onatleast two
oooaslons in her previous history it is reported that, following
anti-depressant treatment, whether with 3*C*T* or with drugs,
she has tended to swing up towards the manic side of normal*
The depressive picture has also boon coloured by the faot that
she has, in the past tended to over-indulge in alcohol and
barbiturates."
2* I* A* (Single, 44 yrs* Civil servant)
Seen at admission for 6th admission with recurrent
unipolar depression*
Personal History: One of 8 siblings, uneventful ohildhood, left
school at 17 yrs* with highers. forked in a bank, then in the
olvil service until 1962 and slnos, apart froa temporary jobs,




1952 Depression. In-treatment E. C. T.
1957 " .1 «
1962 Suicide attempt. In-patient E. C.T.
Imipramine, Amitriptyline and Tranylcypramine
1967 Depression. In-patient E.C.T. Tofranil,
Marplan, Largactil, Psychotherapy.
1968 Depression. E.C.T. Started on lithium.
1969 Depression, in-patient treatment. Marplan
changed to Sparine and Valiumf then Prondol.
Typical Admission Notes: This patient had had six previous
admissions with severe depression and one serious suicidal
attempt when she was seen. There had been no definite history
of spontaneous hypomania or mania, but she had been rather elated
and overactive on several occasions after treatment, particularly
with EAOI drugs. However, the general opinion was that she is
best regarded as a case of recurrent unipolar depression.
"Miss A was obviously depressed, but was reluctant to come
into hospital. She expressed feelings of great unworthlness
and was very bitter about her persistent depression and failure
to get effective treatment."
"looks depressed. Close to tears through the interview.
On several occasions burst into tears especially when she talked
about her mother and has loss of faith. %es downcast. Fiddled
nervously with her hankerohief the whole time. Very sad affect."
Or again "This depressive episode has been quite incapaci¬
tating: she stays in the house or even in bed and is extremely




Analysis of Variance of the experimental groups*
df 33 MS I
Intronunitiveness
Groups 5 183.42 36.68 7.21
Srror 100 509.00 5.09
Total 105 692.42
Groups 5 119.41 23.38 9.18
Srror 100 259.55 2.60
Total 105 378.96
Anxiety
Groups 5 122.37 24.58 7.*9
Srror 100 336.67 3.37
Total 105 459.54
Sstravereion
Groups 5 137.1© 37.43 7.28
Srror 100 513.98 5.14
Total 105 701.14
Intensity
Groups 5 557,324.41 1114©4.68 0.52
Srror 100 21,59*•562.©© 215925*63
Total 105 22,149,337.07
9m§Mm.u
Groups 5 0.50 0.10 2.00
Srror 100 5.08 0.05
Total 105 5.58
A-2ariiMa
Groups 5 20.74 4.17 1.43













Groups 5 8.31 1.66 6.15 i*°01
Srror 100 26.84 0.27
Total 105 35.15
Groups 5 6188.78 1237*76 5.10 /•OOl
Trror 100 2425^.89 ^42.53
Total 105 30441.67
^^ho-aotor Speed Ga^n
Groups 5 368.34 73*67 0.50 N.S.
Terror 100 14690.33 146.90
Total 105 15058.67
Payo^o-yotor OaJja.
Groups 5 311^.33 662.48 3.5 4*01




Groups 5 4314.53 862*91 2*41 < *05
3rror 100 35853.10 358*53
Total






j?V?9, Oaln5r( J)~wP(u )
Groups
3Tror
Total
5
100
105
5
100
105
3066.13
37793.75
40861.96
2371.44
21160.23
23531.67
613*64
377.94
474.23
211.60
1*62 U.S.
■.24 <.1
(N.S.
